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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the powers exercised by government as it attempts to transform 
educational policy into practice. It originates from an interest in the TVEI 
programme, administered for the government by the Manpower Services 
Commission during the 1980s. The engine for this rapid modification of existing 
practice in both school and college appeared to relate to the device of funding on the 
basis of contract. This observation led to an attempt to analyze the range of powers 
available to central government and others. This required both a historical and a 
comparative analysis, together with a concern for the way in which human 
behaviour is shaped by specific power relationships. 
Chapter 1 sets out the origins of the study and establishes a model of the "bases of 
power". Thereafter, Chapters 2 and 3 consider the extent to which government has 
held or extended its grip on these different types of power during this century. 
Chapter 2 deals separately with 1918 to 1939, and 1944 to 1974. After reviewing 
the model in the light of those accounts, Chapter 3 examines the period from 1974 
to the Education Reform Act of 1988. 
Having established the increasing significance of "remunerative" power based on 
categorical or contractual funding, Chapter 4 argues that such strategies contain 
certain key elements : namely, criteria, bid, contract, monitoring, evaluation and 
replication. Using this analytical tool, Chapters 5, 6 and 7 examine three illustrative 
cases, starting with the TVEI programme from which the enquiry originated. 
Chapter 6 examines the impact of a similar funding strategy within the 
reorganisation of INSET, while Chapter 7 draws on a detailed research study of 
similar initiatives within higher education. 
In Chapter 8 an attempt is made to draw together the argument, to relate it to the 
ever expanding use of contract across the range of social policy and, finally, to 
consider the implications of this undeniably efficient mode of policy implementation 
for an avowedly democratic society. 
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Chapter One 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Rationale and structure 
This thesis is traditional in intent and style. The Oxford English Dictionary defines a 
thesis as "a proposition laid down or stated, especially as a theme to be discussed and 
proved, or to be maintained against attack". What follows is an argument, supported 
by evidence which is variable in origin but, I hope, effective in constructing a theory 
about evolving policy implementation. It represents an attempt to do what Janet Finch 
describes as the task of qualitative social science ; namely, to conceptualise what has 
previously been an unconnected series of events (Finch, 1986). As such it does not 
claim to produce a 'truth' about modes of policy implementation, nor to set out the 
results of a detailed empirical study ; rather it aims to put forward a rational, defensible 
and useful set of ideas through which to achieve a clearer understanding of past events 
and future developments. 
Before going into more detail about the content of the thesis, I want to look further 
at the arguments put forward by Finch. Her book deals with the relationship between 
policy-related research and policy-making itself. While the impact of the one upon the 
other has been minimal, she argues that the disappointment and frustration around this 
apparent failure grows out of a faulty understanding of their actual and potential 
relationship. Thus she argues for an 'enlightenment' rather than an 'engineering' 
model. Drawing on the work of a number of others, she suggests that "research is 
rarely used instrumentally in individual decisions" but rather is "most likely to make an 
impact on policy in an indirect way by creating an 'agenda of concern" (op cit, p148). 
Evidence suggests that policy makers use research in an eclectic fashion, seeing it as a 
means of keeping up to date with informed opinion in the area of their responsibility. 
Later she quotes Weiss (1982) who says that research : 
influences (policy-makers') conceptualizations of the issues with which 
they deal ... it widens the range of options which they consider ; it 
challenges some taken-for-granted assumptions ... This kind of 
conceptual contribution is not easy to see. It is not visible to the naked 
eye. 
(quoted in Finch, 1986, p 152) 
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In later chapters, Finch sets out an agenda for policy-related qualitative research which 
accepts and addresses this role while not neglecting the opportunity to make critical and 
challenging interventions when and where appropriate. 
This study has much in common with the approach advocated by Finch. While a 
thesis addresses an audience which is not itself directly involved in the policy-making 
process, the ideas put forward in this study have grown out of concern for and 
commentary upon educational and curriculum policy. The thesis provides space and 
time to refine the conceptualizations around the developments studied. If that process is 
successful, it can feed back into arenas where its influence may be a little closer to the 
action. 
The issue to be addressed is, then, concerned with the implementation of educational 
policy. It will be argued later in this chapter that it is impossible to separate decisions 
relating to educational provision from their implications for what young people actually 
learn, and so the ultimate impact of all educational policy is upon the curriculum, 
whether or not it is the explicit focus. The emphasis throughout the chapters which 
follow will be on strategies of implementation rather than on the formulation or indeed 
the quality of the policies themselves. The intention is to provide an account which is 
as far as possible descriptive and analytical rather than normative. Much educational 
commentary is, perhaps inevitably, concerned to be prescriptive, for education is 
essentially a value-laden activity. But this thesis endeavours to reserve normative 
commentary to the conclusion. 
There are two observations to make about this decision. First, implementation 
strategies are concerned with means rather than ends. That does not excuse them from 
moral criticism. It is, however, better that such criticism is based on a careful 
exploration of the processes involved; and hence normative conclusions should be 
based on analysis rather than intuitive approval or disapproval. Second, the delay in 
reaching a normative critique does not and will not preclude the judgemental because, in 
reviewing the varied impact of implementation strategies, there are inevitably points at 
which effects must be seen as positive, negative, or at least problematic. 
Medieval scholarship recognised a distinction between "ordo inveniendum", the 
route by which one comes to a particular way of seeing, knowing or understanding 
something ; and "ordo demonstrandum", the way in which one chooses - or needs - to 
demonstrate or communicate that discovery. To explain the structure of what follows, I 
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need to set out the distinction which exists between the chronological process through 
which I developed the argument contained in these pages and the order in which I now 
seek to communicate it. 
My initial interest in the topic came about as a result of involvement in the Technical 
and Vocational Education Initiative (TVEI), announced by the government in 1982 and 
implemented in 1983. That initiative is the focus of Chapter 5. Those working in the 
field of curriculum studies were both intrigued and horrified by this bold programme, 
managed from outside the education system and bringing rich resources into a 
somewhat arid environment. In order to observe what was happening from inside 
rather than outside a major development, I sought and found various contracts to act as 
a local evaluator. As a result I have had first hand involvement of this kind in three 
LEAs and close contact with several more; I also became involved with networks of 
local and national evaluators, and contributied to their seminars and publications; with 
officials from the sponsoring agency, the Manpower Services Commission; and with 
many LEA co-ordinators and other project staff. TVEI also provided me with 
privileged access to a large number of schools and colleges. The data on which I can 
draw for an analysis of this programme is therefore a rich personal archive of 
documents, published and unpublished, field notes and personal encounters, together 
with nearly a decade's first hand experience of both the initiative and of reactions to it. 
Part of this data is reflected in Chapter 5 ; some is directly visible through references 
and quotations : much more is transmuted into my overall analysis and commentary. 
Commentary about TVEI has tended to focus on curriculum content and pedagogy, 
together with issues of institutional management and staff development. Such topics 
made up the bulk of my own evaluation work. But beyond that, as a university teacher 
concerned with broader issues about curriculum development, I was increasingly 
concerned to analyze the reasons for the effectiveness of the programme, how and why 
TVEI had made such a rapid and extensive impact on the workings of a system 
previously chiefly characterised by its inertia. In the early eighties we were watching 
the death agonies of the Schools Council ; for years we had been debating curriculum 
development strategies with our advanced course students and endeavouring to account 
for the successes (some) and the failures (more) of that agency (Steadman et al, 1980). 
Why was TVEI so manifestly effective when other, ostensibly better founded, projects 
had made little impact ? 
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A popular answer concerned "the money". However, I became increasingly 
convinced that the secret lay not so much in the resources themselves as in the manner 
of their distribution. I related this to the notion of 'categorical funding' developed in 
the "Title" programmes spawned by the Education and Science Act of 1965 in the USA 
(Atkin and House, 1981). Under this Act, designated funds were made available to 
those willing and able to deliver programmes which met the Federal government's 
rather specific policy intentions of countering social and economic deprivation through 
educational programmes. The effectiveness of such specific funding was well attested I 
by Pincus in a study for the Rand Corporation (Pincus, 1973). 
The distinguishing characteristic of such funding strategies, at least as they were 
evolving in Britain and notably in the hands of the MSC, seemed to be the existence of 
a contract, formal or merely implicit, between the sponsor and the agency undertaking 
to deliver the specified programme. I therefore published several papers from 1985 
onwards (Harland, 1985; 1987a; 1987b) in which I attempted to analyze the 
components of such a contract as far as I could determine them through observing the 
operation of the TVEI scheme. Chapter 4 contains contains an exposition of the model 
I developed at that time and have subsequently refined. 
From this interest in the operation of categorical funding and the emergence of 
contract as a potent mode of policy implementation, there emerged, more or less 
simultaneously, two further questions : how far did this strategy represent a change, an 
innovation, within the process whereby governments have sought to turn policy into 
practice ; and where else, if anywhere, were such strategies being used within 
education ? 
To answer the first question requires a historical analysis and this is what occupies 
Chapters 2 and 3. They cover the years between 1918 and the Education Reform Act 
of 1988, though the later years are dealt with in much greater detail than the earlier. 
Thus Chapter 2 covers 1918-1944 and then 1944-1974, while the whole of Chapter 3 
is devoted to the remaining fifteen years. The evidence used here is the normal 
historical material of documents and other primary sources, coupled with critical 
commentary from secondary sources where appropriate. 
The purpose of this historical analysis was to trace the significance of resource 
management as a tool for securing policy implementation, and hence curriculum 
change. However, in order not to over-emphasise the significance of resources during 
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this period, a broader conception of the powers available to central government was 
needed. Financial powers are, after all, only one aspect of the powers potentially 
available to government (or for that matter to any agency which seeks to shape the 
behaviour of others). An obvious candidate for this theoretical under-pinning was 
Margaret Archer's 'resource dependency theory'. Archer argues that "educational 
politics" comprise three different types of negotiation : 'internal initiation' in which 
change is generated within the educational system; 'external transaction' in which 
change emerges as a result of inter-action between internal and external pressure groups 
; and 'political manipulation' which "is the principal resort of those who have no other 
means of gaining satisfaction for their educational demands" (Archer, 1981). The 
relationships which develop within this nexus, and the deals that are struck, depend 
upon differential access to resources and the consequent creation of a structure of 
dependencies. Resources consist of finance, authority, and expertise. Each party to 
the exchange process will endeavour to maintain and extend their existing resources but 
each is involved in mutual, though unequal, relationships of dependency. 
The relevance of this theory to the present task is obvious but it is difficult to use 
because of its high level of generality. Take, for example, the following statements: 
The principal resource commanded by the education profession is its 
expertise. 
The principal resource commanded by external pressure groups is their 
wealth ... 
The principal resource commanded by political authorities (both central 
and local) is their legal authority and capacity to impose negative 
sanctions 
(Archer, 1981, p34 .ffl 
Such statements seem to suggest, contrary to experience, a monolithic identity within 
any one identified "actor" in the exchange relationship, implying that all teachers or all 
LEAs are united in a single disposition. They also appear to carve up available 
resources in a fixed and inflexible manner, whereas what is interesting is the degree to 
which any of the parties retain, develop, use, or indeed lose, resources that they may 
once have held. 
A large part of the argument within this thesis will be concerned with this last point. 
Thus, although what follows has undoubtedly been influenced by the work of Archer, 
a more useful model has been derived from organisation theory. It is drawn from the 
work of Bacharach and Lawler who formulated a theory concerning the four "bases of 
power" which operate within an organisation. While their work relates mainly to 
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individual institutions, it did not prove difficult to apply their ideas to a relatively closed 
'system' such as education. 
The model will be described initially in the closing pages of this chapter. It plays an 
increasingly significant part as the historical analysis progresses : in the section on 
1918-44 it suggests themes to explore within a necessarily superficial account ; for 
1944-74 and again for 1974-88 it provides the framework for the analysis, undergoing • 
further refinement as the account progresses. 
Historical questions about the use of resources in the cause of policy implementation 
seem naturally to precede the detailed account of the programme, namely TVEI, from 
which the whole enquiry emerged. Thus, to summarise, the two historical chapters (2 
and 3) produce an interim conclusion about the changing style of resource allocation 
and its increasing significance for policy implementation. This leads to a theoretical 
chapter (Chapter 4) in which the nature of categorical funding and its constituent parts 
is discussed and a model proposed. There follows a chapter (Chapter 5) which 
exemplifies and illustrates the operation of that model in the case of TVEI. 
The thesis then turns to the second of the questions which emerged from my early 
attempts to understand the workings of contract within TVEI : where else, if anywhere 
were similar strategies in use within education ? Chapters 6 and 7 therefore explore 
two areas in which such strategies play a prominent part, namely the transformation of 
policy relating to the in-service education and training of serving teachers (INSET), and 
the whole area of funding for higher education (HE). 
These two chapters employ rather different kinds of data. Chapter 6, dealing with 
INSET, was largely drawn from documentary analysis, supplemented by professional 
contacts with inter-LEA groups such as the North Thames In-service Network, a group 
of 17+ LEA INSET co-ordinators; I also refer to a range of discussions and semi-
formal interviews with individual LEA personnel. Despite extensive searches 
(including in the DES's own library), little evaluative material and even less secondary 
critique on the "new INSET" is available even though the programme was launched in 
1986 : the reasons why this is so are themselves material and will be dealt with during 
the discussion. The account that is offered here is therefore, however modest, 
something of a pioneering effort to construct an over-view of the scheme, its operation 
and its underlying policy intentions. 
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Chapter 7, on the other hand, benefits from a rich vein of empirical data, drawn 
from a DES funded research programme looking into New Funding Mechanisms in 
Higher Education. (1) The final report was based on twenty four in-depth case studies 
of universities and polytechnics. The topics investigated focused particularly on a 
series of programmes financed through contracting, and upon HE reaction to the whole 
process of competitive tendering. Obviously, in the context of this study, it is not 
possible to do justice to the complexities of the HE funding scene. But the chapter 
provides an overview of DES policy intentions and a summary of some of the specific 
programmes funded via strategies of categorical funding which, together with first-
hand accounts of HE responses, shows many parallels with the programmes operating 
in the school sector. 
The fmal chapter (Chapter 8) draws together the threads of the argument. It also 
considers why, in the light of the evident potency of categorical funding and contract, \ 
the government has found it necessary to assume detailed legislative control over the 
education system. In doing so, it acknowledges the increasing popularity of contract 
across all areas of social policy and draws attention to some of the apparent cross-party 
agreements in this area. The connections and contradictions between, on the one hand, 
this preference for contractual forms of resource allocation, and on the other, the 
emphasis on choice within the operation of a free market, will be explored. 
These themes introduce the main argument within the conclusion which is concerned 
with the compatibility of contract as a mechanism for the detailed control of the 
education system with the broader principles of a democratic society. At this point the 
argument can no longer avoid issues of value and the thesis ends with a switch from 
questions about how, when, why, and with what effect, to issues about how far we 
should welcome the apparent efficiency of policy implementation via the sophisticated 
control of resource allocation. 
1.2 Theoretical Perspectives 
The remaining tasks for this chapter are concerned with setting out two of the 
perspectives which underpin the thesis : the proposition that there is no rational basis 
for distinguishing between policy which focusses on the curriculum and more general 
educational policy ; and the ideas about the nature of power which have already been 
mentioned above. 
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Curriculum policy making 
In the first place, therefore, it should be noted that this thesis will be concerned to 
demonstrate that the learning experiences of young people, collectively even if not 
individually, are directly affected by all decisions about what should be provided, 
developed and distributed within the education system ; and moreover by the style and 
manner in which those policy decisions are implemented. Thus virtually all educational 
policy is, directly or indirectly, curriculum policy. 
There are many defmitions of curriculum itself, each of them encapsulating a 
specific value position in relation to the aims and goals of schooling. Such definitions 
vary widely in the extent to which they contain the potential to guide or even determine 
the course of action. Much curriculum theorizing has virtually ignored the issue of 
implementation, preferring instead to see disagreement operating at an abstract level 
rather than manifesting itself as open political conflict. As Kirst and Walker could say, 
in a paper dating from 1971 : 
...when professional educators write about or study the curriculum, 
they rarely conceive of their subject in political terms. The words 
"policy", "politics" and "political" do not even appear in the indices of 
any of the major textbooks in the field (Tyler, 1949; Smith, Stanley and 
Shores, 1950; Gwynn,1960; Taba 1962; Saylor and Alexander, 1966). 
These authors treated conflict always as conflict among ideas, never as 
conflict among individuals, interest groups, or factions within school 
system bureaucracies. One finds consistent acknowledgement of the 
existence of political influence on curriculum, but no mention of policy 
or policy-making, nor any attempts to compare and contrast curriculum 
policy making with other types of public or private policy-making. 
(Kirst and Walker, 1971, p481) 
The political dimension comes into the debate about curriculum when we link the 
discussion to the concept of policy making; for at that moment we have to realise that 
some curriculum ideals will prevail and will be reflected, even if only partially, in action 
while others will be consigned to the lecture room and the academic press. As Kirst 
and Walker say 
„curriculum is not just influenced by political events; it is a political 
process in important ways... Throughout curriculum policy making, 
political conflict is generated by the existence of competing values 
concerning the proper basis for deciding what to teach. The local school 
system and the other public agencies responsible for making these 
decisions must allocate these competing values in some way, even 
though this means that some factions or interests win and others lose... 
The inevitability of conflicting demands, wants, and needs is 
responsible for the necessarily political character of curriculum policy 
making .... 
(op. cit., p480) 
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Kirst and Walker's definition is useful in that it allows us to consider curriculum 
policy making at periods when there was little or no acknowledgement that there was 
any such thing : 
Among the most important of the specifically educational policies of 
schools are those pertaining to what children study in school. Children 
in school are normally required to study certain subjects and forbidden 
to study others, encouraged to pursue some topics and discouraged 
from pursuing others, provided with opportunities to study some 
phenomena but not provided with the means of studying others. When 
these requirements and pressures are uniformly and consistently 
operative they amount to policy whether we intended so or not. We 
shall call such implicit and explicit guides to action curriculum policy 
and the process of arriving at such policy we shall call curriculum 
policy-making. 
(op. cit., p479) 
According to this definition, "specifically educational policies" relate to a totality of 
expectations about what children should study and by extension, which children should 
study what, in what institutions and for how long. Such expectations are 
operationalised by the provision of resources and opportunities for such studies, and 
also constrained in various ways, sometimes by specific prohibition but more 
frequently by the non-provision of the appropriate facilities. Thus we might point to 
the expectation in the United States that the majority of high school students should 
receive driver education and the consequent provision of facilities and instructors; and 
this can be contrasted with the absence of similar expectations and therefore resources 
in Britain. Kirst and Walker claim that "When these requirements and pressures are 
uniformly and consistently operative they amount to policy, whether we intended so or 
not" (my italics). Thus we can argue that in any society where there is a set of norms 
and expectations about the content of a state sponsored (not necessarily provided) 
education system, then that state has a curriculum policy. That policy may, of course, 
be implicit as well as explicit. Thus, when the time comes to make specific changes in 
the norms and expectations surrounding the process of schooling (as for example, in 
the role and responsibilities of teachers or local authority personnel), there takes place a 
process of curriculum policy making, though again the process itself may be more or 
less self-conscious. 
This is perhaps the key to a more sophisticated way of understanding the nature of 
curriculum policy making and hence control than can be achieved by a simple attempt to 
locate the power of decision on a given issue. To attribute responsibility for 
curriculum policy change, it is important not to assume that decisions are made in a 
vacuum and therefore that an apparent freedom to make a decision indicates the location 
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of power. Scope for the promotion or denigration of specific norms and expectations 
and the capacity to influence how these will be selectively re-inforced by the provision 
of opportunities and resources are more significant indicators of power than 
responsibility for decision making, because they determine the all-important framework 
within which decisions are made. They are therefore a crucially important part of the 
curriculum policy making process. 
The 'Bases' of Power 
My second task, in this concluding section of the Introduction, is to set out the 
model of power which will form the basis for the historical analysis in Chapters 2 and 3 
and upon which I will later build an elaborated account of that kind of power relating to 
resource allocation. 
Much of the extensive literature on the nature of power draws a distinction between 
two distinct categories : authority and influence. Both have clearly been of considerable 
significance in the history of curriculum policy making in Britain though at any one 
time the balance has shifted between them. But if we are to examine these fluctuations, 
it would be useful to explore the two concepts more fully. 
For the purpose of this argument it is necessary to offer some definitions though I 
can only hint at the long history of debate which lies behind each one. I shall use 
'authority' to mean the power which is implicit in hierarchical structures where there is 
always at least the possibility that the superior can take steps to enforce his will 
legitimately upon the subordinate. In Weber's widely quoted definition from The 
Theory of Social and Economic Organisations  (1947) 
Power is the probability that a person can carry out his or her own will 
despite resistance. 
'Influence' on the other hand is more subtle, is multi-dimensional, and consists of a 
capacity to affect action without resort to, or even a right to use, sanctions. As such it 
depends on a range of situational and inter-active factors. Bierstedt (1950) has stressed 
that influence is inherently persuasive and desired outcomes are therefore achieved 
through the voluntary submission of others : in contrast, power (as authority) is 
essentially co-ercive and submission is normally involuntary, even where it is 
maintained that such subordination is willingly conceded as part of some form of social 
contract 
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Many of those who have written about the power of the DES and its predecessors 
have explored both their authority and their influence. In the past it was commonly 
suggested (see, for example, Broadfoot 1986) that the DES lacked power in the sense 
of authority despite its right to make certain kinds of decisions, use certain sanctions 
and threaten the possibility of legislation. 
By the end of the 1980s the situation had changed and the DES had assumed all the 
authority that it might conceivably need to implement government policy. But much of 
this thesis is concerned with the many ways in which it had succeeded in extending its 
powers short of assuming the absolutism sanctioned by the Education Reform Act of 
1988. It has often been argued that the DES and its predecessors have actually 
preferred to promote policies by exploiting their very considerable influence, thereby 
securing compliance without resort to crude coercion. Among these, the power to 
determine and then to administer resource allocation has proved very significant. 
In so far as the education system has generally conceded the right of government to 
shape policy, even where no coercion was involved, we see at work the 'politics of 
deference'. Such deferential behaviour is often remarked as a feature of the British 
education system, where subordinates make assumptions about the actual authority of 
their superiors which lead them to defer - sometimes even unnecessarily - to the wishes 
of central government. In an essay on the problems of defining social power, Wrong 
describes very exactly this phenomenon : 
A party can have power without using it. The compliance of possible 
targets is often based on their subjective expectation that potential can 
and will be used when necessary. 
(Wrong, 1968) 
However it is not by any means clear that central government has over a period 
consistently preferred the exercise of influence rather than direct authority. This will be 
an issue of considerable importance in the historical analysis. 
The argument in this thesis will return at several points to the issue of influence and 
specifically to the so-called 'politics of deference', but at this point I want to refer to the 
work of Bacharach and Lawler who have offered some useful distinctions in the 
concept of power that can illuminate the various strategies by which central government 
has endeavoured to guide the curriculum of schools and colleges. Drawing on other 
theorists, they distinguish and describe four 'bases' of power, which are defined as 
"what parties control that enables them to manipulate the behaviour of others" : 
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The co-ercive base of power is the control of punishment; the 
remunerative base is the control of rewards; the normative base is the 
control of symbols; and the knowledge base is the control of 
information. 
(Bacharach and Lawler, 1980, p36) 
We can readily extend these categories to fit the particular case of central government 
departments : the co-ercive clearly relates not only to punishments (sanctions) but also 
to the legitimate enactment of legislation and the whole gamut of regulations and 
administrative memoranda, all of which can), the implication of penalty for acts of non-
compliance ; the remunerative covers the area of resources in cash or kind, and the fact 
that they can be both distributed and with-held ; the symbolic rewards of the normative 
base can be understood as the bestowal of public recognition and the marks of official 
approval; and the knowledge base which concerns the control of information can be 
seen in activities as widely varied as monitoring, testing, inspection, commissioned 
research and the collection of statistical data. 
For Bacharach and Lawler those with authority have structural access to all these 
four bases of power. Those with influence alone have only partial and situational 
access; and in particular, they are excluded from power based on the control of t 
remuneration (i.e. resources). 
In the next two chapters, I intend to combine the insights of Kirst and Walker about 
the nature of curriculum policy making with the analysis of the four bases of power 
offered by Bacharach and Lawler to provide a framework for the historical account 
outlined in the opening sentences of this chapter. That is to say, I propose to assert that 
even at a period when curriculum policy-making was not seen as an explicit objective, 
it can nonetheless be examined by deducing the norms and expectations of schooling 
which emerge from government action and inaction. I then propose to use the 
Bacharach and Lawler taxonomy as a means of sub-dividing the notion of 
authority/influence in a way which allows me to examine what kind of power central 
government has or has not had in each period, and also to attempt to describe how this 
has changed over time. As Bacharach and Lawler say 
Any power relationship in an organisation can encompass all of these 
bases but each relationship may well be characterized by one of them 
rather than another. 
(op.cit., p36) 
To conclude therefore, I have a matrix structure which permits an examination, as 
appropriate, of each of the periods identified in Chapters 2 and 3 : first, in terms of 
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shifts in norms and expectations as indicated by particular developments; and then, 
through an account of the differential exercise of authority/influence as demonstrated 
through the use of coercive power, the control of resources, the allocation of symbolic 
rewards, and the production and use of knowledge and information. Thereafter, as 
already described in the earlier part of this chapter, I shall turn specifically to the use of 
resources ; in other words, to an elaboration of the remunerative base. 
Footnotes 
1. 	 During the academic year 1988-89, I was a member of the research team for 
this project which was based in the Centre for Higher Education Studies at the 
University of London Institute of Education. I was invited to participate because of my 
known interest in contract and in the development of new forms of funding for INSET, 
one of the topics which the DES specified for attention. I conducted three of the case 
studies - in a university, a polytechnic and a free-standing teacher training college. 
With the permission of the Project Director, I am also able to draw upon findings from 
all 24 case studies completed by members of the team, and also the Final Report to 
which I contributed the chapter on Continuing Education and INSET. 
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Chapter Two 
SHAPING THE EDUCATION SYSTEM : 1918 - 1944 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter offers a mainly historical account but it does so within the context of a 
project which seeks to be explanatory and not merely descriptive. Ranson (1985) 
argues that any attempt to interpret the kind of changes with which this thesis is 
concerned "must undertake theoretical rather than merely descriptive work". He goes 
on to say 
Narrative without explanation is not vacuous but necessarily 
incomplete. Yet .. much of the literature in educational administration 
... eschews analytical work and is pre-occupied instead with 
description of the legal and administrative framework within which 
services must operate, or with empirical accounts of the way services 
may vary. The study of public sector services and institutions is an 
undernourished area theoretically. 
What we can expect from theory is the discovery of an underlying 
pattern which has previously been inaccessible to everyday experience 
and which therefore illuminates the relations of causal dependence 
between institutions, activities and events 
	  
(Ranson, 1985, p 112) 
Following Weber (1949) and his own earlier work on organisational structuring 
(Ranson et al, 1980), he goes on to argue that 
a cogent theory .. should be adequate at the levels of meaning and 
causality so as to embrace three integrated modes of analysis: 
phenomenological, comparative and temporal". 
To meet the phenomenological criterion, the analysis will need to address the way 
in which those involved make sense of their experiences, and by their actions and 
reactions shape the way in which organisational systems develop. The comparative 
mode in turn addresses the contextual framework and constraints, and considers 
similar events in related activities. The temporal mode "focuses on the historical 
development ... (involving) the discovery through time of underlying structures of 
social relationships whose constitutive political processes account for the structural 
relationships that we wish to explain". 
Ranson's argument presents a formidable challenge to any study of educational 
policy-making. This thesis attempts to meet it, at least to some degree, with the aim 
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of moving from description towards "the discovery of an underlying pattern". Later 
chapters will deal with a number of examples of the use of contract and other related 
strategies in the implementation of educational policy in order to meet the criterion of 
comparability ; and those accounts will endeavour to handle the phenomenological 
level by attempting to analyze the way in which such strategies were perceived and 
experienced by those concerned. In this and the next chapter, however, the focus will 
be upon the historical (the temporal mode). Here I shall look fairly briefly at the 
period from 1918 to 1944, and thereafter a little less briefly at the period from 1944 
to the early seventies. Chapter 3 will then deal with the years between the mid-
seventies and the late eighties. 
2.2 From 1918 to 1944 
2.2.1 The role of central government 
In 1927, two years after completing fourteen years as Permanent Secretary to the 
Board of Education, Sir Lewis Amherst Selby-Bigge, Bt, KCB, was able to preface 
his book about the work of the Board with the comment 
...the Central Authority does its business in no Olympian manner. It 
does not speak in "categorical imperatives". It "superintends" matters 
relating to education which is mainly provided by local authorities who 
are much more than its agents, and is imparted by an army of teachers 
which is not its own army. 
(Selby-Bigge, 1927, Preface) 
Selby-Bigge goes on to describe in forthright terms his privileged view of the 
Board's role and relationships. After a short chapter describing the history of the 
Board, chapter II has the incisive title : "What the Board does not Do". There follow 
seven pages listing negatives, among which we might note that the Board 
- does not itself directly provide, manage or administer any schools or educational 
institutions (with a few insignificant exceptions); 
- has no authority over universities; 
- "does not supply or prescribe or proscribe any text books for use in grant aided 
schools though it may criticise, through its inspectors, the use of unsuitable textbooks 
as affecting the efficiency of schools"; 
- has not for many years made a practice of describing in its Regulations, except in 
general terms, the curriculum of grant-aided schools and the methods of teaching. 
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- has no general power to interpret the Education Act or to determine questions of law; 
- cannot "dissolve LEAs, or appoint persons to perform their duties or exercise their 
powers"; 
- does not audit LEA expenditure though it may exclude from the calculation of 
(percentage) grant specific items of otherwise legitimate local expenditure which fall 
outside what the Regulations authorise or the Board approves. 
It is significant that Selby-Bigge should begin by stressing the negative powers of 
central government. Such a preference might well have operated at any time for the 
next fifty years (see, for example, the comments of both Boyle and Crosland in 
Kogan, 1971). Even when we turn to chapter III, which deals with "the features and 
aspects of the service of education which at different periods have specially engaged 
the attention and endeavours of the central Administration", the tentative tone 
reappears in the title : "What the Board Tries to Do". The identified "features and 
aspects" are dealt with under the following headings : 
1) school provision 
2) school attendance and accessibility 
3) minimum efficiency 
4) value for money 
5) organisation 
6) systematisation. 
(Selby-Bigge, op.cit, Chap III ) 
Selby-Bigge adds that "The idea of expansion of educational facilities has in most 
periods been prominent" ; but that, sadly, is said to be beyond the scope of the book. 
He next turns to the "means by which the Central Authority has tried to attain the 
objects which have been at different times most in its mind" (and these clearly relate to 
what has been referred to in Chapter 1 as the "bases of power" or "what parties 
control which enables them to manipulate the behaviour of others"). Selby-Bigge 
identifies these means as 
1) regulation 
2) inspection (dominated for a considerable period by examination) 
3) the training and recognition of teachers and the regulation of 
school staffing 
4) the distribution of information and propaganda including all the 
machinery of inquiry and consultation. 
(op.cit., p31) 
Each of these 'means' is discussed in a later chapter of his book. However before 
any of them, there is a long chapter on 'Finance'. It would seem that Selby-Bigge 
sees this as the pivotal chapter. Curiously, Finance has not appeared among the 
'means' and there is a continuing ambivalence about the degree to which the power 
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over resources is seen as the chief 'base' for the Board's authority. When we come to 
consider the question of "regulation", however, we shall see that Selby-Bigge stresses 
the significance of the Board's absolute discretion over the allocation of grant, a 
discretion which gained in significance as the regulations governing elementary and 
secondary education became less specific during the twenties. 
Reading Simon's detailed account of these years, we might assume that the 
Board's officers and presumably their political masters saw finance (the 'remunerative 
base') as the prime regulative mechanism (Simon, 1974). It could be that the Board 
identified policy targets and then promoted them through financial provision; and 
conversely killed off alternative objectives by systematic starvation. However the 
picture that emerges is one in which the control of finance was not, for much of the 
period, seen as a promotional device geared to the implementation of government 
educational policy but rather was seen as essentially permissive. The only exception 
to this might conceivably be found in the two short periods of Labour administration, 
notably under Trevelyan, when the re-organisation of senior elementary education and 
the raising of the school leaving age became political priorities. 
To describe the financial policy of the period as permissive in character may seem 
odd because the two decades between the 1918 Education Act and the outbreak of the 
1939 war were characterised by attempts to curtail educational spending. However 
the framework for these economies was the conception that central government's 
grant support was the green light for LEA expansion of the service : cuts on the other 
hand represented the red light, the withdrawal of permission. Although LEAs were 
just as likely to vary in their inclination to spend as they have been in later years, the 
post 1914-18 mood was towards an ever-enlarging provision whether it were in 
building elementary schools; in developing senior elementary provision; expanding 
the secondary system ; reducing class sizes; or paying higher salaries to teachers. 
Such expansionist thinking was encouraged by the provisions of the Education Act 
of 1918. This was passed during the Presidency of H.A.L.Fisher, who had been 
brought into Lloyd George's coalition with the promise that funds would be made 
available for a substantial expansion in educational provision. The Act raised the 
school leaving age to 14 for all children, and promised compulsory part-time 
education for all 14-16 year olds. However, the major innovation of the Act was the 
proposal to pay a minimum Exchequer grant of 50% of all local authority expenditure 
on education. The effect of this 'percentage grant' system was even more generous 
than it sounds for it had the effect of raising the level of grant to LEAs from 46.9% of 
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permitted expenditure in 1913 to 56% in 1920. This was very much in accord with 
Fisher's thinking. In his view, educational progress had been arrested by a lack of 
financial support; too great a burden was being borne by the rates, too small a 
proportion by the taxes. 
Simon sees this as 
a measure calculated to encourage the more progressive authorities 
setting the pace for educational advance, no less than those lagging 
behind to avoid putting too great a burden on the rates. 
(Simon, 1974, p 16) 
Selby-Bigge considered that the door was being opened too wide, and that the 
demand for secondary education for all would not be contained and yet could not be 
afforded. However a departmental committee appointed by Fisher in 1920 to look 
into the provision of free places in secondary schools recommended that 75% of 
children should have some form of free secondary education to the age of 16. In the 
mean-time there was to be an immediate rise in the number of free places available 
from 25% to 40%, with maintenance allowances for all those over 14, and even for 
those over 11 who were especially needy. 
One month after this report was published in November 1920 (Board of 
Education, 1920) came the first of the economic crises which were to occur with 
crippling regularity during these inter-war years. A Select Committee on expenditure 
described the percentage grant as "impossible to defend" (Simon, op cit, p30); the 
Board had "no adequate control" over expenditure and indeed was guilty of 
stimulating increased spending. Such criticism was heavily re-inforced a year later by 
the Geddes Committee, an ad hoc body made up of business men convened to 
examine the government's estimates and advise on economies. This committee was 
required to reduce public expenditure by 30%, largely by reversing the recent and 
substantial rise in spending on the social services. Its report said 
We consider that the percentage grant should be abandoned in the 
interests of economy and replaced by fixed grants... We are impressed 
by the position of impotence of the Board of Education in either 
controlling expenditure or effecting economies, once the policy has 
been determined. There is no doubt on the other hand that Local 
Authorities have been urged into expenditure upon a scale which they 
would not have contemplated if left free. 
(quoted in Selby-Bigge,1927, pp106-7) 
Selby-Bigge thought that they had handled the question of percentage grants 
"roughly" but he concedes that 
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Apart from questions of principle it must be admitted that central grants 
based on and related to the actual expenditure of Local Authorities on 
an inherently expansive service are not easy to administer, with due 
regard to the proper anxiety of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to see 
ahead, to be furnished in good time with reliable estimates and to be 
protected against unpleasant surprises 
(op.cit., p108) 
The Geddes Committee therefore recommended a series of cuts which in various 
forms were to re-appear in successive economy drives over the years to 1939. 
Reading the history of these decades, one rapidly concludes that the government's 
major pre-occupation with education during this period concerned the issue of 
finance. Government was increasingly called upon to support a new network of 
social services which became the seed-bed of the post-war Welfare State. The 
germination period was filled with doubts and uncertainties as the logic of Keynsian 
economics came to inform government thinking : the idea that it was government 
rather than the market which bore responsibility for creating a context for economic 
stability and growth was inevitably going to lead to previously inconceivable levels of 
government spending. While the Labour party combined with much of the teaching 
profession to demand higher levels of social investment, Conservative politicians 
were less certain. Simon portrays each successive Chancellor of the Exchequer -
Austen Chamberlain, Horne, Snowden, Baldwin, Churchill - as holding the line 
against escalating expenditure, and one has to remember that each was facing 
economic problems of a scale and intensity which exceeded anything within living 
memory. The implications for an education system over-ripe for expansion were 
serious. Writing about the attempt by Lord Eustace Percy to revive the Geddes 
proposals in 1925 (after a brief period of Labour government during which Charles 
Trevelyan had tried to "reverse the engines"), Simon describes the period as a 
continuing "battle to restrain the government from gaining full control of the education 
system in the interests of the economy". 
It can therefore be argued that social spending itself that was the issue of the day, 
rather more than the specific developments which were enabled or held up by 
spending decisions. Hence spending - where it occurred - can be described as 
essentially permissive, and cuts represented the rescinding of permission in the 
context of a need for economy. The policy intentions behind those new developments 
which were afforded were therefore less of an issue than has been the case in later 
years. During the inter-war period, financial support for education operated on a 
tightrope between, on the one hand, demands for restraint on public expenditure and 
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on the other, a desire to seek the social and political advantage of acceding to very 
substantial pressure for reform and expansion. Educational spending was thus tiat a 
device for achieving educational ends devised within government as an element within 
a coherent social and economic policy. Decisions to pay grant and authorise 
expenditure were essentially about giving freedom and possibly encouragement to 
local education authorities so that they might implement their own policies. 
It is however possible to interpret events rather differently and here we need to 
look into the related area of regulation(s) ; in other words, the coercive base. From 
1895, when the 'payment by results' system was fmally ended, the Board steadily 
retreated from the detailed control of curriculum content. This is clearly acknowleged 
by Selby-Bigge in his statements about 'What the Board does not Do'. In 1905 that 
the Elementary Code was replaced by the Suggestions for the Consideration of 
Teachers and others concerned with Public Elementary Schools  and the Board stated 
that 
The only uniformity that the Board of Education desire to see is that 
each teacher shall think for himself, and work out for himself such 
methods of teaching as may use his powers to the best advantage and 
be best suited to the particular needs and conditions of the school. 
(quoted in Lawton and Gordon, 1987) 
However, until 1926 the Board continued to stipulate that the time-table and the 
curriculum of each school were subject to their approval via the inspectorate, and 
documents setting out the agreed programme, duly endorsed with the Inspector's 
signature, were displayed in every school. Much has been made of the withdrawal of 
this requirement in 1926. It is generally agreed that for some years there had been a 
steady liberalisation of the Board's view of elementary education. This happened as a 
more child-centred approach to schooling became the new orthodoxy under the 
influence of such people as Edmond Holmes and, later, Percy Nunn. Thus the 
famous Hadow committee statement, that the primary curriculum should be thought of 
in terms of activity and experience, appeared not as a bolt from the blue but rather as 
the articulation of an increasingly popular view. But the events of 1926 have attracted 
considerable attention in more recent years and the interpretations proposed have a 
direct bearing on the issue of curriculum policy. White (1975) has argued that the 
Board may have been seeking to distinguish elementary from secondary education by 
the simple device of not de-regulating the latter ; and that this can be seen as an 
attempt to prevent a second Labour government from promoting its plans for a more 
inclusive system of secondary schooling. In fact the Labour party had suffered a 
serious electoral reversal in the autumn of 1924. Furthermore Baldwin, the 
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Conservative Prime Minister, had himself adopted the Hadow platform. Thus 
White's hypothesis, while thought-provoking, is no more than that. Powers 
renounced in Regulations (which of course, were not statutory) could readily be 
resumed by the next administration, especially one likely to be popular with organised 
teachers. 
A more sweeping analysis of this episode has been advanced by Martin Lawn 
(1987), an analysis which is to a degree supported by the writings of the two 
protagonists, Percy and Selby-Bigge. Lawn's argument is that 
It was not a question of moving from a regulated to a de-regulated 
education system but of moving from a system of direct control to one 
of indirect control. 
Lawn supports this by quoting from an essay of Percy's written in 1922 in which he 
suggests that the administrative system had become "too over-burdened and too 
complicated for efficiency" and that what was needed was a more "exact" 
administration which would have the freedom to concentrate on the "vitally important 
sphere of high policy". Lawn suggests that Percy had been influenced by the ideas of 
Lugard, the colonial administrator, who had developed a strategy of 'indirect rule' in 
Northern Nigeria. Lawn discusses the "probability" that by 1926, Percy was already 
familiar with these ideas as published by Lugard in 1924 and that he was actively 
working for a form of indirect and yet potent control over Local Authorities, where a 
loose authority could be re-inforced by sanctions over resources. Much of the 
evidence for this comes from Percy's memoirs, published in 1958, the year he died, 
and it is probable that Lawn is not making sufficient allowance for ex post facto 
rationalisation in the final months of a public life, nor giving adequate recognition to 
all that Percy might have learned and thought in the succeeding years, both in political 
life and subsequently as Vice-Chancellor at Newcastle University. 
Lawn does however find some strong support in the writings of Selby-Bigge, 
published only a year after the event though two years after he had left the Board (thus 
raising again the issue of setting the record straight). Lawn acknowledges Selby-
Bigge's view that the regulations were withdrawn in 1926 because of the development 
and stability of the system but he also quotes an intriguing sentence from the chapter 
on Regulation  : 
The Board's regulations were subjected to a process of evaporation 
which dissipated their more liquid, volatile and aromatic components 
and left only a residue of financial solids. 
(Selby-Bigge, op.cit., p168) 
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Over the next pages, Selby-Bigge goes on to suggest that it may well be that 
...the harness of particular regulations can be lightened and the whip 
left in the coach house. 
The whip however he sees as a powerful weapon : 
A small kernel of specifically imperative provisions is left in the 
regulations, the operation of which is unmistakeable and independent 
of interpretation by the Board. But the main provisions only sum up 
under different heads what the authorities are expected to do, and 
refrain from saying, even by way of guidance, how they are to do it, 
or by reference to what particular considerations they will be criticised 
if they do not do it. On the other hand the payment of grant, which is 
presented as the dominant and exclusive concern of the regulations, is 
dependent on the absolute discretion of the Board unfettered by any 
previous declaration of the way in which it will be exercised -
whatever the Board does, no appeal can be made . 
... in the regulations for secondary schools and the "Code" for 
elementary schools, the omission of the large body of details or 
illustrations contained in previous regulations throws much more 
weight on general terms such as "recognition" or "approval", or 
"satisfaction", "efficiency", "sufficiency" and "suitability". 
(Selby-Bigge, op cit, pp 172-3) 
Selby-Bigge goes on to congratulate the Board on "a bold and interesting 
experiment" which gives a "wider discretion to the Local Authorities and a more 
absolute because a more general discretion to the Central Authority". Success will 
depend on engendering "the spirit of partnership". 
These statements are certainly helpful to Lawn's argument. However the post hoc 
theorizing of both witnesses does not allow for the fact that educational expenditure 
was only rarely a strategy to secure specific educational policy objectives but more 
often, as I argued earlier, an attempt to pursue broader political and economic 
priorities. Selby-Bigge admitted that the Board had problems in controlling the 
expenditure of local authorities. Moreover we must remember that he gives an 
absolutely key role to the Inspectorate in ensuring 'value for money' and 'efficiency; 
in other words, in determining how the Board should exercise its 'discretion'. This 
seems somewhat over-optimistic : in 1927, there were 318 LEAs for elementary 
education, and 145 for secondary education - plus 868 boroughs and urban districts 
with limited powers of spending money (Selby-Bigge, p.175). Against this there 
were only 324 HMI in 1925 and even fewer, 307, five years later (Lawton and 
Gordon, 1987). One cannot help wondering whether the occupants of high office 
were deluding themselves as to what can be achieved with a coach-house whip. 
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This discussion of the significance of financial and regulatory control during the 
period raises questions about the potency of the remunerative base for the 
implementation of policy. What emerges is uncertain and the reason would appear to 
be that the Board, maybe the administrative system in general, was operating in a 
rapidly changing environment in which public spending on the social sector, including 
the education system, was beginning to show symptoms of the rapid growth that 
escalated post 1945. Although educational expenditure remained at a steady 6 to 7% 
of national expenditure (Simon, op cit, p375), there was an increase in the Board's 
estimates between 1920-21 and 1933-34 of around 250% (p.380). As public 
expenditure on the social sector experienced a sea-change, techniques for controlling 
it, and for relating monies spent to any form of specified policy, remained embryonic. 
Co-ercive power over the curriculum may of course be less direct and explicit than 
that expressed through precise specification. For example, it has long been suggested 
that the English secondary school curriculum has been closely controlled, not by 
prescription of what was to be studied but rather by tight control over what the system 
was supposed to achieve ; in other words, by an elaborate public examination edifice 
in which both the syllabus and the assessment is largely the responsibility of bodies 
external to the schools. In a book significantly titled Examinations : an account of 
tgirv 1 ieam=uu n England, Montgomery says : 
...like financial control, (examinations) can be a means of exerting 
power. Financial control is inescapable ... Once the financial 
framework is set up, however, examinations can prove more effective 
in determining the real nature of the education given in the classroom. 
Grant controls and central inspection have proved relatively clumsy 
methods, when compared with examinations, in forming details of the 
school curriculum. For many years, grants to schools from the central 
government have been made indirectly, through the local bodies ; there 
is little evidence to suggest that they affected the curricula other than in 
a general way since the eclipse of the Revised Codes and of the early 
Secondary School Regulations .... The visits of Her Majesty's 
Inspectors have long been sufficiently infrequent to be the cause of a 
considerable commotion within each school. External examinations, 
in contrast, are annual events to which school syllabuses are geared 
directly, and they affect the day-to-day teaching more intimately. 
(Montgomery, 1965, p.168) 
What then was the situation in the inter-war years ? In 1917 the Board had 
established the Secondary Schools Examination Council (SSEC) to undertake the co-
ordination and oversight of the examination system at a time when the options 
available to schools from a plethora of examining bodies were becoming increasingly 
chaotic. The Council was originally made up of nine representatives from the 
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university examining boards, four from the local authorities' associations, six from 
the teacher organisations and three HMI. The Chairman was appointed by the Board 
of Education. 
The new Council set about the task of creating a more or less uniform system. 
Montgomery suggests that at the same time "the examinations were gently used to 
promote central policy" (op.cit, p131). In fact the Board was able to influence 
various aspects of school practice via an inter-play between the Regulations and the 
examination system. For example, pupils were not allowed to enter for examinations 
before the age of sixteen ; entry fees were grant-aided only in relation to approved 
examinations; and only those secondary schools which had at least one 'form' entered 
for School Certificate were eligible for grant. Again, under the 1936 Education Act, 
the Board decreed that public examinations might not be taken by pupils in the new 
'modern' schools. Through these years, however, the major impact of the 
examination system on the curriculum of secondary schools was in sustaining the 
notion of a 'sound general (i.e. academic) education' to 16, and an increasingly 
specialised one in the two following years. This was achieved by "grouping" subjects 
and requiring candidates to choose from each group. 
If the School Certificate served as an indicator of the sucessful completion of a 
sound general education, then the Matriculation (which could be achieved by 
performance at an enhanced level) was intended as a predictor of future potential, 
most particularly for university education. Schools which anticipated sending even a 
few of their pupils on to higher education had to study carefully the requirements of 
each university. The particular demands of Oxford and Cambridge (for Latin), and of 
London, therefore came to dominate the curriculum of secondary schools to an 
excessive degree. However, as Montgomery says, 
Though there were variations in Matriculation requirements, there was 
little divergence in principle when it came to determining a balanced 
curriculum in the early twentieth century. The universities filled a 
position in determining the curriculum of their tributary schools which 
could only have been rivalled by an organisation of a national 
government. Central control was out of fashion when examinations 
came in. 
(Montgomery, 1965, p.158) 
There are two ways of interpreting such a view in so far as it reflects upon the 
Board of Education as a policy making body. One is that the Board indeed lacked 
power in relation to the examinations which were to all intents and purposes in the 
grip of a virtually independent sub-system. Thus the Board appears to have lacked 
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any decisive power over the secondary curriculum. The other view is that there was 
"little divergence in principle" and that the Board was therefore content to let things 
take their course. It is true that, although the SSEC and the examination enterprise 
took on a life of its own, there was never a period in which the Board lost touch with 
its activities by virtue of its power to appoint a Chairman and the continuing presence 
of its Inspectors. Moreover, there was no ideological conflict between the Board and 
a secondary examinations system geared to the interests and views of the universities. 
The content of curriculum leading to examinations at 16 was not seen as a contentious 
issue : the necessary elements were re-inforced by a more or less universal 'common-
sense' perception of what education was about. But one has to conclude by saying 
that, given the extent to which examinations operated a de facto control over school 
programmes, the Board did not appear anxious to take this potentially powerful 
coercive device directly into its own hands. Another coach-house whip, perhaps ; but 
this one had been lent to others. 
Before leaving this period we must turn to the question of power conceived as 
knowledge and information, and to normative power seen as the possibility of 
bestowing symbolic rewards. 
During these years education was clearly a matter of increasing public interest, a 
fact demonstrated by its rising profile in political life. But in many places its actual 
practice remained trapped in rigid and separated educational traditions : 
The narrow idealistic classicism of the grammar school and the narrow 
realistic utilitarianism of the elementary school were still strong.... 
(Curtis and Boultwood, 1966, p241) 
Nevertheless there was a current of new educational thinking which was beginning to 
penetrate these earlier certainties, encouraged by improvements in teacher training. 
Most educational writing of the time focused on the individual child and his 
development. This led naturally to a concern for the organisation of classrooms and 
the content of the curriculum. Dewey's writing was first published in England just 
after the 1914-18 war and his ideas about practical learning and the importance of 
relevance to the needs of a changing world impressed many English teachers. Ideas 
such as these, together with the influence of the "new psychologists" of the early 
twentieth century, encouraged the foundation of several conspicuous experimental 
schools such as Dartington Hall and Neill's Summerhill. But change was also visible 
in elementary schools and even some secondaries. Teachers in these were influenced 
by books such as Caldwell Cook's Play Way  (1917) ; by Homer Lane's ideas about 
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the educative value of self-government by pupils ; and by Norman McMunn's 
attempts to develop individualised learning ("differentialism") alongside peer tutoring. 
Knowledge of these ideas spread through the publication of books describing 
experimental practices, and even more widely through the Board of Education's 
Suggestions which was re-issued in 1926 and 1937. Perhaps the key book as far as 
the moulding of student teachers was concerned was Sir Percy Nunn's Education. its 
Data and First Principles, first published in 1920 but continuously in print over forty 
years. Nunn was a scientist and philosopher who became Director of the London Day 
Training College, one of those institutions which offered supplementary training to 
university students intending to become teachers. Academics in other fields were also 
writing about educational issues : among these, the contributions of two philosophers 
- A.N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell - were significant. 
This very rapid review of educational thinking throws some light on the location of 
knowledge-based power in these years : 
- most original and influential thinking was coming from practising teachers -
Cook, Lane, McMunn. Neill, and many others ; 
- those writers who were not teachers drew on diverse academic disciplines rather 
than expertise in formal educational studies per se : for example, philosophy, science, 
psychology. There were few "educationalists" as such ; 
- none were associated with the policy-making process of the Ministry. Beyond 
contributing to the Suggestions. HMI's work was confined to inspection rather than 
the production of officially sponsored expertise; 
- educational thinking seems to have been more concerned with teaching and 
learning rather than with broader issues of policy. (This is not to deny much parallel 
activity in the political sphere aimed at securing change and expansion.). 
From this account I think we can argue that the Board of Education neither had nor 
claimed any privileged role in the production or ownership of knowledge and 
expertise about educational processes. There is also no evidence that their control of 
information was such as to add significantly to their power base. We should not 
however ignore the work of the Board's Consultative Committee which produced 
four significant reports during this period, three under the chairmanship of Hadow 
and one under Spens. Here we overlap with questions concerning the normative 
power of the department because appointment to this Committee was arguably the 
major mark of approval which the Board could bestow. Questions therefore arise 
about the nature of the expertise generated by the Committee, the characteristics of its 
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members and the possible reasons why they might have accepted the Board's 
invitation to participate. 
Kogan and Packwood, who have written one of the few available studies, suggest 
that such committees 
enhance the process of social discovery and criticism by taking issues 
that are already prominent in the educational establishment, by 
collating the data which make or criticise the case for change, and by 
presenting governments with public statements upon which changes in 
policy can be based .... 
At the same time as making .. deliberate attempts to evangelise by 
eulogy, the councils mounted arguments for changes in policy which 
were already being mooted within the education and wider social 
service world... 
Apart, then, from the evangelical and the policy formation role, the 
committees have legitimised new thinking about the relationship 
between education and society... 
None of these functions is, in principle, exclusive to government 
committees. 
(Kogan and Packwood, 1974, pp4-6) 
They conclude this summary with the following 
.. government councils stand halfway between the formal authorities 
and informal systems that we have been describing. While they are the 
creatures of government, appointed by ministers, financed by the 
Treasury, recruited largely from those with whom government have 
formal relations, they also serve the important purpose of articulating 
beliefs, which might be inert and implicit in the whole society, about 
how education should be run and how it should be beneficially 
changed. 	 (pp6-7) 
This final paragraph makes clear that such committees did not simply provide the 
messages which government wished to hear : but neither did they present the 
education world with wholly new ways of viewing their task. Instead they reflected 
back, they articulated, they sanctioned and they legitimised. In only a very narrow 
sense could they be seen as the 'property' of central government and indeed they often 
seemed to be setting the pace and the agenda for the years to come. 
Kogan and Packwood examined the membership of the Hadow committee 
appointed in 1924 and pointed out that the report did not show the positions held by 
members and that no complete record remains in the Public Record Office (p90). 
However, by dint of searches in the Dictionary of National Biography and elsewhere, 
I have been able to discover significant elements in the professional experience of 33 
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out of the 46 people who served on the Consultative Committee at some time between 
1924 and 1939. Among 45 items in the biographies of these 33 people, positions in 
higher education are much the largest category (Oxbridge 8, London 3, other 
universities 1). Three people held senior posts in training colleges, and 3 in technical 
education. There were 5 representatives from education committees and 2 Directors 
of Education. From the school sector, there were 2 heads of public schools and 3 of 
grammar schools ; there was only one identified elementary school head. Various 
teacher interests were represented through 3 people (one of whom was also head of 
Roedean). Adult education (4), army education (1), and the church (1) were all there, 
together with 2 ex-senior civil servants and 2 ex-HMIs. Only 9 of the 46 were 
women. 
The Times Educational Supplement for 24 June 1920 seems to have recognised the 
names of some of the more humble members : of the 21 people appointed in 1920, it 
said 
The claims of children who now attend public elementary schools will 
be safe-guarded by many members of the committee, though in fact we 
do not feel that the local authorities will need much stimulation in this 
direction. 
Remarkably from our perspective, there does not appear to have been a representative 
of employers, of industrialists, of accountants, of parents or other pressure groups, of 
journalists or other media persons, of political advisers or of ideological pundits. 
There is, however, a clear indication of from what sections of the education system 
the Board sought advice, and also something about the relative importance it attached 
to the various sectors. 
Kogan and Packwood comment on the motives which might have led individuals 
to accept an invitation to what could be a period of hard and unpaid work : 
Membership could have a threefold appeal - the fact of recognition, 
that one is regarded as having gained sufficient expertise and status to 
advise the government ; ambition, to make a little history, to help 
weave a new strand in educational policy. And for some, particularly 
teachers, such service enhances career prospects. 
(op cit, p32) 
This does suggest that the Board did have a real share in the normative power 
available within the system. But our earlier account of significant contributions to 
educational thinking does indeed suggest that there were other sources of recognition 
from both professional and public opinion which could confer reputation and status, 
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and as the system expanded, there were other sources of position and promotion 
which could do the same. 
2.2.2 Conclusion 
In this review of the years between 1918 and 1944, I have attempted to relate the 
narrative to the concepts within Bacharach and Lawler's model of the four bases of 
power. The account has demonstrated that it is useful to distinguish between them. It 
has been possible to show that government's grip on all four bases was tenuous, and 
with hindsight it seems that neither the Minister nor his officials seemed more than 
fleetingly aware of any need to exploit the possibilities open to them. A more 
historically acceptable interpretation however would be that they did not think it 
necessary or appropriate to tighten their grip on either local authorities or schools. 
Neither the pace nor the character of change was so contested an issue that it seemed 
essential to challenge existing patterns of control and influence. Coercive powers 
were limited or, in the case of examinations, not fully exploited ; remunerative power 
consisted of stop-go rhythms which related more to economic conditions than to 
educational policies ; the knowledge base was widely shared and the Board of 
Education was not attempting to lead opinion ; the information base was slight in the 
extreme ; and the normative base chiefly served to confirm rather than to challenge 
existing hierarchies. In general, however, there does not appear to have been any 
serious unease with the existing distribution of authority and influence within the 
education system. 
2.3 From 1944 to 1974 
2.3.1 The context : two stories and two themes 
We turn now to the period 1944-74, again not to provide an exhaustive analysis 
but to examine the nature of the power exercised by the DES over the education 
system. 
The choice of these specific dates may seem arbitrary and some justification may 
be useful. Many commentators have seen the middle sixties as a turning point in the 
evolution of maintained education on the grounds that it is at this juncture that the 
post-war reformist and expansionist consensus (for which the basis was well-
established in the inter-war years), gave way to a period in which educational views 
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became increasingly polarised. Although political differences had long since featured 
in educational debate, from the return of the Labour government in 1964 educational 
differences entered the political debate with an increasing stridency. However, a 
review of the manner and style of the department's power relationships suggests 
considerable continuity across the whole thirty year period ; it is in the early seventies 
that the roots of a new regime can be found and it is therefore at that point that the 
divide will be made. 
Most analyses of educational developments during the thirty years after the 1944 
Education Act appear to concentrate on two stories and to thread their accounts with 
the discussion of two themes. The stories are consecutive : the first concerns 
consensus, the second with its collapse. The themes are concerned with partnership 
and with interest groups. Together all four will provide a background for the analysis 
which follows. 
The post-war consensus 
This tale deals with the implementation of the 1944 Act, a task hugely greater in scale 
than was originally envisaged. It stresses not the differences between Conservative 
and Labour, but rather the convergence of views, at least among politicians, and the 
continuities in policy. Thus we are reminded that both Ellen Wilkinson and George 
Tomlinson are often accused (with the benefit of hindsight) of having been more than 
dilatory in the promotion of a non-selective secondary system. Ellen Wilkinson, for 
example, is criticised for failing to repudiate The Nation's Schools (a pamphlet issued 
by the Ministry in 1945 before her arrival), which clearly advocated to local 
authorities the installation of a tri-partite system of secondary schooling (Ministry of 
Education, 1945). Similarly, George Tomlinson appeared to adopt a wholly 
pragmatic approach, in no way seeking to promote government policy by 
circumscribing the autonomy of LEAs ; and moreover giving a hostage to fortune by 
stating, in 1947, that it was "no part of our policy to reduce in any way the status or 
standing of the grammar school". However the position adopted by these two 
ministers does not seem too far removed from that of the majority of their 
parliamentary colleagues : no more that half a dozen Labour MPs spoke up in the 
House of Commons for comprehensive schools in the whole period of the post-war 
Labour administration (Fenwick, 1976). A Fabian research pamphlet published in 
1952 indicated that commitment to non-selective schooling (which by that date 
involved only 1% of the age group) was equally divided between Conservative and 
Labour authorities ; and went on to assert that 
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There are opinions in the Labour party which do not wish to see the 
special heritage of our day grammar schools destroyed or reduced to 
meet the immediate needs of this epoch. A policy of comprehensive 
schools might widen the gap between 'secondary' and 'public'. An 
aristocracy of learning among the adolescents is not necessarily, they 
believe, incompatible with an egalitarian age. 
(Thompson, 1952) 
In the view of the authors of Unpopular Education (CCCS, 1981), this line in 
post-war Labour thinking indicated a definition of equality which stressed 'equality of 
opportunity'. The CCCS authors contrast this interpretation with genuine 
egalitarianism, where equality is seen as an end rather than merely, or even partly, a 
means to something else. Their argument is that Labour governments have often 
invoked both principles but that their policies in the post-war years were invariably 
directed towards 'equality of opportunity'. The authors go on to demonstrate a neat 
fit between arguments for equality of opportunity and arguments about the need of the 
economy for an enhanced supply of educated persons, particularly in the fields of 
science and technology. As they say 
The combination was very important. The economic themes and, 
especially, the stress on the need for a generally better educated work-
force, gave a thoroughly hard-headed and vulgar materialist 
justification for equalising policies. 
(CCCS, op.cit.p .97) 
It is on this ground of economic advantage that we can see most clearly the 
apparent reasons for the convergence of Labour and Conservative policy, particularly 
with regard to secondary re-organisation. However, it is often dangerous to discount 
the altruism of traditional 'one nation' Conservative thinking, with its Whig traditions 
of reform, paternalism and 'sound administration' ; much radical critique loses its 
force through the projection of a dangerously over-simplified two-dimensional model 
of selfish capitalism. Thus the thrust of education policy under the Conservatives 
from 1951 to 1964 was not marked by any great change from that of their 
predecessors. The style remained pragmatic, genuinely expansionist (especially after 
the departure of Florence Horsburgh), and "there was no dogmatic opposition to 
experimentation with comprehensive schools" (Fenwick, op.cit.,p103). 
	 Eccles, 
Conservative Minister from 1954-57 and from 1959-62, presided over a considerable 
expansion in educational spending in both absolute and relative terms, and managed to 
imbue educational policy with an air of optimism and achievement. His successor, 
Boyle, was concerned for equality of opportunity and was willing to question the 
wisdom of selective secondary education (Kogan, 1971). 
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Kogan calls Boyle "a reluctant Conservative" ; he calls Crosland, Minister in the 
new Labour government, a "cautious revolutionary" because although he made the 
first moves towards the ending of selection at 11+, he thought that comprehensive 
schools should end physical segregation while retaining streaming (CCCS, op cit, 
p73). The continuity between him and Boyle is thus clear but it is nevertheless to this 
moment around the mid-sixties that we can trace the break-up of consensus, and we 
thus move to the second of the 'stories' which characterise these post-war year 
decades. 
The consensus breaks down 
Kogan (1975) sees the change to a Labour government in 1964 as marking a 
significant transition : 
The expansion of (higher education) and the creation of the 
polytechnics, and the promotion of the comprehensive school and the 
first attempts to create educational priority areas, all demonstrate how 
the Labour government took up expansionist policies already prepared 
by their Conservative predecessors but also how in terms of policies 
relating to social distribution they broke the consensus of two decades. 
The continuities were those of education being an undisputed good. 
The new and discontinuous policies were based on contentious social 
and economic rather than received educational premises. 
(Kogan, 1975, p37) 
The most significant element in this revised direction was clearly the issue of 
Circular 10/65 requesting LEAs to submit plans for ending selection at 11 
(DES,1965). Much has been made of this action, largely directed at down-playing its 
importance, either by demonstrating that many LEAs were already moving in this 
direction or by stressing that Crosland chose to "request" rather than require 
compliance with his policy objectives. However, even a cursory study of the relevant 
figures shows that Circular 10/65 marked a turning point ; in 1964 7% of pupils were 
in comprehensive schools and by 1970 the figure was 30%. But Crosland made haste 
slowly. Many submitted plans were sent back for further thought and the Minister 
declared that he was not prepared to accept "any old makeshift scheme". Complete re-
organisation was going to take time. 
These moves left the Conservative opposition in something of a dilemma. 
Preparing for the 1964 election, they had declared themselves against "doctrinaire 
plans for comprehensives" but still committed to "opportunities to go forward". In 
the 1966 campaign they spoke of "arbitrary interference with the power of local 
authorities to put forward proposals which they believe to be right..." ; yet by August 
32 
1966, only 3 LEAs had failed to submit their plans, 15 had had their plans approved, 
52 had received partial approval, and 68 were 'pending', having been received by the 
DES. By February 1970, after a swing back to the Conservatives in the local 
elections of 1967, Margaret Thatcher was developing her famous exercise in logical 
thinking by arguing for the "co-existence" of selective and non-selective schools ; 
while Boyle, though against compulsion, was advocating the end of selection. This is 
not, however, meant to suggest that the consensus was about to re-surface. From 
here on, events became more significant than words as each side began to push on the 
pendulum whenever and wherever the opportunity arose. In the fmal months of the 
Labour administration, Edward Short failed, as a result of inefficient whipping, to get 
legislation through Parliament aimed at converting Crosland's request into a statutory 
requirement. By June of the same year, Margaret Thatcher had replaced him as the in-
coming Conservative Minister ; within three days she had issued Circular 10/70 which 
'withdrew' 10/65. But by 1974, Labour was once more "reversing the engines". 
Education was firmly established as a political football. 
Partnership 
Until very recently, partnership was perhaps the first concept encountered by 
students of educational administration to account for the relationships between central 
and local government and between both of these and the teachers. As Fenwick said 
(partnership) is not a purely objective term ; it undoubtedly carries an 
overtone of approval by its users and it may serve to disguise 
problems in consensus and to distort analysis with legal fiction. 
(Fenwick, 1976, p.2) 
Derek Birley, with years of experience as Deputy Education Officer in Liverpool 
behind him, was more scathing : 
The present system is a kind of compromise machine. People often 
explain it as a partnership, notably between the Department of 
Education and Science, the local authority and the teacher. It is a 
homely metaphor. We are invited to think of three chaps amicably 
chewing over problems together, a sort of family situation in which, 
though power is not equally distributed, everyone at least has a voice. 
In reality, interplay of these three abstractions is utterly unlike those of 
independent individuals. For instance, the DES is only part of a 
government; the LEA, one of several score anyway, embraces both 
council and education committee; the teacher is a member of a union 
and an employee of the LEA as well as one of a staff serving under a 
head, or a head trying to lead a staff. And of course, there are many 
other sophistications attached to the roles of each 'partner', not to 
mention many other partners (such as the voluntary bodies, the 
universities and even the poor old parents). 
(Birley, 1972, p.5) 
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In Lawton's (1980) account of the partnership model, there are some interesting 
reminders that whatever the 'truth' of the situation, the relationships within it are not 
static. Through the image of a triangle in which each side represents one of the three 
major 'partners', Lawton suggests that at any one time one side may be longer, ie 
more powerful, than the others (though not of course longer than the other two 
combined). He goes on to suggest that the metaphor of partnership, with its 
overtones of satisfaction and trust, has tended to give way in recent years to one of 
accountability which implies dissatisfaction and distrust. However, the image of 
partnership is remarkably resilient. Even throughout the eighties, a period of 
increasing confrontation between all concerned, DES publications continued to make 
pious references to the need to work out the implications of policy with "its partners" 
(see, for example, Better Schools, DES 1985a, passim). This discourse was 
developed and institutionalised during the three decades following on from the 1944 
Act. 
Interest Groups 
It is a nice point to distinguish between partnership and the related idea of interest 
groups. As Birley pointed out, the partners are in no sense monolithic and the 
divisions within one element of the triad may sometimes seem almost as great as the 
differences between them. Kogan (1975) has used the term 'interest groups' to 
distinguish between these sub-divisions. Such groups he describes as "legitimised" 
in so far as they have 
an accepted right to be consulted by government and by local 
authorities, and by public organisations concerned with education such 
as universities, before policies are authorised (even though) the 
decision to consult is in the gift, formally, of the Secretary of State. 
(Kogan, 1975, p75) 
Other groups lie outside the normal processes of consultation and these are termed 
"non-legitimised". These groups come much closer to the standard definition of 
interest groups which are generally regarded as groups of people who are politically 
active in some cause close to their interests and on which they are often very 
knowlegeable. It is possible to regard the influence of such groups in two ways. On 
the one hand, their existence is seen within the dominant pluralist perspective as 
benign, providing government with more information about public opinion on key 
issues of policy than can be gleaned from elections, and giving scope for those with 
urgent concerns to find a legitimate and socially useful form of participation in the 
political process. An alternative view is to see interest group activity as an organised 
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attempt by minorities to exploit the governmental system for purely sectional 
purposes. One effect of their interventions is to induce politicians to 'get things 
moving' on issues which generate interest group campaigns and hence adverse media 
attention : the result is often a series of unco-ordinated short term policies (Dunleavy 
and O'Leary, 1987). 
Birley is one who takes this second view. Writing of the attempt to develop more 
systematic planning processes in the DES in the late sixties and early seventies, an 
issue to which we will return, he says 
The much greater susceptibility of central government in the 1960s to 
influence from pressure groups represents a bigger threat to 
constructive planning than the reactions of the other partners in the 
governmental process, because these reactions can be expected and 
allowed for whereas the influence of pressure groups is essentially 
arbitrary. The accessibility of central government to pressures and the 
effectiveness of pressure groups is well illustrated by the effect of the 
mass media of communication, notably television. Instant news and 
instant comment, the instant presentation of highly dramatised issues -
all this creates a climate in which anything but an instant response can 
be made to look like a silly evasion; hence the fashion for instant 
government. 
(Birley, 1972, p.7) 
It is worth remembering that Birley was writing, not recently, but at the end of the 
period under review. 
An over-view 
Kogan's (1975) use of interest group theory seems designed to take a neutral view 
of their existence. His book provides a painstaking account of the input of a whole 
range of groups : but although he certainly does not down-play the areas of conflict, 
he records rather than evaluates the facts of participation and pressure. Much 
educational policy analysis has used this approach. In the Introduction to his book, 
Education as a Public Service, in which he draws on ideas developed by Maclure in 
1970, Shipman spells out his own perspective which can stand for many others who 
have written in this field, (with the notable exception of explicitly neo-Marxist studies 
such as CCCS, 1981) : 
The service can be seen as a grid, a net. That net, the education 
service, depends for its shape and organisation on pressure groups 
pulling away at the corners. On one axis of the grid are financial, legal 
and administrative controls exercised by central government, the 
Treasury, the DES, LEAs, churches and so on. On the other axis are 
professional, academic pressures exercised by the teachers, lecturers, 
researchers, examination boards and so on. Developments are the 
result of the interaction between these two sets of influences. 
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To each of the parties within the education service pulling at their 
corner, can be added external forces. Some of these will come from 
the Treasury, the Department of Employment, the Manpower Services 
Commission, the Department of Industry, the universities, 
independent schools, the European Economic Community, the 
Commission for Racial Equality, the Equal Opportunities Commission 
and so on. But others come from parents, employers, trade unions, 
social workers, youth workers acting through interest groups both to 
affect the legal and financial basis of the service and to influence 
professional practice. 
	
(Shipman, 1984, pp5-6) 
Shipman goes on to say that this is a pluralist model which assumes that power is 
dispersed; that while it can be "used to generate hunches, it should not be mistaken for 
reality on the ground with all its confusion and change"; and that while it may suggest 
rationality in decision making, this is far from the reality of what happens and that 
policy-makers are doomed "to live with the unintended consequences of their 
actions". 
Perhaps the surprising statement here is that it might be assumed that this model of 
policy-making in the interstices of a net might even conceivably be a rational process. 
Indeed the wonder of the whole scenario is that anything purposive happens at all ! 
I have dealt at some length with these themes of partnership and interest groups 
because, as we turn to look more explicitly at the manner in which the DES did, or did 
not, attempt to engage in curriculum policy making, it is important to consider, not 
only what happened during this period (the story, or rather stories), but also the 
context in which events took place. In all this there has been only a brief reference to 
the wider national and international context : the period of post-war austerity and 
reconstruction; the booming, swinging years of the late fifties and early sixties; and 
the unsettling period from the late sixties when unwelcome characters such as French 
students, Arab oil-men, Cuban missile minders and striking miners seemed destined 
to shake the country out of its growing complacency. Yet all these factors impinged 
on educational policy. When we add to this the huge weight of the 'partnership' 
described above, we can more easily appreciate the extent to which the Ministry, and 
later the DES, was confined within what seemed to be an ever-diminishing space. 
Having laid the ground in terms of narrative and themes, the position with regard 
to the four identified bases of power may now be more readily assessed : that task will 
occupy the remainder of this chapter. 
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2.3.2 The Powers of Central Government 
The Coercive Base 
The scope for coercive action in relation to curriculum policy during these years 
was clearly limited. As Fenwick points out, the 1944 Act was drawn up in such a 
way as effectively to weaken the position of the Ministry vis-a-vis the local authorities 
(Fenwick, 1976, p37). For some thirty years, a somewhat weak definition of the 
"duty" of the Minister as set out in the Act was to prevail : 
... to promote the education of the people of England and Wales and 
the progressive development of the institutions devoted to that 
purpose, and to secure the effective execution by local authorities, 
under his control and direction, of the national policy for providing a 
varied and comprehensive educational service in every area. 
(Para 1.1) 
It was for local authorities, governing bodies, and the heads of institutions in co-
operation with their staff, to determine the detailed content of educational 
programmes. The Act, therefore, saw the end of the Ministry's direct, but already 
loose, control over the secondary curriculum, thus bringing it into line with the 
elementary/primary, curriculum. Still in place was the SSEC and beneath it the 
examining boards. But this essentially co-ercive restraint on curriculum structures 
was soon to be relaxed : first, when the SSEC recommended and the Minister 
accepted that a single subject examination be introduced in 1951 to replace the School 
Certificate ; and later when the council itself was dissolved in 1964 and its 
responsibilities handed over to the newly established Schools Council for the 
Curriculum and Examinations. Control via examinations, which had certainly been 
potent during the inter-war years even though exercised on the Board's behalf by a 
delegated body, receded even further with the introduction in the mid-sixties of the 
Certificate of Secondary Education, a 16+ examination originally intended for pupils 
in the 20th to the 60th percentile of the ability range, which from its earliest 
conception had been developed and controlled by teachers. Furthermore, the Schools 
Council proceeded to exercise its major influence over the examination system 
through detailed work on the techniques of examining rather than on strategic 
planning. It was only later that it ventured into the business of proposing radical 
alterations in the structure of public examinations (in relation to 18+ during the sixties, 
and 16+ in the early seventies) and it made little enough headway (Plaskow, 1985). 
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The Council itself was the visible sign that curriculum control, together with the 
accepted right to leadership in curriculum matters, had passed firmly into the hands of 
the profession. It had been set up as a result of the protests of teachers and local 
authorities to the attempt by David Eccles in 1962 to set up a Curriculum Study Group 
within the Ministry, a move which Crosland was later to refer to as a "sadly 
misunderstood attempt to help the schools" (Kogan, 1971, p170). The protests, and 
the establishment of the Council, can be seen as confirmation of a de facto situation in 
which the Ministry appeared bereft of any direct control over the curriculum. During 
the remainder of this period all the key committees of the Council were dominated by 
representatives of the teacher associations. The notion that curriculum expertise lay 
with the practitioner was rarely contested. This was as true for the primary as for the 
secondary sector. The Plowden report on Primary Education published in 1967, 
while in many ways ahead of practice in terms of its advocacy of child-centred 
education, nevertheless re-inforced this dominant view of the proper location for 
curriculum development (CAC, 1967). Its major recommendation to government 
concerned the establishment of Educational Priority Areas : in other words, it took 
government's role to be the judicious provision of resources. Further evidence can be 
gleaned from the list of projects commissioned by the Schools Council. Here we see 
reflected in the names of project directors and their teams, the greatly enlarged world 
of teacher training and educational research, itself the product of a rapid growth in 
teacher numbers and of their substantially enlarged participation in advanced courses. 
As more and more expertise and experience developed in the broad pastures of the 
education sub-system, it is not surprising that the attitude of Ministers towards the 
curriculum became increasingly diffident. David Eccles had made his famous remark 
about the need for others to enter the 'secret garden of the curriculum' in 1960 ; but as 
the sixties progressed, the experience of many teachers in the classroom was that there 
were new and urgent problems to be solved and that such problems had to be resolved 
on the ground, for no-one else had the answers. Crosland himself was quite clear 
about his role in relation to the curriculum. In his interview with Kogan, he said 
The nearer one comes to the professional content of education, the 
more indirect the Minister's influence is. And I'm sure this is 
right 	 generally I didn't regard either myself or my officials as in 
the slightest degree competent to interfere with the curriculum. We're 
educational politicians and administrators, not professional 
educationalists. 
(Kogan, 1971, pp 172-3) 
But if the Minister himself could make remarks of this kind, why did Kogan insist 
that "If the role of the centre has always been strong, it has become stronger" (Kogan 
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1971) and, five years later, that the DES had "determinant authority and great power"? 
And this despite his comment on the last page of his 1975 study, where he describes 
the education system as "pluralistic, incremental, unsystematic, re-active". As he 
himself says, 
In this book we have taken a fragment of social concern and are yet 
still uncertain as to how so vast and complex a structure interacts, 
creates new policies, and somehow moves forward. 
(Kogan, 1975, p 238) 
The process, he claims, is instrumental rather than systematic. The DES "denies it 
has power to aggregate or to lead yet it plainly does so". Do we then have picture of a 
department which could not avoid policy formulation but which did so without a 
sense of direction and without realising the implications of its actions, subject to the 
winds of interest and pressure and the steady breeze of administrative necessities? Is 
this the "determinant authority and great power" ? 
It is possible that Kogan, despite his privileged knowledge as a former civil 
servant in the DES, had a somewhat biased view of the department's authority in so 
far as he knew the weight of administrative activity which perennially passes through 
a government office. In classroom parlance, much of this might be called 'busy-
work', activity without any purpose, at least in terms of policy generation. But seen 
from a local education office, this activity could be differently interpreted. Birley 
(1972) expressed an alternative view of DES activity at this time : 
The central government has removed over the years more and more 
power from the local authorities. Yet, on examination, it seems 
scarcely to have put this power to positive use, but has rather increased 
its negative control 	
 The government of the day declared its 
intention in 1965 to introduce comprehensive education.... But this 
intention was, and could only be, implemented by negative methods -
refusal to allow LEAs to build secondary schools that did not conform 
to that aim. That, and exhortations, was as much as the government 
could achieve 
(Birley, 1972, p 6) 
It is clear that administrative regulation - positive or negative - occupied much of 
the department's time during these years. A huge proportion of this work concerned 
the opening, closing or re-organisation of schools which followed on from the post-
1944 restructuring, then the moves to end selection, and then the raising of the school 
leaving age. Such decisions were needed also in relation to the pre- and post-school 
sectors, technical education, higher education in both sectors, the youth service, the 
health and welfare services, and even (under Mrs Thatcher) the minutiae of school 
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milk provision. The regulation of the teaching profession formed a further large 
province for departmental activity. 
One can of course argue that not one of these regulatory decisions, and certainly 
not one of the macro-organisational questions concerning comprehensivisation or the 
raising of the school leaving age, failed to have some kind of impact on the 
curriculum. However, what seems clear is that there was no coherent and consistent 
policy informing all these moves. While clearly the weight of central government's 
administrative activities impinged on local authorities and their schools, their 
curriculum implications were for the profession to work out. Boyle, in fact, saw 
policy in its broadest sense as emerging from this professional process : 
I would say overwhelmingly the biggest number (of policies) 
originated from what one broadly calls the 'education world'.... from 
the logic of the education service as it was developing. 
(Kogan, 1971,p 89) 
The Remunerative Base 
What of the remunerative base during these years ? Is it possible to argue that 
between 1944 and the early 1970s, the DES was using financial measures to enforce 
policy, particularly in matters with a direct bearing upon the curriculum ? 
To answer these questions it is first necessary to look at some wider issues related 
to educational funding. The major change during this period was the switch to 
general or 'block' grant as a result of the Local Government Act of 1958. Prior to 
this, methods of funding LEAs remained very close to the system of percentage grant 
first introduced by Fisher in 1918. The crucial question for LEAs was whether 
planned expenditure would be 'recognised for grant' by the Ministry. Payment of 
grant was subject to local authority compliance with Ministry 'standards' and 
regulations; if it was not satisfied, the Ministry might make arbitrary deductions from 
the sum which could otherwise have been paid. Sir William Pile, a civil servant in the 
DES for 26 years and Permanent Secretary from 1970 to 1976, claims that this system 
enabled "fairly detailed control over the expenditure of local authorities" (Pile, 1979 : 
a source which we must once again recognise contains a good deal of post hoc 
rationalisation but, in the very matters to which it attends, provides useful evidence 
about DES sensitivities and concerns). Although one of the avowed purposes of the 
switch to general grant was to increase local financial discretion, there still lingered the 
notion that percentage grants were open-ended and hence potentially inflationary. 
Moreover, because they were at least partly unpredictable, they were regarded as 
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difficult to integrate into any serious planning exercise. Perhaps, therefore, it is not 
surprising that it was after the introduction of the block grant that education began to 
secure a rocketing proportion of public sector expenditure : prior to 1958, the 
percentage of national income devoted to education was around 4%; by the middle 
1970s, that figure had virtually doubled. 
The general grant system of 1958 took the form of an aggregated sum to support 
local authority expenditure on all public services, with no part ear-marked for 
particular uses. What had previously been a specific grant to the local education 
authority now became an element in the general grant to the local authority. The local 
authority then had the responsibility of deciding whether the global sum should be 
divided up in such a way as to reflect the government's original calculations. A 
further relaxation resulted from the fact that although the Ministry still issued 
regulations setting out the required standards for building, staffing, etc, the local 
authorities no longer had to ensure that all their expenditure was 'allowable'. 
Problems, however, continued to arise because of the inflexibility of the rating 
system. The Local Government Act of 1966 therefore revised the arrangements and 
henceforward supported local authority expenditure via a more sophisticated version 
of the block grant, the Rate Support Grant (RSG). Yet more revisions were made in 
1974. The intention was to increase steadily the level of the Exchequer's contribution 
to local authority services. This, indeed, happened. Over a decade, the percentage of 
'relevant' expenditure on local services which was paid by central government rose 
from 54% (1967-68) to 66% (1975-76) (Pile, 1979). But although one might argue 
that general grant and its successor, the RSG, gave a new degree of freedom to local 
authorities, it remained true that central government was becoming increasingly 
indispensable in the funding of local services and so, by the same token, the 
authorities themselves were becoming increasingly vulnerable to changes in policy 
concerning the level of public expenditure. 
Griffith (1966) argued that the autonomy apparently allowed by the block grant 
was illusory, especially in relation to education where freedom of action was 
effectively curbed by a huge range of controls and regulations which, while not 
specifically financial, circumscribed every local decision. Eileen Byrne's (1974) 
study of resource allocation in Lincoln, Nottingham and Northumberland reached 
similar conclusions that LEA discretion was narrow and getting more so. 
Government frequently handed down conflicting and therefore constraining demands; 
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for example, Circular 10/65 called for the re-organisation of secondary schools but 
within the existing estimates. She concluded that 
The balance of power appears .. to have shifted constantly from local 
to central government over the past 25 years, to the detriment of the 
LEAs' capacity to respond to .. local needs and demand. 
(Byrne, 1974, p307) 
Birley is one who felt that, even within local government, the education committee 
was losing its autonomy to the corporate planning structures within the local authory, 
notably to the Finance and General Purposes committee (as it is generally called), a 
financial over-lord which receives the bids of each of its sub-ordinate committees and 
then allocates resources between them, not necessarily according to the assumptions 
built into the calculation of the RSG. 
In purely financial terms some have claimed that education has 
received the same share of what was available as it would have done 
under the old system. However, our concern is not simply with 
money but with the terms on which it is offered. In many places, for 
instance, more decisions affecting the education service were arbitrary 
because more were taken on the basis of standardisation throughout all 
local services.... The potential for constructive planning by LEAs in 
partnership with the education ministry envisaged by the 1944 Act is 
diminished when the direct line between the two is weakened and 
when both locally and centrally, educational leadership is 
circumscribed. 
(Birley, 1972, p 9) 
But despite all the many constraints on LEAs, we have to recognise the force of 
Kogan's observation (1971, p 27) that, although the "range and level" of local 
authorities' activities were prescribed by central government, this was not true of the 
"style and quality". And at a time when central government was not concerned to 
influence or direct the content of the curriculum, curriculum belonged to the sphere of 
local "style and quality". Regan (1979) listed the various areas of discretion open to 
local authorities. Very largely this consisted in determining (within DES regulations 
as to permitted maxima) the number, types and grades of teachers to be appointed; the 
level of resources such as books and equipment which would be provided in 
institutions of various types; and the pattern of in-service training and advisory 
services. Moreover, authorities were also free to determine the extent to which they 
undertook capital expenditure within the permitted maximum figure. Eileen Byrne 
illustrates this wide area of discretion in a chapter called The Allocation of Curricular 
Resources: 
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... the discriminal patterns of allocating resources in the three survey 
areas... appeared to be based on widespread assumptions bearing little 
traceable relationship to assessed educational needs according to 'age, 
ability and aptitude or to future social and industrial needs. What 
assumptions ? For example. only the top 12 per cent, 15 per cent or 
25 per cent of the ability range respectively in the survey areas could 
cope with external examinations - until the late 1950s and mid-1960s 
proved the authorities wrong. But by then scores of schools had been 
designed and staffed for non-examination syllabuses without extended 
(ie five year) courses. Small schools are better than large schools for 
the less able whatever the educational product at 15+; but grammar 
school children need large, economic and viable schools offering a 
wider variety of subjects. The education of boys ought to be different 
from the education of girls. Secondary modern pupils don't want to 
stay on for a Vth year. Rural children and those in small schools don't 
need the full range of specialist subjects or resources. Less able pupils 
need less money, fewer staff, lower-paid staff than the academically 
bright. Children in new schools need more money than those in old 
schools. Children in non-grammar schools don't need or can't profit 
from Nuffield science projects, Project Technology, and audio-visual 
language courses. They shouldn't even learn modern languages. 
Girls don't want to do physics; boys don't want to do biology or to 
cook. Clever pupils don't like or need technical crafts. And above all, 
teachers in post-war schools, especially non-grammar schools, can 
offer a full education in schools over-crowded by 10 per cent, 15 per 
cent, or even 20 per cent. 
(Byrne, 1974, pp 26-27) 
Byrne then goes on to describe differential resource allocation in the three 
authorities that she studied with sections on discriminal education by ability, by sex, 
by the provision or not of extended courses based on their "viability" in schools of 
particular sizes, and by access to public examinations. Here then we see curriculum 
policy making taking place at the local level in the terms described by Kirst and 
Walker and quoted in Chapter 1. Children in the schools studied by Byrne were most 
certainly "required to study certain subjects, and forbidden to study others, ... 
provided with the opportunities to study some phenomena but not provided with the 
means of studying others..." ; such implicit or explicit guides must properly be seen 
as curriculum policy and the process of determining them, curriculum policy-making. 
The impact of LEA assumptions, and the funding of the service which resulted from 
those assumptions, directly affected generations of children. But central government, 
though providing well over half the money, did not exploit its potential control over 
these resources either to intervene or to standardise. 
So much for control based on resources in terms of the year by year dealings of the 
DES with the local authorities. There is, however, another story to tell about 
significant developments within the department, and within government as a whole, 
concerning the overall management of resources. The full impact of these 
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developments was not to be felt by local authorities until the next decade ; but through 
the sixties and early seventies a capacity for detailed management based upon the 
marriage of planning to refilled budgetary techniques was growing rapidly. 
An early venture into centralised planning is to be found in the Architects and 
Building Branch, established in the early fifties . This was jointly chaired by the 
Chief Architect of Hertfordshire, Stirrat Johnson-Marshall, and a succession of senior 
DES officials including both Derek Morrell and William Pile. Kogan (1971) sees the 
establishment of the branch as "decisively altering the balance of power between 
central and local government". 
A further move in the direction of central planning was the establishment of the 
Teacher Supply Branch in 1962, a period of acute teacher shortage. But the major 
innovations of the period concerned expenditure. In 1961, government instituted a 
system of public expenditure surveys. This required departments to produce five-year 
projections of capital and current expenditure and the collated PESC (Public 
Expenditure Survey Committee) report allowed Ministers to take an overview of 
government spending plans. This exercise involved the DES in making medium-term 
projections. However, by itself the PESC process proved to be better at fore-casting 
the continuation of existing policies rather than at anticipating new ones. 
Furthermore, as Pile says, 
Nor were departments required to define their objectives in relation to 
the government's overall strategy, or to indicate how far either their 
present or their prospective policies forwarded the achievement of 
these objectives. Further, no useful way was provided for measuring 
the claims on resources of one programme against those of another. 
(Pile, 1979, p 53) 
As a result of these deficiencies the Treasury decided to introduce Planning 
Programme Budgetting (PPB), a technique developed during war-time operational 
research and popular for some time in public administration in the USA. Pile 
describes this process as 
a methodical analysis of objectives in a particular area of policy; an 
accurate measuring of both the inputs of resources provided to achieve 
these objectives and the outputs obtained; and the cost and other 
relevant information arranged in a way that makes possible the 
presentation of costed options, with supporting information about the 
implications of each course. 
(Pile, 1979, p 54) 
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The DES piloted this technique in 1967 and the first product was its Education 
Planning Paper no 1, Output Budgeting for the Department of Education and Science 
(DES, 1970). It is worth reviewing how the Permanent Secretary saw the problems 
and advantages of the PPB strategy. The first problem he saw related to the de-
centralised nature of the education service which was clearly antipathetic to centralised 
planning. Second, he was concerned about the inbuilt inertia of a system in which 
freedom of manoeuvre was inevitably constrained by earlier decisions. Third, he saw 
difficulties in defining objectives in clear-cut terms, partly because many 
activities/inputs contributed to more than one objective, and partly because there were 
a multitude of views about the aims of education, and hence about priorities. And 
last, he considered that assessing outputs in quantitative terms was difficult either in 
terms of the satisfaction of individual demands on the system, or in terms of the social 
benefit of, for example, primary education or non-vocational secondary and post-
school education. However, on the positive side he noted the value of re-ordering the 
department's information systems so as to relate costs to objectives; also the incentive 
to sort out medium-term objectives as "yard-sticks of educational advance", such as 
the number of school places built, teacher-pupil ratios, and participation rates post 16. 
Yard-sticks of individual attainment such as examination results were also 
systematized and periodic surveys encouraged in matters such as the measurement of, 
for example, reading ability. However, his overall conclusion was that 
Many would argue that the ultimate value of the PPB approach lies less 
in the development of specific techniques of measurement than in its 
encouragement of a rational, systematic and analytic approach to 
resource problems, and in the provision of a common framework for 
their discussion. 
(Pile, 1979, p56) 
Two other developments require a brief note. One was the impact of Programme 
Analysis Review (PAR), a system of regular reviews of departmental policies 
instituted under the terms laid out in the White Paper of 1970, The Re-organisation of 
Central Government (Prime Minister, 1970). This exercise required the definition of 
policy objectives, the formulation of programmes in output terms, and the 
presentation of alternative strategies for the achievement of the chosen objectives. The 
second development which must be noted, even in this cursory form, is the 
establishment by the DES Finance Branch of its Education Programme Budget which, 
inter alia, aims to show "the extent to which educational expenditure is susceptible to 
policy choice". This is yet another activity which both grows out of and spawns 
improvements not only in the capacity to link resources to policy, but also in the 
information base of the department. 
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The first fruits of these developments in terms of policy development may be seen 
in the White Paper, Education : a Framework for Expansion published in 1972, two 
years after the return of a Conservative government and the arrival of Margaret 
Thatcher as Secretary of State for Education (DES, 1972a). Pile describes the White 
Paper as the product of "a major development of the department's capacity, through a 
combination of organisational changes and new methods of handling relevant 
statistical and financial data". The paper itself has several characteristics which we 
should note. In the first place, it was selective in that it focussed on areas of concern 
to the new government such as nursery education and teacher training; second, every 
section of the document was comprehensively supported by statistical data and 
expenditure projections in a way which indicates the substantial information base 
behind it; third, it represented "a deliberate attempt to tilt the balance in the disposition 
of resources between different sectors" (Pile, p 59); and fmally, it aspired to be a ten-
year strategy, which some may see as a bureaucratic pipe-dream. 
As already suggested, the significance for policy-making of these various 
developments in planning technique was not fully apparent until the years after 1974. 
But nevertheless, their origins lie in this earlier period and it is therefore here that we 
should first encounter them. We see the DES acquiring substantially more 
sophisticated techniques for the control of policy through the management of 
resources, and simultaneously developing a far more comprehensive capacity to 
gather and to use information. Pile's account of the spectacular advances made in 
these directions must perhaps be treated with a little scepticism in the light of the 
rigourous criticism of DES planning in both the OECD (1975) Report and the 
subsequent report of the Expenditure Committee on Policy Making in the DES (House 
of Commons, 1976), neither of which are given even a passing reference in his book. 
However, even if the planning function was not yet operating in a wholly admirable 
manner, the future implications are clear. 
The Knowledgellnformation Base 
If HMI are the "eyes and ears of the department", then we might expect to find that 
they were making a major contribution to the department's control over the 
knowledge/information base. In fact, these decades were clearly not among the most 
illustrious in the history of the Inspectorate. Lip-service is duly paid to their role as 
"guardians of national standards" (whatever that may mean), as channels of 
information between the DES and the LEAs, and as advisers to the teachers. But 
Boyle (in Kogan, 1971) suggested that he had not found that they made much of a 
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contribution to policy formulation nor that they were invariably consulted on 
important matters. Crosland acknowledged their advice concerning the various 
options for a non-selective pattern of schools which were included in Circular 10/65, 
and he described them as having an influence on curriculum through their participation 
in the Schools Council : hardly a warm endorsement ! Lawton and Gordon (1987) 
consider that during the period of broad consensus "it was natural for HMI to keep a 
fairly low profile", concentrating on promoting 'progressive' teaching and working 
for the stability of the tri-partite system. But Benn and Simon (1970) noted that 
throughout the years in which LEAs were, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, 
preparing their plans for non-selective secondary schools, HMI gave no specific 
advice or support ; rather they appeared to work on the assumption that the pattern of 
provision was a matter for local decision, thus apparently suggesting that the 
educational consequences of such decisions were neutral. HMI were thus the dogs 
which didn't bark in the night, and their non-interventionist approach nicely illustrates 
their re-active, rather than pro-active role during this period. By the mid-seventies 
their ambivalent attitude to non-differentiated schooling still held up : see, for 
example, their comments on mixed-ability teaching (DES, 1978). 
Her Majesty's Inspectorate also had structural problems at this time. There was a 
growing over-lap with the rapidly developing advisory services in many LEAs; and 
there was also doubt as to their influence within the department. In 1968, a Select 
Committee investigated their role and was critical both of them, and of the 
department's use of their expertise (House of Commons, 1968). Among its 
recommendations, the Committee proposed an end to full inspections. However, in 
the early seventies, the role of HMI was rescued from decline by various factors : the 
appointment of William Pile as Permanent Secretary; the appointment of H.W.French 
in 1972 and then of Sheila Browne in 1974 as Senior Chief Inspector, now with 
deputy rather than under-secretary rank; and above all the development of the new 
review and planning procedures outlined above, which put a high premium on 
information and upon an understanding of alternative policy options, both areas to 
which HMI could presumably contribute. Thus, although between 1944 and 1974, 
HMI had done little to enhance the department's power through augmenting its 
command of the knowledge/information base, by the end of the period there were 
clear signs of movement in that direction. 
At this point we should return to the officially sponsored 'knowledge' which 
emerged in the various reports of the Central Advisory Council and other ad hoc 
bodies during this period, among them such major land-marks as the Newsom and the 
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Plowden Reports (CAC, 1963 and 1967). As in the earlier period we will need later 
to consider membership of these committees as a form of patronage. But the point to 
make here is that the important research contained in the reports, and the resulting 
recommendations, were seen as the product of professional thinking and not as the 
generation of fresh knowledge by and for the department. Indeed the 
recommendations in the reports were invariably seen as a direct challenge to 
government. Thus they did not directly re-inforce government's grip on the 
knowledge base. They do however lead us on to consider where else power of this 
kind could be found in these years. 
A remarkable feature of these three decades is the emergence of an intellectual 
'establishment' in the sphere of education (Kogan and Packwood, 1974, p4). Both 
Ministers and bureaucrats appeared to welcome and benefit from this development. 
The most explicit acknowledgement of this came in Crosland's description to Kogan 
of his debt to an informal think-tank which met at his home during his years as 
Minister. This group included economists such as John Vaizey, sociologists such as 
A.H.Halsey, Michael Young and David Donnison, and other academics such as Noel 
Annan and Asa Briggs. University based research and commentary from people such 
as Mark Blaug, Jean Floud, Richard Peters, Paul Hirst, Basil Bernstein and 
J.W.B.Douglas, resulted in a shift of educational thinking to places outside the 
department. Such research was confirmed and extended in a formal sense by the 
establishment of the Schools Council in 1964 and of the Social Science Research 
Council, with its education sub-committee, in 1967; and also by the growing 
involvement of private foundations such as Nuffield from the late fifties onwards. 
The activities of these people, not least the influence of their work on advanced 
courses for teachers, together with the remarkable growth in the publication of books 
about education, were responsible for the steady development of expertise and 
informed opinion within the system as a whole. 
Working sometimes alongside, sometimes in parallel, with the Schools' Council, 
there were the subject associations. Many of these were able to act as foci for the 
expertise of practising teachers. Though most had been formed much earlier in the 
century, they came into particular prominence during the curriculum development 
movement of the sixties and seventies. Their own work in the field, and their reaction 
to the work of others, was seen as authoritative and influential. Among the most 
prominent, we should note the Association for Science Education, the National 
Association for the Teaching of English, the Modern Languages Association and the 
Geographical Association, but the list is necessarily incomplete. Against the collective 
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wisdom of these bodies, the DES appeared to have little to offer, and the capacity and 
right of the subject associations to make authoritative statements about the curriculum 
were rarely challenged. 
Other power bases existed, notably in the teacher associations, in which the pre-
eminent figure during this period was Sir Ronald Gould, General Secretary of the 
largest union, the National Union of Teachers; and also in the local authority 
associations. Of these, the influence of the Association of Education Committees, 
which represented the education committee of every local authority except the ILEA 
until it was superseded in 1974, was enormous. This powerful position was partly 
attributable to its location within the system which gave it an obvious right to be 
consulted, but it was considerably enhanced by the personal status and influence of 
Sir William Alexander, its Secretary from 1946 to 1974. Sir William had weekly 
access to the Minister (see Boyle's evidence in Kogan 1971); daily contact, formal 
and informal, with senior DES officials; access to members of Parliament, often 
directly by involving them in the AECs committees; and direct contacts with every 
conceivable interest and pressure group concerned with education. All this activity 
was backed by a powerful committee structure and secretariat. The work and the 
direct influence of this body and of its chief executive merits a detailed analysis on its 
own (Kogan 1975, chapter 6, is the fullest account available), but the relevant point 
for this discussion is that the strength and importance of its work, coupled with the 
parallel activities of the teacher associations, and the exponential growth of research 
and advanced educational study, all serve to under-line the fact that the department 
certainly had no monopoly of knowledge and expertise. Indeed, even in terms of 
information, pure and simple, it was only in the later years of this period that it could 
rival the grasp of, say, the AEC. 
By the mid-seventies some, if not all, local authorities had themselves become 
involved in educational research and curriculum development, significant at the local 
and sometimes at the national level. Notable among these was the Inner London 
Education Authority which put enormous resources into both areas but there were 
many other examples throughout the country. 
Finally, it is appropriate to mention the growing influence of the media - press and 
television - in fostering and legitimising the role of public opinion in determining what 
should and should not happen to the education system. (In 1974, Kogan and 
Packwood (op cit p4) estimated that there were 50 full-time educational journalists.) 
While it is arguable in what sense such expressions of opinion should count as 
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'knowledge', it was certainly the case that there were a growing number of people 
who claimed to know what was needed in schools. Where such opinion was co-
ordinated through the work of pressure groups, we see the emergence of competing 
centres of expertise, often promoting views which were, it must be admitted, 
influenced by members who were also teachers. Examples of such groups would 
include the Campaign for the Advancement of State Education (CASE) and the 
National Association of Governors and Managers (NAGM). 
The conclusion to this section must be that, in 1974, the DES had no claim to be a 
centre of expertise or knowledge generation, and it had little or no influence on those 
locations within which such knowledge and expertise was being generated. 
However, if it was in a weak position in this respect, in the other aspect of this power 
'base', the generation and ownership of information, the department was gaining 
ground. For as we noted in the previous section, by the mid-seventies new planning 
practices connected with resource allocation were requiring ever more extensive 
systems of information gathering. 
The Normative Base 
The possession of normative power has been defined as the power to allocate 
symbolic rewards in the form of public recognition and other marks of approval 
which are prized by the recipient. Clearly, during these years the DES did have 
favours to bestow and could develop its authority through its willingness to recognise 
the contribution of some individuals and organisations, while giving only a low 
profile to others. 
A major expression of such patronage was the power to appoint to a committee of 
the Central Advisory Council of Education, the body established in the 1944 Act to 
replace the pre-war Consultative Committees. The major reports published in these 
years were those from committees chaired by Crowther (15-18, CAC 1959/60), 
Newsom (Half our Future, on young school leavers, CAC 1963), and Plowden 
(Children and their Primary Schools, CAC 1967). There were also three other 
substantial reports from committees set up "at the whim of a minister" (Corbett, 1973, 
3rd edition): Robbins (Higher Education, Committee on Higher Education, 1963), 
James (Teacher Education and Training, DES 1972), and Russell (Adult Education, 
DES 1973). 
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On one level therefore we must acknowledge that the right to appoint to these 
committees was a significant form of patronage. Yet looking through the 
membership, it appears that the department did not use this opportunity to indicate 
who should belong to its preferred educational establishment but rather appeared to 
confirm through its choices the existing hierarchies of prestige and reputation. The 
impression given is that the department wanted to draw in people whose expertise was 
already accredited by the 'professionals'. Moreover, the general thrust of the reports 
once published appeared to challenge rather than promote government policy and thus 
create distance between committee members and their sponsors. Thus, an invitation 
to serve both confirmed and enhanced the position of members, and there was no 
attempt to signal support for some viewpoints and policies rather than others simply 
through the selection of some people rather than others. 
The relative obscurity of HMI during these years was discussed in the previous 
section of this chapter. The department seemed uninterested in establishing HMI as 
its 'organic intellectuals', and HMI rarely published or committed themselves to a 
public view of good practice. They were therefore not the beneficiaries of any 
normative power which might have been claimed by the department. 
On the other side of the coin, as the educational world expanded, as education 
became a more and more dispersed field of interest and activity, and as public interest 
and concern for education grew, alternative sources of symbolic rewards became 
increasingly available. Reputations and prestigious appointments could be secured by 
climbing other ladders and ploughing other furrows. The universities, the media, the 
Schools Council, certain innovative LEAs, and various international organisations 
such as the OECD were all important platforms for the ambitious as well as potent 
sources of recognition. For many prominent figures in education during those years, 
there were thus many alternative patrons to government. The link between symbolic 
rewards and the whole business of knowledge production, demonstrated expertise 
and public recognition is obvious. During the thirty years to 1974, government often 
appeared to be slightly irrelevant to the business in hand. 
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2.3.3 Conclusion 
This discussion of the years between 1944 and 1974 has done little enough to 
resolve the issue of power relationships between central and local government. Much 
more remains to be said and to every argument advanced in the previous pages, a 
counter-argument could be mounted, perhaps because of the inherently political nature 
of the issue. As Crosland says 
All governments and Ministers are a bit schizophrenic about their 
relationship with local authorities. On the one hand they genuinely 
believe the ringing phrases they use about how local government 
should have more power and freedom.... On the other hand a Labour 
government hates it when Tory councils pursue education or housing 
policies of which it disapproves, and exactly the same is true of a Tory 
government with Labour councils. 
(Kogan, 1971, p 171) 
However, what I have attempted to do is to clarify some of the issues about control 
over the curriculum by examining in turn the various bases of power by means of 
which central government might or might not have exercised control. Co-ercive 
power, in the sense of legislation concerning the curriculum, was non-existent in this 
period. Firm regulation via control of the examination system was virtually 
abandoned as a means of securing conformity to some national norm. Certainly the 
DES was engaged in constant administrative, largely regulatory, activity; but this 
must not be confused with specific curriculum policy despite the almost inevitable 
knock-on effect of decisions about the standards and procedures to be observed by 
LEAs in their provision of a school system. To a very large degree, curriculum 
leadership lay in the schools and with the teaching profession's own intelligentsia in 
the colleges, universities, project teams and professional advisory services, although 
it has to be remembered that all these people were obliged to operate within the context 
of LEA assumptions, so graphically described by Eileen Byrne. 
The power to control resources (the remunerative base) is a less clear cut issue 
because, as we saw, despite the apparent financial autonomy of the local authorities 
particularly after 1958, the DES could and did hedge LEA decision making with 
myriad regulations. However, in the absence of an explicit curriculum policy 
emanating from the DES, much that happened in schools was shaped by resource 
allocation within the authority. This was particularly true in the period to 1965 when 
there was a broad expansionist consensus but a parallel lack of concern with what 
should be taught. However, it was noted that financial and other novel forms of 
planning technique were being developed within the DES, and that these had a 
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potential for far greater control in the future. Such developments required a detailed 
knowledge of the workings of the system, its inputs and outputs, and increasingly, 
the degree of match between programme objectives and programme outcomes. In 
thus gathering to itself the capacity to manage the system in these new ways, the DES 
enormously enhanced its control of the knowledge/information base and, co-
incidentally, found a new role for HMI, a body which had had little sense of direction 
for some time. To know a system and what is more, to set the agenda for knowledge 
gathering, is to enhance the capacity to control it. However, if the potential was 
developed during the years before 1974, its effective deployment was still to come. 
Simultaneously during these years, access to the knowledge base was substantially 
widened. Whereas in the inter-war years, expertise in educational matters was 
relatively confined, - and its public expression almost wholly confined - to prominent 
Establishment figures, the post-war period saw a growing acknowledgement of 
education as a legitimate and important area for public debate and academic critique. 
Concern for the quality of social life within the developing Welfare State encouraged 
the formation of countless interest and pressure groups, generally seen to be a healthy 
manifestaion of pluralism and an important contribution to the emergence of 
consensus. Colleges and university departments of education no longer confined 
themselves to the training of neo-phyte teachers, but launched into public debate and 
the promotion of enhanced professionalism among practising teachers. Sociologists, 
curriculum theorists, and philosophers joined the ranks of the somewhat discredited 
psychologists and made a bid for a share of that form of power which accrues to the 
expert and the public debater. The media gave them increasing encouragement by 
devoting more and more space to educational issues and causes celebres. Not only 
was a monopoly of the knowledge/information base thereby denied to the DES, but 
central government itself acknowledged the situation by bestowing symbolic rewards 
on the system's own leaders. Thus other forms of recognition and approval were 
increasingly available and the DES had no exclusive grip on the normative base of 
power either. 
During these years it was common to explain the functioning of the social and 
indeed, the educational, system in terms of pluralism. While such theories are no 
longer popular among students of policy, it is easy to see why they seemed adequate 
and appropriate at the time. The years between 1944 and 1974 were, it has been 
claimed, marked first by consensus and later by the break up of that consensus. This 
inevitably leads us to consider what strands of opinion were either reconciled or in 
competition. Again, the identified themes of partnership and interest groups call for a 
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similar analysis. What pluralism as a theory of social order lacks is a notion of 
conflict and of the unequal distribution of chances to see one's interest prevail. But 
our analysis of the powers available to central government in these thirty years may at 
least demonstrate why pluralism went unchallenged for some time. For it would 
appear that no one party had exclusive access to any of the four bases of power and 
that it was therefore reasonable to talk about balance, compromise, partnership and 
consensus as operating principles even if contestable facts. 
At this point we turn to the years after 1974. There would be little disagreement 
that from that date to this, the DES has changed significantly the nature and extent of 
its control over the education system. It is hoped that, through this attempt to separate 
out the various elements within the powers available to central government, it will be 
possible to demonstrate the exact mechanisms by which this change has been brought 
about, before going on to look in later chapters at some aspects of their application. 
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Chapter Three 
CONTROLLING THE EDUCATION SYSTEM : 
1974 TO 1988 
3.1 The Model Reviewed 
Choosing dates to divide one period from another is an arbitrary business : no 
sooner is one date selected than there seem to be overwhelming reasons why another 
might have been better. In proposing 1974 as the start of the final period, I hope it may 
be seen as a boundary with somewhat blurred edges. In choosing it, I shall be pointing 
to a change of style in the relationship between central and local government, 
particularly with regard to the curriculum, marked partly by precise events, and partly 
by a change in 'climate'. 
There is some support from Fowler (1981) who traces the "switchover" from the 
"disjointed incrementalism" of the sixties to the "disjointed decrementalism" of the 
middle seventies onwards to the oil crisis of December 1973. In this he explicitly 
disagrees with Kogan (1975) who locates the climactic in 1968 when the Labour 
government was first obliged to introduce public expenditure cuts, including a further 
deferment of ROSLA plans. He sees this as marking the beginning of a period of 
contraction which re-surfaced in 1970 when the Conservatives increased the price of 
school meals and cut the provision for school milk. The pattern of retrenchment was 
confirmed, according to Kogan, by the 1972 White Paper (see Chapter 2) which 
marked a new level of attention to financial control, and demonstrated a new awareness 
of how policy could be shaped by medium to long term planning. However, Fowler 
regards the events of 1968 as "harbingers", the meals and milk episode as "irrelevant" 
because marginal, and the 1972 White Paper as a legitimate attempt to shift priorities 
rather than retrench. Moreover, he suggests that the oil crisis did not entirely put an 
end to incremental decisions, and he cites as evidence the more generous provision of 
resources for students on advanced technical courses, the adult literacy programmes 
and, most notably, the doubling of the nursery building programme. Real problems 
and a real swing towards contraction date from the Public Expenditure White Paper of 
1976 which marked a reduction in real terms in educational expenditure. This was 
brought about by the acute need for all-round economic restraint (demanded by the 
International Monetary Fund to whom the Labour government had been obliged to go 
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for financial succour), and justified in some degree by the fall in pupil numbers and the 
consequent opportunity to cut back on teacher training. 
Such debate merely demonstrates how far the selection of dates is arbitrary. 
Choosing a date reflects a focus, the choice of a particular aspect of policy. Both 
Kogan and Fowler take educational expenditure as the key issue : other years may seem 
of greater significance in relation to, for example, the development of explicit policies 
for the curriculum. Fowler appears to follow a 'bases of power' argument very similar 
to that being pursued in this thesis. Of the sixties, he writes 
above all else the Secretary of State exercised power and influence 
through the provision of resources such as money for building 
programmes.... The power of the purse in the sixties was the major 
one. In the seventies it became much less important because the purse 
was relatively so much smaller. 
(Fowler, 1981, pp15-16) 
But in the seventies local authorities are being pressured by central government because 
the Secretary of State (is) having to legislate because he or she has no 
funds to hand out... 
central government (is) having to legislate more and more .. since it is 
the only way it can get its way, having lost the power of the purse. 
(pp25-26) 
These comments support the argument that there are various types of power 
available to the DES and that they have varied over time. I shall later take issue with 
Fowler's view of the seventies and early eighties when I argue that the DES has now 
discovered (or rather has been shown by example) strategies for policy implementation 
through the control of resources, and that this is at least partly a direct product of 
expenditure restraint. First however, it will be useful to review the argument about the 
bases of power, to refine the categories in the light of the discussion in the previous 
chapter, and to anticipate some of the themes that will arise in the detailed examination 
of this final period. 
It has become clear that the coercive base is considerably wider than legislation or 
statutory regulation. The DES issues a constant stream of admonitory circulars, 
memoranda, and so forth which are the outward sign of the executive function of the 
civil service. It is the task of government departments to administer and to interpret 
legislation, and the process of doing so results in a flow of communications. It would 
be an impossible task for LEAs to consider minutely the extent to which each element in 
these interchanges, most of which require some kind of action or response on their 
part, is obligatory in the sense that sanctions will result from non-compliance. There 
56 
are, of course, examples of refusal to respond : one authority did not make a return 
when Shirley Williams issued Circular 14/77 asking for details of their curriculum 
policies (DES, 1977c), and there were numerous examples of responses so dilatory as 
to be virtual rejections. The DES, after all, lacks a regional structure and the task of 
detailed supervision was far beyond the district offices of HMI, despite their 
responsibility to act as channels of communication between centre and locality. 
However, the sheer weight of administrative requirements is coercive in its effect. The 
emerging managerial and planning structures which we traced in the last chapter, 
substantially increased the pressure on LEAs to respond to the demands and enquiries 
of the DES. When we add to this the 'politics of deference', we can see that the 
coercive base does indeed amount to a lot more than explicit legislation and regulation. 
The control of examinations is another significant form of coercion. In the inter-war 
years, we saw that this was an effective, valued and widely-accepted power despite a 
growing opinion that teachers should have more influence (see, for example, the 
Norwood report, SSEC,1943). In the post-war years, the centre did release its grip ; 
but after 1974, the re-establishment of control over examinations and other forms of 
accreditation, and the institution of new forms of testing, are important themes, 
demonstrating a renewed interest in this form of regulatory and therefore coercive 
power. 
The remunerative base is the one high-lighted in Fowler's analysis. In Chapter 2, 
I suggested that in the inter-war years expenditure was largely permissive. In the post-
war years of expansion, the 'power of the purse' was crucial. A good Minister was 
one who secured an ever-increasing share of public expenditure. However in the late 
fifties, the switch to block grant greatly reduced the Minister's influence over actual 
spending. The major power over resources related to volume rather than use. Even 
allowing for the enormous inertia of educational spending, where most expenditure 
goes to meet the financial obligations created by earlier decisions, there was enough 
scope at the margins for substantial LEA and institutional discretion. But by the 
seventies we noted that new planning and financial strategies had emerged which 
increasingly linked spending to medium and long term planning, annd thus to the 
formulation and implementation of policy. These new techniques meant that education 
became increasingly subject to corporate planning practices. Thus we now have to 
recognise a future orientation to the remunerative base which greatly increased its 
potency as a basis for the power of the centre. This tendency was even further 
strengthened by the attempts of government, including the Labour administration from 
1976, to curb public expenditure, especially that of local authorities. 
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Sophisticated financial planning generates enormous demands for information and 
there is therefore a coming together and mutual re-inforcement of the remunerative and 
the knowledge/information bases of power. The new planning procedures were partly 
responsible for transforming the role of HMI who were in increased demand as 
monitors of the system. However it would be wrong to see that as the principal 
function of the Inspectorate, or to see HMI as the main generators of the data which the 
department required. What needs to be recognised is the increasing dependence of 
government on a flow of data about all aspects of social and economic life; and the 
consequent translation of every aspect of LEA provision into statistical returns to the 
DES. Technology has, of course, both serviced and stimulated this demand for 
information. The space between Matthew Arnold's leisurely essays on the state of the 
elementary schools, when HMI wrote travel diaries about their journeys through the 
system, and the computerised returns of the 1980s, demonstrates the total 
transformation of the nature of information and therefore of its potential as a source of 
power. 
In examining the earlier periods, distinctions have had to be drawn between 
knowledge and information. Knowledge is, after all, far more than information. It 
relates closely to expertise, and to study its genesis we have to consider who is making 
authoritative contributions to current educational theory and practice, and where they 
are located. In the 1918-39 years, such knowledge generation was the preserve of a 
relatively small 'Establishment' intelligentsia, mostly composed of people in positions 
of power in prestigious institutions. To their number was added the increasingly 
influential psychologists. In the 1944-74 period, we saw how this group widened to 
include sociologists, economists, philosophers, curriculum developers, teacher 
educators and journalists. Towards these people the DES adopted a stance of openness 
and sometimes responsiveness, but made few attempts to control or participate. Post 
1974, we shall see the DES actively endeavouring to find and develop alternative 
sources of intellectual support and opinion leadership in a manner underlines the 
significance of knowledge as a power base. 
Once again there is an overlap with a further base, this time the normative. There is 
a sense in which expertise counts for little in terms of power and influence until it is 
recognised. Recognition is a potent form of symbolic reward, resulting in enhanced 
status and often in the more tangible reward of appointment or promotion to desirable 
positions. The capacity to bestow such rewards is therefore a valuable form of power. 
However, I have suggested that during the post-war years there were many alternative 
sources of symbolic rewards : in some circles, the DES seemed a tedious necessity of 
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relatively marginal importance to the real business of education, a sort of bus conductor 
to the whole enterprise. But to cover the developments of the final period, it seems 
likely that we shall have to expand this category also. Not only shall we see the DES 
stake a claim to a monopoly in the bestowal of patronage; but we shall also have to 
consider the extent to which the department set out to shape public opinion, to allocate 
praise and blame, and to establish its own agenda for educational reform. Thus the 
normative base is expanded to include the promotion of a discourse, the terms and 
values of which then become the basis for the distribution of symbolic rewards. 
In the preceding pages, I have reviewed the model of power introduced in the last 
chapter. Three conclusions can be drawn. First, no taxonomies of the kind described 
can be regarded as static and, in order to have a useful analytical framework, we shall 
have to allow for the fact that they change over time. The vigour with which systems 
seek for new forms of power must surely contribute to their refinement. Second, there 
are substantial areas of overlap between the different bases and this too would appear to 
have increased over recent years. Third, there is diversity within each base sufficient to 
at least raise questions as to whether they should be further sub-divided. In the 
interests of clarity, however, I propose to retain only the four categories. The next 
section of this chapter will provide an overview of the events of the years 1974-88 in 
order to lay the ground for the final section; at that point, I shall use the framework 
refined in the first part of this chapter to analyse the events of those years, focussing 
once again on the capacity of the DES to make and to implement policy, particularly of 
the kind which directly affects the learning experiences of school pupils. 
3.2 An Overview : 1974 to 1988 
The Social and Economic Context 
The years from 1974 began with five years of Labour government, followed by a 
long period of Conservative administration with election victories in 1979, 1983 and 
again in 1987. As already noted, the Labour administration faced severe economic 
problems, a period of world recession, a persistent balance of payments problem, 
frightening levels of inflation and - towards the end of their five years - rising 
unemployment. In terms of educational policy, the government had to fight hard not to 
lose ground. Despite the attempt to sustain some growth, there was little that could be 
done to hold the line against expenditure cuts; as we have seen, the Public Expenditure 
White Paper of 1976 marked the beginning of a decline in educational spending, not 
just in terms of the total spent but also relative to other areas of public spending. This 
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decline continued under the Conservatives. Capital expenditure was particularly hard 
hit, dropping by 25% between 1978 and 1985. Had it not been for the fact that local 
authorities continued to spend 5-6% more on education each year than the government 
had planned, the decline would have been even greater (Travers, 1986a, p135). 
The Labour government made some attempt to maintain its long alliance with the 
education system and its teachers. Teachers' salaries were very substantially increased 
as a result of the Houghton committee's recommendations in January 1975; and the 
Clegg committee was set up to review the gap between teachers' pay and that of other 
occupational groups. The Education Act of 1976 was intended to consolidate the 
comprehensive school system by requiring the re-organisation of the remaining 
selective schools and by forbidding LEAs to support children at direct-grant schools. 
Yet the years were chiefly marked, not by the confident pursuit of policy after a brief 
Conservative interruption, but rather by a mounting uncertainty, concern and complaint 
about education. It is worth pausing to note that these years were marked by social, 
economic and particularly industrial upheaval. It was a Labour government which 
introduced a wage freeze in 1966, de-valued in 1967, and faced a record level of 
unofficial strikes in 1968-69. The Conservatives then endeavoured to take a strong line 
with the unions with a new Industrial Relations Act and a tough wages policy, but in 
the end they lost the 1974 election on a "Who governs Britain?" platform after a 
prolonged confrontation with the miners and the introduction of the notorious '3-day 
week'. Labour returned with a Social Contract already agreed with the unions ; but by 
the mid-seventies, the oil price increases and a looming sterling crisis convinced the 
government that it could not find the funds to keep its side of the bargain. Inflation was 
getting dramatically worse and unemployment, especially among young people, was 
beginning to rise. 
These few facts demonstrate that the very substantial changes which have convulsed 
the education system since the mid-seventies, affecting the curriculum, the institutional 
structures and the power relationships within the education system, emerged at and 
from a time of very general social upheaval. There is a dangerous tendency to treat 
education as if it were insulated from the rest of life but that is to deny useful 
comparative insights. However, there is no doubt that the education system was itself a 
focus for many of the uncertainties and ideological battles of these years : and so it still 
remains. 
Salter and Tapper (1985) have analyzed the attempt to develop an explicitly 
Conservative ideology during the years in opposition between 1964 and 1970. There 
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was a widely shared view that a fundamental intellectual task confronted the party. 
Cowling (1978) wrote that the country's intelligentsia had been responsible for creating 
and validating a Labour platform and for "making Conservative criticism seem morally 
and intellectually disreputable". As a reaction to this apparent left-wing bias in thinking 
about social planning, Edward Heath established around thirty policy groups to look at 
all aspects of public life, drawing upon the expertise of sympathetic academics, 
industrialists and journalists. But those further to the Right thought his approach 
pragmatic rather than principled; many found that their ideas were more acceptable in 
the party after Mrs Thatcher became leader in 1975. From that date, the ideology of the 
New Right found a means of expression through bodies such as the Institute for 
Economic Affairs (IEA), established in 1958 as a pro-market research body but with 
little influence until the Thatcher years : it was later to give house-room to the National 
Council for Educational Standards. Another very influential body, with a particular 
interest in education, was the Centre for Policy Studies, established by Keith Joseph 
and Margaret Thatcher in 1974. 
After economics, education has been perhaps the most favoured topic for New Right 
polemics. The issue emerged publicly in the Black Papers, five of which were 
published between 1969 and 1977. These pamphlets, edited by Cox and Dyson and 
with contributions from Rhodes Boyson, a future junior Minister at the DES, attacked 
the schools for low standards, poor discipline, and the unproductive and 
unsophisticated use of 'progressive' pedagogies. Employers, also, were increasingly 
vocal about the standards of literacy and numeracy among young employees. Such 
complaints were joyfully seized upon by the media who found here a rich vein for 
investigative journalism and moral indignation. The William Tyndale affair was 
glorious confirmation that the criticisms were justified. But this is not to deny that there 
were serious issues confronting the schools. The school leaving age had not been 
raised to 16 until 1971 and many schools were still facing problems in developing 
programmes to motivate all their older pupils. There were unresolved problems 
concerning education in inner city areas; uncertainties about curriculum provision for an 
ethnically and culturally pluralist population; falling rolls, which were already severe in 
the primary sector; and an urgent need to re-think 14-19 education in the light of new 
demands from industry and escalating youth unemployment 
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Central government and curriculum control 
By the time that Callaghan made his famous speech at Ruskin College in October 
1976, there had been at least seven years of anxious debate. The speech was intended 
and taken as a sign that government now proposed to play a central part in the review 
and subsequent control of the school curriculum. Fowler (1981, p24) cites this episode 
as evidence that 'trends' alone do not result in new policy initiatives : in analyzing the 
politics of education, "you have to look for a trigger mechanism". Certainly, this 
speech can be seen as the point at which talk began to turn into action. 
A full account of the speech, of the events which led up to it and followed on from 
it, can be found in Chitty (1989), and there are also comments in the autobiography of 
Callaghan (1987) and his senior policy adviser, Bernard Donoughue (1987). Here, 
however, I am concerned only with those elements which relate to the changing 
strategies of central government in relation to devising and implementing policy. 
Donoughue claims (TES, 29 May 1987) to have advised Callaghan to identify a few 
areas of policy where he might seek to make an impact. Education seemed a suitable 
candidate. Certainly it was demonstrably 'an issue' in 1976, and had been for some 
years. It was an issue defined outside government - this cannot be said of all issues -
but it was politically untenable for the government of the day not to have a policy in 
relation to that issue. The inevitable implication of having a policy is that it must then 
be activated by a programme or programmes, for otherwise commitment to the policy 
itself rapidly loses credibility. 
Callaghan had perhaps not thought through to that stage, which may explain the 
unsatisfactory nature of the ensuing 'Great Debate'. 
Politicians are not alone in needing to develop policies in response to issues : civil 
servants also identify issues, and a central part of their function is to anticipate the 
political response. Inevitably they become committed to certain policy preferences of 
their own. Thus the department would appear to have had a series of initiatives already 
in train which were not inconsistent with Callaghan's aspirations (Salter and Tapper, 
1981). In 1975 the OECD examiners had commented on the role of the department in 
relation to the curriculum. Having recognised that senior civil servants in Britain are, in 
the continental sense, "notables" by virtue of their "prestige, acquaintanceships and 
natural authority", they went on to discuss the "momentum of thought and action which 
develops within a department". The examiners recognised that DES officials 
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endeavour to identify a social consensus as to the priority issues 
towards which policy planning could be directed .... They do not make 
the plan in answer to their own beliefs and desires alone. But neither do 
they make it as passive respondents to the political process or the 
general will of the community. 
	 (OECD,1975) 
There are few direct references in the Examiners' report to the curriculum but in the 
concluding Confrontation Meeting, we catch a glimpse of the "momentum of thought 
and action ... within the department" when it is reported that the Permanent Secretary 
"did wonder aloud whether the Government could continue to debar itself from what 
had been termed 'the secret garden' of the curriculum". 
In the following year the House of Commons Expenditure Committee reviewed the 
OECD report, and (after what seemed, to this eye-witness, a far from friendly cross-
examination of the Permanent Secretary, the Senior Chief Inspector, and other 
officials), they concluded 
The DES, itself, would like to see the ambiguities attaching to the 
Secretary of State's position in relation to the curriculum clarified ... We 
think he (the Secretary of State) should be prepared strongly to 
encourage and participate in educational development without seeking to 
control it. In this, HMIs would have a key role to play ... The 
Committee does not share the view that the curriculum is a 'secret 
garden' which none but the initiated may enter 
(House of Commons, 1976, p7) 
There is a similar remark in the Yellow Book, a private but leaked DES 
memorandum to the Prime Minister : 
The time has probably come to try to establish generally acceptable 
principles for the composition of the secondary curriculum for all 
pupils, that is to say a "core" curriculum. 
(TES, 15 October 1976, extracts from the Yellow Book) 
The memorandum reported that HMI were already working on this task, and were 
preparing "to publish discussion papers and to run a national in-service course for 
teachers". 
Thus it is clear that the intention to expand the role of central government in relation 
to the curriculum was already under discussion well before the Ruskin speech, perhaps 
only awaiting a "trigger mechanism" to launch it. A succession of documents 
followed. But first came a series a national conferences in early 1977 at which the 
government's 'partners' were invited to agree that the Secretary of State should "seek to 
establish broad agreement .... on a framework for the curriculum". There followed the 
Green Paper Education in Schools : a consultative document (DES 1977b) which 
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repeated word for word the quotation from the Yellow Book given above, with only 
one significant change : the word 'probably' is now omitted for 
It would not be compatible with the duty of the Secretaries of State .... 
to abdicate from leadership on educational issues. 
(para 2.19) 
Over the following years the momentum was sustained. The next step was the issue 
of Circular 14/77 which invited LEAs to report on their curriculum policies. The 
Circular was issued by a Labour government, but the replies were collated and issued 
(DES 1979a) under the new Conservative administration, with little apparent change of 
tone or purpose bar an increased emphasis on "no additional resources". Again we 
read that Ministerial responsibility required "an overall view of the content and quality 
of education seen from the standpoint of national policies and needs". Only one 
authority - Kingston-upon-Thames - had declined to respond, though 71 replies were 
late and another 14 were very late. But in making their responses, however dilatory, 
the local authorities conceded the right of central government to demand such 
information. The Report claimed that many authorities did n.Qt "formulate curricular 
policies and objectives which meet national policies and objectives". 
The next year the DES published its Framework for the Curriculum (DES 1980a), 
and in the same month HMI published a parallel document A View of the Curriculum 
(DES 1980b). The DES document argued that LEAs should closely monitor the 
curriculum and attainments of their schools in order to ensure compliance with the 
authority's own policy, which should itself reflect national needs as defined by the 
DES. Replies to 14/77 and recent HMI surveys of primary and secondary schools 
(DES 1978c and 1979b) suggested that LEAs were falling down on that task. The 
point to notice here is that the DES appeared not to have solved the problem of 
achieving control of the curriculum through the seemingly unavoidable agency of the 
local authorities. The DES document set out in considerable detail the department's 
proposals for a curriculum "framework", described in terms of subjects and even 
percentages of time to be devoted to each; but implementation of the policy has 
apparently to be left to the will of the LEA. The DES was still relying on exhortation 
and moral persuasion. No specific  dead-lined action was required of LEAs. 
After a year of rather strenuous criticism from many parties, the DES issued its most 
confident statement to date, The School Curriculum (DES 1981a) which accommodated 
some of the criticisms made of its earlier document. Several concessions were made. 
This time, however, action was required. In Circular 6/81, LEAs were given two years 
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to report on the progress they were making towards installing the national framework. 
Here, then, was an obligation which presumably authorities were required to meet. In 
the event, it appeared that few did because two years later a further Circular, 8/83, was 
issued, reminding them of what was required. Many authorities had in fact made 
progress, but one has to assume that their efforts were either inadequate or had become 
irrelevant to the further development of national policy because no summary report of 
their responses was ever published. In January 1985, the Association of Metropolitan 
Authorities asked how "broad agreement" could be achieved if the Government ignored 
the LEAs' replies to 8/83 (TES 25 January 1985). Perhaps publication would not have 
been able to conceal an unacceptable diversity of view. Even more significantly, it 
might have demonstrated for all to see that the DES statements on curriculum to date 
had relied heavily on exhortation and norm-setting - and that this strategy was 
provoking only a very slow and uneven response. In Better Schools  (DES 1985a), 
the next authoritative DES document on curriculum and related matters, this issue was 
obviously still rumbling. It is stated there that 
an explicit curricular policy will shortly inform the work of nearly every 
LEA, but that martv authorities' policies do not yet extend to all the 
matters for which local policies are needed.  
( DES, 1985a, para 42, my emphasis) 
Better Schools stands as the final document in a series which has come to resemble a 
19th century novel, issued chapter by chapter, with a common theme but also 
unanticipated changes in direction and a succession of sub-plots. In many ways it 
reads like a summing up of the debates of the previous decade and in particular of the 
work of Sir Keith Joseph, one of the most active and influential of Secretaries of State 
for many years. Yet Better Schools does far more than merely re-cap the debate of 
former years. This document is bursting with talk of initiatives under way, and of the 
implications for action across the whole gamut of school issues, expressed with force 
and clarity. It will therefore be useful to review the new policies included in the 
document and the administrative strategies that were proposed to deal with them. 
Paragraph 29 states that "action is necessary in four areas of policy". The first is 
concerned with "the need to secure greater clarity about the objectives and the content of 
the curriculum". This was later (para 81) re-stated as "a more precise definition .... of 
what pupils of different abilities should understand, know and be able to do", and then 
re-formulated yet again into "a definition of attainment targets". Better Schools 
concedes that this will be no easy task. Looking backwards from the early nineties, it 
is almost surprising to read that "Objectives cannot be agreed for all time" and that 
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"Even initial agreement will take several years to accomplish" (para 32). But the 
document contains various suggestions as to how these agreements would be forged : 
through further policy documents, such as Science 5-16 : a statement of policy  (DES 
1985c) ; HMI publications "designed both to inform and to stimulate discussion" ; and 
as the product of the APU surveys in English, mathematics and science. These moves 
would however stop short of "national syllabuses". 
The second area for action concerned the reform of examinations and the 
improvement of assessment which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
The third area concerned efforts "to improve the personal effectiveness of teachers 
and the management of the teacher force". After reviewing the policy for teacher 
training set in motion by Teaching Ouality (DES 1983e), the Secretary of State 
announced that the funding of INSET would be re-structured (see Chapter 6) and that 
he planned to introduce a scheme for teacher appraisal. 
The fourth area for action is concerned with the need 
to reform school government and to harness more fully the contribution 
which can be made to good school education by parents, employers and 
others outside the education service. 	 (para 29.4) 
The proposals represent a detailed response to the consultation which had followed the 
issue of the Green Paper parental Influence at School  (DES 1984b), during which 
parent organisations had resisted the idea that they should have 50% of the seats on 
governing bodies. Better Schools set out revised proposals, later incorporated into the 
Education Act of 1986. The explicit objective was to reduce LEA influence while at the 
same time recognising that governing bodies cannot be totally unconstrained by the 
responsibilities of the authority. (At this stage, 'opting-out' on the lines permitted in the 
Education Reform Act of 1988 does not appear to have been contemplated.) 
Better Schools contains two or three smaller items which can be seen as further 
nails in the coffin which was being slowly constructed for LEA autonomy. First, the 
DES indicated plans to conduct a survey of the role of local advisory services (para 
267); and second, it announced that LEAs would be asked to respond to HMI 
inspection reports, particularly in so far as there were implications for other schools 
(para 269). A third item to note is the reminder that the Education Support Grant 
scheme was due to get under way in the academic year 1985-86 and that this would 
have "an important contribution to make towards a limited and cost effective re- 
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deployment of expenditure into activities which particularly advance the shared 
objectives set out in this White Paper" (para 284). 
With the publication of Better Schools it becomes clear that many of the DES 
aspirations in relation to the curriculum, or to matters which have a direct bearing or 
influence upon the curriculum, are now being expressed in terms of action. These 
actions are of very disparate kinds - surveys, pilot projects, consultation processes, 
legislation, public relations, financial arrangements - but they show that the DES had 
moved beyond pious and hopeful exhortation, and was now finding scope within its 
statutory rights and traditional role, to expand both its influence and its authority over 
the system. These various devices were only just beginning to gel into a coherent 
strategy : but they do represent an attempt to explore the various types of power 
available to the centre. Moreover, it is clear that the local authorities, the teacher 
associations and that part of the 'educational world' which was opposed to the 
increasing drift towards heavy centralisation, were not displaying an equal 
sophistication in exploiting the power available to them.  
3.3 Expanding Powers : the Model Explored 
The Coercive Base 
It is now time to go back to the model of power developed in this thesis and to use it 
to chart the how of the department's aggrandisement. 
A convenient starting point is the observation by Fowler (1981), already noted, that 
as the Secretary of State lost the 'power of the purse', so he or she was obliged to 
resort to legislation. However legislation remained relatively scanty during the 
seventies. The only major parliamentary Act of the Labour administration was that of 
1976 which sought to enforce comprehensive re-organisation, an Act repealed by the 
Coservatives in 1979. One additional provision terminated the direct grant system. A 
short Education Bill was introduced in 1978, aimed at helping LEAs to make a planned 
response to falling rolls ; but this too was reversed by Conservative legislation in 1980. 
The Education Act of 1980 was an attempt to make immediate policy changes in the 
direction desired by the in-coming government : each element within this legislation 
was the product of prior thinking or commitment dating from five years of opposition. 
It contained the first moves to widen the membership of governing bodies by making 
the representation of parents a statutory requirement (many authorities had already 
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adopted this practice). New procedures concerning admission to schools were laid 
down in order to allow parents a greater degree of choice between schools and hence 
capacity to influence the decisions of their LEAs about closures. Schools were now 
required to produce brochures, providing much fuller information to parents about such 
matters as their aims, curricula, and examination results, thus apparently encouraging 
parents to make more informed comparisons between schools. Further provisions of 
the 1980 Act concerned procedures for the establishment, change of character or 
closure of schools, with new arrangements for the consideration of objections ; another 
measure was designed to restrain LEA action by facilitating local protest. And fmally, 
it was in this Act that the government honoured its commitment to the independent 
schools by announcing the introduction of the Assisted Places Scheme, possibly as 
compensation for the ending of the direct grant system (Salter and Tapper, 1985). 
The Education Act of 1981 was concerned with the implementation of changes in 
special education following on from the recommendations of the Warnock committee 
(DES, 1978f). This was, broadly speaking, a reformist measure of the 'old' type, for 
it reflected developments in specialist professional thinking and sought, in a consensual 
style, to work out the implications for the school system. Later problems were largely 
about the extent to which local authorities were able or willing to implement its 
requirements, given restrictions on both resources and expertise. 
There are two more important Acts to note, both remarkable for the degree to which 
their provisions reach into the heart of curriculum practice. The first of these, passed in 
1984, was the Education (Grants and Awards) Act. As its name suggests, it was 
concerned with finance ; the system of grant aid which it inaugurated will in large part 
be the topic of the second half of this thesis. For the moment, the point to note is that it 
was this legislation which established the Education Support Grant scheme, anticipated 
in Better Schools (DES 1985a). Under the Act, the DES took the power to retain 0.5% 
of planned educational expenditure. This money was then made available to LEAs 
which chose to put up proposals for pilot programmes or in-service training which met 
a government list of short to medium term curriculum policies. As already noted, there 
were many echoes between the priorities listed and the overall programme enunciated in 
Better Schools. In the first year the areas to be supported included pilot schemes for 
Records of Achievement, changes in mathematics teaching to reflect the 
recommendations of the Cockcroft committee, developments in the management of the 
teaching force, and the promotion of information technology. For 1986-87, further 
categories were added. In 1986, the Education (Amendment) Act confirmed the 
Secretary of State's satisfaction with the ESG scheme by increasing the retained 
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element of planned expenditure from 0.5% to 1%, and yet more. policy-oriented, 
categories were added. 
It is not of course easy to disentangle coercive from remunerative power in this 
development. As experienced by the system, ESGs are clearly fmancial devices for 
they are a means of securing extra resources in areas where the LEAs themselves may 
very well be committed to change. Nevertheless, they clearly represent a deliberate 
attempt to direct local initiative to centrally selected priorities by coercive means. The 
use of resources in this manner was previously outside the department's authority and 
the strategy had therefore to begin with the assumption of new powers through the 
process of legislation. 
It is interesting to see how these new powers were buttoned up. The 1984 Act 
announced that Regulations would be issued providing for ESGs as a percentage grant 
(ie. the DES would pay only 70% of approved expenditure), and that it would only be 
payable "in respect of prescribed expenditure within the financial year". Furthermore, 
it was envisaged that "payment ... shall be dependent upon the fulfilment of such 
conditions as shall be determined ... by the regulations" and that LEAs would be 
required "to comply with regulations made". This was not mere bureaucratic language. 
The implication was that these funds were not be siphoned off into other activities, and 
therefore there was an assumption of careful monitoring. Moreover, the sums to be 
spent on these centrally identified priorities would amount to 43% more that the total 
retained in the DES, because LEAs had to find £30 from their own budgets for every 
£70 provided from the ESGs. Finally it must be remembered that the retained money 
was not extra educational funding because the total block grant for education was to be 
top-sliced. 
The Education (no. 2) Act of 1986 was a major piece of educational legislation, 
dealing with further reform of governing bodies and the funding of in-service education 
for teachers. But there were also important supplementary elements, some of which 
were the product of amendments made during the passage of the Bill through the 
parliamentary process, notably in the House of Lords. These unexpected additions can 
be seen as extraneous to, but not necessarily unwelcomed by, government. They 
related to measures to "ensure" freedom of speech in the universities; to the need to 
avoid political indoctrination and to guarantee the "balanced treatment" of political 
issues in schools; to ensure that sex education in schools pays due attention to "moral 
considerations and the value of family life"; and to abolish corporal punishment. 
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Another important section concerned teacher appraisal : the Act gave the Secretary of 
State powers to "make regulations requiring LEAs to make regular appraisals". 
It was measures such as those reported in the past few lines - matters to do with the 
tone and style as well as the content of education - which seemed so strange as matters 
for legislation. For years such topics might reasonably have been areas over which the 
DES endeavoured to exercise some influence, to stimulate professional debate by 
means of HMI activity ; but the idea that they must now be the object of specific 
statutory control demonstrates the extent to which legislation grew in significance 
during these years. It is also an indication of the degree to which the traditional form of 
transactions between the educational 'partnership' no longer seemed adequate to 
government. 
However, the main intention of the 1986 Act was to focus on the third and fourth 
"areas for action" identified in Better Schools : the reform of school governance and the 
management of the teaching force. The significance of each for the curriculum is 
indirect but nevertheless important. In giving parents a bigger stake in the government 
of schools, and in ensuring that representatives of the community including its business 
interests were co-opted, the legislation severely curtailed the power of the local 
authority, for it could no longer nominate a majority of each Board. While the Act 
recognised the continuing responsibility of LEAs to determine the staffing, and the 
broad issues of school structure and finance, governors were now to be more directly 
responsible for the development and execution of school policy.and were required to 
ensure that parents had information about the school. The overall thrust towards letting 
the consumer influence the product was unmistakeable. In a speech to the Oxford 
Union in 1975, Sir Keith Joseph had argued that the Conservative party should seek 
the "common ground" between its policies and the aspirations of the people for, he 
said, "most people want to be served, not to be changed". He saw the common ground 
on education as a concern for basic skills, social attitudes and a preparation for work 
(Joseph, 1976). This legislation was intended to seek out that common ground, for its 
object was to reduce the influence of the local bureaucrats, the local professionals and 
indeed the local politicians, in favour of the "consumer" as both parent and employer. 
It did not, however, do anything to reduce the influence of central government ; for on 
the see-saw of power, the centre becomes weightier as the authority of the locality is 
progressively lightened. 
The re-organisation of in-service training for teachers via the introduction of specific 
grant will be analyzed in some depth in Chapter 6 as an example of the impact of 
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changing patterns of resource distribution. It is sufficient to note here that this was 
another piece of legislation designed to allocate new powers to the Secretary of State, 
and that there were very real similarities between the system now established for 
INSET and the earlier provision for ESGs. The move over INSET is another instance 
of overlap between the coercive and the remunerative ; and it illustrates the fact that in 
order to advance its grip upon the other bases of power, the DES has frequently to 
change the existing rules of the game by introducing legislation. However this is not 
invariably so, because not all new coercive powers are based upon changes in statute. 
The chief example of this is the way in which the DES chose to revive very long-
standing powers in relation to national policies on examinations. 
It has long been a commonplace in the comparative study of school systems to say 
that, whereas many countries control the curriculum from the centre and then leave 
assessment in the hands of the teachers, Britain does things the other way round. 
Broadfoot (1985) describes this as a contrast between process evaluation and product 
evaluation. She characterises the British education system as one of strong control 
(thanks to the emphasis on product evaluation in the form of public examinations) ; and 
she suggests that although this used to be essentially de-centralised control, there is 
now an increasing tendency towards centralisation. Strong but de-centralised control 
seems an accurate description of the position in the post-war years when the enormous 
influence of examinations over the curriculum was in the hands of the university 
controlled GCE boards and the teacher controlled CSE boards. The role of central 
government was essentially responsive, agreeing to some proposals such as the 
transformation of the School Certificate and Higher School Certificate into GCE 0 and 
A-levels in 1951, and the introduction of the CSE in 1964 ; and resisting others, 
notably those put forward by the Schools Council for the reform of sixth form 
examinations or for the introduction of a common examination at 16+. However, in the 
early eighties there seems to have been a rather rapid realisation in the DES that product 
evaluation had many advantages as a means of exerting control specifically over the 
curriculum, but also more widely over the performance of teachers and schools. In a 
notably frank interview, James Hamilton, Permanent Secretary at the DES from 1975 
to 1982, made this very clear : 
Looking back over his seven years at the DES and the debates that led to 
the publication of the Department's policy document, The School 
Curriculum, Sir James admits that the Government has shown too much 
"delicacy" about making its presence felt in the classroom 
	 While 
acknowledging that LEAs have a "pivotal role" to play in the evolution 
of educational policy and the implementation of educational 
development, he says there is an argument for the DES acting "more 
directly in certain limited areas of the curriculum" 
	
 The present 
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exercise of reforming examinations at 16-plus should be seen as part of 
this process of establishing greater central control, he says. 
(TES, 1.7.83) 
From this one must assume that, by 1982/83, the DES had realised that exhortations 
about common aims and national frameworks were having only a restricted impact and 
that more direct means were required. In the space of two or three years the role of 
central government in relation to the control of examinations was transformed. The 
most far reaching changes concerned the introduction, 11 years after it was first 
proposed by the Schools Council, of a common examination for 16 year olds, the 
General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE), but there were also significant 
changes at 17+. Broadfoot suggests that although this period also saw the growth of 
self-assessment in the form of profiles, and also new developments in graded 
assessment, the thrust of government policy was overall an attempt 
to exert greater influence through the accountability network and to 
make greater use of those assessment procedures which control the 
Content and process of education rather than individual achievement. 
(Broadfoot, 1985, my emphasis) 
I therefore intend to stress those aspects of the new procedures which have a particular 
emphasis on content and process. 
By the mid-eighties, government appeared to have decided that de facto educational 
goals could be clearly encapsulated in the examination system. (The fact that the 
Education Reform Act extended this principle through the establishment of national 
testing at 7, 11, 14 and 16 re-inforces this point.) Parents, employers, pupils and even 
teachers are, on a day to day basis, prepared to accept the achievement of particular 
certification as the rationale for school activities. Thus the specification of what is to be 
tested moulds what is taught and examination success is a key element in any 
consideration of accountability. Teachers accept the importance of good grades both as 
fulfilling their moral obligation to assist individual pupils through the system, and as 
indicating that they have met their professional obligation to achieve the best 
performance possible with any group of students. The Education Act of 1980 first 
linked professional accountability to examination success by demanding that results be 
published. The combined effect of this, and of greater parental choice between schools 
(based not infrequently on uncritical estimates of a school's past performance), was to 
make schools far more open to both public and official evaluation. 
What then of content and process ? The Schools Council, after extensive feasibility 
studies into the development of a common 16+ examination, forwarded their report to 
the DES in 1976. As Nuttall says 
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Proposals for a teacher-controlled and fairly liberal new examining 
system, linked to the ideal of comprehensive education, could not have 
been sent to the DES at a less auspicious time than the middle of 1976. 
(Nuttall, 1984, p167) 
In order to "safe-guard the public's confidence in the existing examinations", 
Shirley Williams felt it necessary to establish a further enquiry under Sir James 
Waddell. Their report recommended that there would need to be "differentiated" 
papers to cater for a full 60% of the ability range, much greater co-ordination of the 
existing examining boards, and "nationally agreed criteria" to ensure comparability 
between them (DES, 1978b). 
It was in the development of this notion of national criteria that the DES found the 
strategy for control over the "content and process" of 16-plus examinations. The GCE 
and CSE boards began the task and presented their draft proposals to Sir Keith Joseph 
in early 1983. He then made it the first task of the new nominated Secondary 
Education Council (SEC) to advise on these draft national criteria. The definition of 
such criteria on a subject by subject basis, and at least the possibility that within these it 
would prove possible to define the level of performance expected for the award of 
specific grades, thus became the price, the sine qua non, for a system to which many 
teachers were strongly committed. 
The range and reach of the national criteria developed for the GCSE broke entirely 
new ground. As adopted, they carried strong implications for both content and 
pedagogy. Inevitably, the criteria for each subject imposed a particular conception of 
that subject (which left scope for considerable disagreement about the model presented 
in many of them). Moreover, both the strategies for differentiation, and the insistence 
on practical and course work (now once more out of fashion) shaped the curriculum 
experience. The GCSE remained, of course, a single subject examination. Thus it did 
not address two of the curriculum principles which were so strongly featured in Better 
Schools, namely balance and breadth. However, the other two - relevance and 
differentiation - were key elements: the criteria insisted at all points on the practical 
application of knowledge and its relation to the world of work; and as we have seen, 
the need to target pupils towards the achievement of a particular range of grades ensures 
that this is a differentiated examination system, rather than a common examination 
(Gipps, 1986). 
Space does not permit a discussion of two other significant issues surrounding these 
developments : namely the role of teacher assessment and the 'solution' of the 
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curriculum 'problem' for the 40% of pupils initially excluded from the remit of the 
GCSE. The first of these matters is interestingly debated by Bowe and Whitty (1984) 
and by Torrance (1986) who concludes that under the new dispensation teachers 
become involved in school-based examining directed from elsewhere rather than 
exercising genuine responsibility for assessment. The second was resolved both by 
teacher reluctance to abandon the concept of a common examination, and by an 
ingenious (or adroit?) manoeuvre by Joseph who declared that the performance of 80-
90% of children would rise to the level currently achieved by the average ! Overall, the 
GCSE exercise serves to indicate the extent to which government re-captured the school 
examination system, and did it in such a way as to acquire substantial authority, not 
only over the outer framework, but also over the details of "content and process". 
The development and subsequent eclipse of a new examination for 17+ students 
nicely illustrates once again the decisive effect on the curriculum that examination policy 
was now to make. As the 'new sixth' of the sixties gave way to the 'reluctant sixth' of 
the seventies when many stayed in school or college because of high unemployment, 
the curriculum offer available to the non A-level student became enormously diverse 
and frequently ineffective ((Dean and Steeds, 1981, p8). The Schools' Council had 
proposed an upward extension of the CSE to provide a single subject, non-vocational 
Certificate of Extended Education (Schools Council Working Papers 45 and 46, 
1972/73), and with some reservations, this was finally commended to the DES by the 
Keohane committee (DES, 1979). Simultaneously however, the Further Education 
Unit had sponsored developments based on the recommendations of its own working 
party in A Basis for Choice (the Mansell report, FEU, 1979). This attempted to 
systematize the many pre-employment courses which in recent years had been offered 
to young school leavers in FE colleges ; it was avowedly vocational, though not 
narrowly job-specific. Its approach grew out of a new challenge rather than, as was 
the case with the CEE, evolved from an old tradition. 
Faced with the necessity of choosing between these two lines of development, the 
new Conservative administration preferred the FEU model and the result was the 
emergence of the Certificate of Pre-Vocational Education (CPVE). Despite its 
subsequent problematic history, the point to note here is that the government's actions 
in this area, in choosing between two contrasting curriculum and educational models, 
demonstrates again the potency of the control over assessment. 
In an important paper on the introduction of the CPVE, significantly titled Towards 
g Tertiary Tri-partism, Ranson (1984) has argued that the state's policy for "steering" 
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the education system has been guided by three under-lying pre-suppositions : 
"vocationalism, rationalization, and stratification". "Steering" is itself a concept which 
derives from the work of German sociologists, notably Habermas (1976), but with 
close links to the theories of "crisis" as developed by Offe which will be discussed 
later. Thus, in responding to the apparent need to "steer", government actions have 
been shaped by a conviction that the enhanced vocational preparation of young people 
will serve variously as a remedy for unemployment and poor economic performance, 
and also as an apparent "strategy" to deal with more deep-seated, politically 
embarrassing, but possibly intractable, social and economic problems. After 
vocationalism, there are two further pre-suppositions to consider : firstly, the need for 
the rationalization of an over-extended, over-complicated system, which appears to be 
about the responsible management of resources but which can also be understood as "in 
essence an opportunity question about the educational offering which young people 
should be provided with"; and secondly, a commitment to stratification, by which 
Ranson means "the limitation of opportunities ... through more sharply differentiated 
curricular experiences". 
In the preceding paragraph, we have strayed into the definition of particular policy 
preferences. The overall purpose of this section has been rather different, namely an 
attempt to show how the DES set out to re-capture the strong control over the 
curriculum which had certainly once resided in the examination system but which had 
long been dispersed and diluted among a proliferation of examining boards and 
professional interests. However, changes in the mechanisms of policy implementation 
can never be divorced from the purposes behind those changes; the particular directions 
of policy development shape the particular powers which different actors may seek to 
acquire or develop. If Ranson is right in identifying vocationalism, rationalisation and 
stratification as the key assumptions behind government policy, we may perhaps 
assume that there was a view of what was wrong with the system which was the mirror 
image of his triad : liberal academicism, diversity, and egalitarianism. To over-turn the 
latter three in favour of the former required strong central action based on re-defined 
authority, The control of examinations at 16-plus and 17-plus (and other forms of 
assessment) was seen to be a particularly potent weapon in this campaign, which could 
complement, and in some ways surpass, legislation as a means of turning curriculum 
policy into practice. 
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The Remunerative Base 
On one interpretation of events, the supposed independence of local authorities has 
been a popular but largely rhetorical theme. The DES oversees and regulates many 
elements within their provision and they in turn rely on central government to cover as 
much as half of their total spending. However on another view, their independence has 
for a long time seemed secure, even if at times embattled, in that they answer to a local 
electorate, and they both raise and spend a local tax to support their activities. Thus 
they are qualitatively and historically distinct from a mere regional or local office of the 
national bureaucracy. But we have seen in the last section that the DES has tended to 
weaken the 'local electorate' factor by re-inforcing the influence of both individual 
parents and governing bodies. We shall now turn to consider how government has 
also succeeded in limiting the financial autonomy of local authorities. 
In the previous chapter some attention was paid to the Rate Support Grant. It was 
noted that it was essentially a block grant and, particularly after local government re-
organisation in 1974, an education committee budget had increasingly to be negotiated 
through the local authority's Finance and general Purposes committee. Despite 
complaints about the constrictions resulting from corporate management structures, but 
nevertheless decisions about the level and priorities of spending remained largely local. 
When the Conservatives were elected in 1979, they were committed to a policy of 
cutting public expenditure. In this they found little to help them in the existing 
arrangements for the RSG. In particular, the calculation of the "needs" element (60% 
of the RSG) created problems, for "... by concentrating on previous expenditure as a 
determinant of need, (it) favoured high spending authorities and offered few 
inducments to lower expenditure"(Dennison, 1984, p74). 
Accordingly in 1981, the Conservatives introduced the notion of Grant Related 
Expenditure (GRE). GRE is arrived at by calculating, on a service by service basis, 
what local authorities need to spend in order to secure the same standard of provision as 
other authorities in similar circumstances. The GREs for individual services are then 
aggregated for each authority, and it is these composite figures which are used in 
calculating the overall block grant (Crispin, 1985; Travers, 1986a). Although it was 
not originally intended that the GRE for each service should be published, the DES has 
each year allowed the figure proposed for education to be publicly known. GREs 
therefore represent 
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some form of itemization of what ought to be spent ....(Although) an 
authority does not have to comply with the specified figures, ... 
centrally they provide a framework for much tighter control (and) locally 
they can be used as nominated national norms by particular groups in 
the authority to argue for preferred spending patterns. 
(Dennison, 1984, p76) 
The Treasury initially tried to re-inforce the impact of GREs by introducing 
"thresholds" and "tapering multipliers" to penalise local authorities who overspent by 
more than 10% of the estimate, thus forcing the high spenders to cover additional 
expenditure from local rates. However, this alone did nothing to deter the high 
spenders, while overall there was a tendency for the lower spenders to increase their 
expenditure. In 1982 the government therefore introduced the Local Government 
Finance Act which forbade the raising of supplementary rates; and in the following 
year, provision was made for abatement (hold-back) of grant as a penalty for 
overspend. In addition, overall targets were introduced, largely based on spending in 
the previous year, and failure to meet these resulted in further penalties. The net result 
has been that "government has not only introduced a new grant system, but also 
sponsored a major increase in central control over local decision-making" (Dennison, 
1984, p79). 
In 1985 Crispin argued that while expenditure cuts had been significant, the 
publication of GREs in relation to education had not had an enormous impact on local 
authority corporate management practices because authorities tended to discredit the 
whole exercise : the RSG was still a block grant without specific ear-marking, and in 
any event, education often received more than its alloted share. Equally, it had had little 
effect on pressure group activity because few understood it and moreover, their 
concerns were often unpredictable and mutually contradictory (Crispin, 1985). This, I 
think, may be to confuse the surface activities with the underlying realities. GREs, and 
indeed other forms of target setting, have tended to be calculated on the basis of local 
authority statutory duties at the expense of their discretionary powers. Yet it is 
precisely at the margins, in those areas where there is scope for discretion, that the style 
and quality of LEA provision is determined. Where all freedom to allocate fmance has 
gone, there is no autonomy of any real kind. As Dennison says 
The risk, of course, from a government perspective (on the assumption 
that it wishes local authorities to continue) is that eventually the notion 
of local autonomy will be reduced to a meaningless level. It has always 
been circumscribed and its continued erosion must produce 
circumstances in which those elected (and eventually the electorate) will 
perceive that no choices remain open to them. 
(Dennison, 1984, p82) 
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Parallel with these inroads into the block grant system, there was a steady increase 
in the use of specific grant. The in-service training grants of 1982 and the Education 
Support Grants of 1985 have already been discussed. There have been other small 
examples within the range of DES activities but the major practitioner of this style of 
funding within the education and training system has been the Manpower Services 
Commission (re-named the Training Agency in 1988, thereafter the Training 
Commission and subsequently the Training Enterprise and Education Division : its 
original name will be retained in relation to the years of its usage). 
As set out in Chapter 1, I intend to examine this form of funding in some depth, 
using the term 'categorical funding' to describe it, and exploring its operations and 
implications in various settings. At this point I intend merely to refer to the reasons 
why this form of funding had many attractions for an administration seeking to extend 
its powers. One such reason is the extraordinarily cumbersome nature of the RSG 
procedure. The DES might indicate that extra monies have been allocated for a specific 
purpose within the calculation of relevant expenditure submitted to the Treasury. 
However, despite the refinement of the GRE machinery, ultimate decisions on 
expenditure were a long way removed from the original calculations of need in 
Whitehall, and even when they are taken in accordance with DES intentions, the period 
from policy formulation to policy implementation seemed unacceptably long. In 1986, 
Travers wrote 
Local government finance is in a mess, following decades in which rates 
have been allowed to become badly out-of-date, and when the RSG 
system has increasingly been used for new and complex purposes. As 
education makes up about half of all local authority spending, the 
degeneration of the system of local finance has inevitably threatened the 
funding of the service. 
(Travers, 1986b) 
Yet until the Secretary of State took powers in 1984 to retain a percentage of overall 
grant for the Education Support Grants, the DES had no power to target monies on 
areas it had identified as priorities. Travers continued 
In the past two or three years, MPs in all parties have become alarmed 
at the fall in spending on capital, books, equipment, and, in some cases, 
in general provision. Cuts in services (whether real or imagined) have 
led to pressure on the government to "do something" about areas where 
provision has been reduced. Reports by Her Majesty's Inspectorate 
have backed the notion that many, or all, authorities had problems 
because of lack of spending. In addition, in the more politically-charged 
atmosphere of recent years, the government has come under pressure 
from its own supporters to speed through some of the more radical 
policies that they see as essential. 
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The MSC pioneered the use of specific grant during the seventies to fund the 
provision and management of the schemes connected with its training responsibilities, 
particularly in relation to the young unemployed. Its funds were 'new monies', quite 
outside the RSG structures. One of the MSC's more remarkable and remarked 
characteristics has been its ability to get schemes off the ground on breathtakingly short 
time-scales. This was clearly a model to copy. Figure 1 (overleaf) shows the 
remarkable growth in this form of funding between 1983 and 1988 ; the DES spent £5 
million in this way in 1983-84 and £178 million in 1987-88. Meantime the MSC 
continued to spend a similar sum on activities within schools and colleges, having 
captured from the DES 25% of the funding for non-advanced further education. 
Figure 2 (overleaf) shows the flow of funds around the education system in the late 
eighties (Williams, 1987; Peacock et al, 1967). The diagram clearly indicates the 
restricted extent of direct expenditure by the DES - to the UGC for the universities, and 
to a very limited range of centrally funded institutions; to this, we should add the sums 
paid direct to independent schools under the Assisted Places Scheme. The diagram also 
shows that, unlike the DES, the Department of Employment, through the MSC, was 
putting money directly into schools and colleges, or into LEAs to support agreed 
programmes in those institutions. The significance of the ESG scheme is that it put a 
completely new track into the system (not shown in this diagram) whereby money 
flowed direct from DES to LEA for agreed programmes, in a manner very similar to 
that used by the MSC. Furthermore, as we saw above, the DES also found strategies 
to influence local expenditure supported by the RSG and so there is a qualitative change 
which the diagram again does not show. 
It is interesting to consider what would happen if each line on this flow diagram 
were proportional to the funds that it represents. Such graphics would be difficult 
because of the huge sums within educational budgets which are required simply to 
maintain the ongoing provision. However, if it were possible to make the lines 
proportional not to total expenditure but rather to the amount of money over which the 
various spending bodies have discretion after meeting their on-going obligations, a very 
different picture would emerge. Policy change has been described as disjointed 
incrementalism - or decrementalism: it can usually occur only at the margins. Thus 
specific grants would acquire a significance out of all proportion to their size in relation 
to total expenditure. 
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DEPARTMENT 
OF 
EMPLOYMENT 
Growth in specific grants 
(Ent) 
Education and Science 
1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 
(Est) 	 (Plan) 	 (Plan) 
In-service teacher training 5.1 10.2 17.5 
	 21.0 	 114.0 
Education Support Grant 21.0 	 45.0 	 64.0 
Employment 
Technical & Vocational 
Education Initiative 6.7 25.6 31.4 	 40.9 	 58.4 
TVEI-related In-service 
training scheme 5.0 	 20.0 4 	 n/a 
Work-related non-advanced FE 65.0 	 110.0 	 112.8 
Industrial Language 
Training Service 2.0 2.1 2.1 
	 2.3 . 	 2.35 
Capital grants for YTS 
accommodation 7.98 3.4 2.3 	 0.5 	 — 
(Source: Second Report from the Education, Science and Arts Committee. 
Session 1985-86, HoC Paper 351, Table 4, pages xii-xiii; Figures for 
DE in 1987-88 are for 1986 Public Expenditure White Paper) 
Figure 1: Growth in specific grants, 1983 - 1988 
(taken from Travers, 1986b) 
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Figure 2: Principle flows of funds into education in 
Education 
(taken from Williams, 1987) 
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The manner in which the DES was able to spell out the activities for which it would 
provide funds under the ESG scheme showed that specific grant was and is a very 
precise instrument for targetting funds on the policy requirements of central 
government. It is scarcely surprising therefore that government has since sought to use 
such strategies more widely. Specific grant, as practised by the MSC, is a singularly 
sophisticated device in that authorities (and other agencies) 'choose' whether or not to 
bid for resources under these schemes, thus allowing government to maintain the 
semblance of local autonomy while undermining its substance. Yet this is not to deny 
the point made by Williams about the flow diagram : that "there has been a significant 
shift rightwards in the devolution of financial discretion over the details of 
expenditure". He cites the view of the Audit Commission that financial responsibility 
should be devolved to the "users of finance", and the parallel recommendation of the 
Jarratt committee that more financial autonomy should be given to the heads of cost 
centres in the universities. For, as Williams says, 
.... (the fact) that this discretion is being exercised within a tightening 
financial straightjacket is not simply a result of financial stringency. 
Accountability is being brought about through funding mechanisms 
rather than through administrative and legal controls. 
(Williams, 1987, p15) 
Such mechanisms were envisaged in the quotations earlier in this chapter from the 
1984 Education (Grants and Awards) Bill concerning the regulations that would cover 
the payment of ESGs; and we shall see them in action in the following chapter when we 
turn to examine the implementation of schemes funded by specific grant. 
Before leaving the remunerative base, I want to refer once more to planning 
processes. The rationale for output budgeting procedures and for PESC reviews is 
essentially concerned with forecasting and then controlling costs. The PAR exercises, 
which deliberately set out to consider alternatives, are accompanied by details of their 
budgetary implications. Salter and Tapper (1981, p101) suggest that it was the 
Robbins report (Committee on Higher Education, 1963) that set the trend for 
determining policy on the basis of projected numbers, a method that was confirmed 
with the publication of Educational Planning Paper no 2 (DES, 1970b) which dealt with 
the future provision of places in higher education. Despite the claim in that document, 
that it "carries no implication whatever for future government policy", Salter and 
Tapper argue that alternative policies were not explored because, as the Paper itself 
said, "it is not possible to assess their impact in quantitative terms". They therefore 
argue that 
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The more that official estimates dominate the context in which policies 
are made, the more these estimates are likely to become self-fulfilling 
prophecies and, conversely, the more that opportunities to develop the 
system in different ways will be neglected. Official command of the 
type of information input for the consideration of policy makers .... will 
naturally prescribe the parameters of possible policies. 
(Salter and Tapper, 1981, p102) 
Estimates of numbers based upon the extrapolation of trends are invariably translated 
into money terms. What is more, some policy options are more readily costed than 
others and are thus more likely to appear among the options put forward by planners. 
The control of the planning process and the right/need to command the flows of 
information upon which planning is based are both essentially related to the allocation 
of future resources. Hence the control of the planning process is an aspect of power 
which derives from, and feeds back into, the remunerative base. 
In 1981, Salter and Tapper argued that these tendencies in the techniques of 
planning result in a process of enclosure which restricts participation in policy making 
to specialists; that is to say, to officers at the local level and to civil servants at the 
national level. Thus, faced with the detailed policy agenda of the department, 
increasingly based on scientific planning and forecasting techniques, the Minister has 
only a slim chance of making a real impact on policy : 
... it is our contention that the procedures on which the policy-making 
process is founded increasingly circumscribe the nature of its possible 
content and hence the range of choices available to a minister. 
(op cit, p104) 
By 1985 they recognised that this view needed modifying since the advent of crusading 
Conservative Secretaries of State, with policy agendas developed elsewhere. But, in 
relation to LEAs, the "administrative necessity" of the department's centralised planning 
procedures bears down with considerable force, requiring from them quantities of data 
about their schools, colleges, staff, students, budgets and so forth. At the same time, 
LEAs are subject to similar horizontal pressures as a result of the corporate planning 
process within their own authority. 
Education is only one of many areas of public sector policy to have been engulfed in 
technical planning processes. In an article on parallel exercises in fields as diverse as 
transport, housing and inner city partnerships, Leach et al write 
... whatever the reality of the experience of rational approaches in 
central and local government, the 'language' of the rational model, with 
its use of the concepts of needs, objectives, alternatives, evaluation, 
choice, implementation, monitoring, review, etc, has become 
82 
increasingly common .... more and more public organisations have 
apparently felt obliged to go through the motions of presenting and 
justifying favoured policies in terms of the rational model. 
(Leach et al, 1983) 
They go on to demonstrate that many programmes, based initially on joint planning 
approaches, develop into far more narrowly focussed enterprises : thus a concern for 
planned expenditure is replaced by moves to restrain growth; the emphasis on strategy 
becomes a demand to know next year's programme; and an apparent concern for local 
knowledge and autonomy gives way to central dominance. It is not, therefore, only in 
relation to education that the links between planning and resource control are clear. 
The Knowledge / Information Base 
Bureaucratic administration means fundamentally the exercise of control 
on the basis of knowledge ... This consists on the one hand in technical 
knowledge which, by itself, is sufficient to ensure it a position of 
extraordinary power. But in addition to this, bureaucratic organisations, 
or the holders of power who make use of them, have the tendency to 
increase their power still further by the knowledge growing out of 
experience in the service. For they acquire through the conduct of office 
a special knowledge of facts and have available a store of documentary 
material peculiar to themselves. 
(Weber, 1947, p339) 
If we set out to examine the means by which the power of the DES has grown, we 
quickly discover the central importance of knowledge. Weber's remarks suggest that 
knowledge is indeed the fundamental element of power. He does not, however, 
suggest that knowledge is a seamless whole. In the first place he distinguishes 
"technical knowledge", and if we look for this in the DES we have to recognise that 
there is a substantial and varied amount of expertise within the department. There are 
the obvious categories of accountant, economist, statistician, lawyer; but more 
significant than any of these relatively small groups is the expertise of the professional 
civil servant, based on years of practice, training and prolonged apprenticeship in the 
arts of administration To this we must add the extensive professional expertise of those 
members of the teaching force who have been recruited to the Inspectorate. Thus 
substantial amounts of technical knowledge are to be found within the department 
although its depth, extent and sheer quality are strangely obscured from general view 
by the convention of secrecy within which bureaucracies (as Weber also says) prefer to 
operate : distance may, perhaps, lend enchantment. 
Weber's second source of power - accumulated experience - is another characteristic 
well known to observers of the DES. The increased activity within the department and 
its growing self-consciousness about the conduct of its own affairs (in part promoted, 
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as we have seen, by comment and criticism from the OECD, the Expenditure 
Committee and many others) have resulted in a rapid growth of knowledge based on 
"the conduct of office". And finally, Weber's reference to the "store of documentary 
material peculiar to themselves" is a reminder that knowledge is a complex 
phenomenon, that information is an important part of it, and that the control of 
information is a widely acknowledged form of power. 
The adoption of planning procedures based upon calculations of inputs, outputs, 
and the extrapolation of trends has already been identified as a powerful source of 
information. A major bid during these years for information relating to system outputs 
is to be found in the work of the Assessment of Performance Unit, set up in 1974 but 
not fully operational until 1978. Thereafter the Unit conducted surveys of language and 
maths at 11 and 15; of science at 11, 13 and 15; and of modern languages via a survey 
of French at 13. 
There are some curious ambiguities about both the origins and the objectives of this 
Unit : an assessment of the return on increased educational spending, the measurement 
of attainment via light sampling, and the value of regular monitoring, were all mooted 
between 1968 and 1974. But 
There also seems to have been an increasing concern around 1970 that 
the DES (as distinct from HMI) was excluded from involvement with 
the educational curriculum, despite funding the system and ultimately 
being held accountable for it ... DES involvement with testing presented 
itself as a means of obtaining a direct evaluation of the performance of 
the system and consequently a means of achieving some say in 
curriculum content. 
(Gipps and Goldstein, 1983, p6) 
When the APU's terms of reference were first announced, it was suggested that it 
would be primarily concerned with under-achievement, and the consequent implications 
for resource allocation. However, this task was clearly located within the broader one 
of monitoring the overall achievement of pupils. The Yellow Book (TES, 15.10.76) 
claimed that the testing programmes would "set national standards". Education in 
 
Schools suggested there was a "growing recognition that the need for schools to 
demonstrate their accountability to the society which they serve requires a coherent and 
soundly based means of assessment for the education system as a whole, for schools 
and for individual pupils" (DES 1977b). In 1978, the DES claimed that "information 
about the effectiveness of the school system is essential for the development of 
educational policy and the allocation of resources" (DES, 1978g). The 1979 
Conservative election manifesto promised that "The government's Assessment of 
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Performance Unit will set national standards in reading, writing and arithmetic". And 
in 1985 Better Schools  suggested that the APU surveys would support the definition of 
"broadly agreed objectives" across the school curriculum (DES, 1985a, para 81). 
Clearly, the APU was either a multi-purpose enterprise, or one for which no clear 
function was ever identified. 
Gipps and Goldstein (1983) refer to the fact that the DES at no time promoted public 
discussion about the APU's objectives, though it seemed likely that it was seen as a 
way of gaining some purchase on the curriculum. Lawton (1980) takes a similar view, 
suggesting that the APU was a means of taking "a much more positive role in 
curriculum matters" and of "extending influence over the curriculum". He sees the 
APU as 
an interesting example of the DES 'using the back door' (ie the disguise 
of under-achievement) when they might have expected that their 
proposal would arouse anxieties and difficulties if more direct methods 
were used.... Although the British civil servant has often been praised 
for being non-political in the party political sense, civil servants are 
highly political in the sense of knowing how to get what they want. 
(Lawton, 1980, p 60, my parentheses) 
But it is Salter and Tapper (1981) who give an account of DES strategy which is 
closest to the present argument and also succeeds in transcending the many ambiguities 
as to the specific objectives of the APU. They argue that 
As the DES moves further in the direction of policy-making enclosure, 
so it must rely more on its internal means of information collecting 
rather than on information supplied by external groups. (p110) 
However later they say that the Unit has "failed to gather information in the complexity 
and depth the DES would have preferred" (p234). 
The reason for that failure, if failure it was, may well lie in the absence of any 
attempt to identify what policy issues might be addressed by the Unit's activities. As 
Gipps and Goldstein say 
The aim seems to have been simply to develop a national system of 
assessment that functioned and was acceptable with little thought as to 
what specific questions it might answer. 
(Gipps and Goldstein, 1983, p 19) 
Their conclusion is that, in the APU, the DES had a "large and expensive research 
enterprise with considerable potential for answering a wide range of interesting and 
important questions ", but that it seems to have been held to a "narrowly conceived 
monitoring exercise". 
85 
The impact of the APU exercise to the mid-eighties was thus less decisive than its 
critics feared. "Blanket testing" in LEAs which critics feared would lead to increased 
centralisation and control(see especially Holt, 1981), did not emerge as a significant 
factor not least because of damaging criticism of the statistical model on which the 
validity of the tests was supposed to rest (Goldstein, 1981). The back-wash effect on 
the curriculum was also much less than anticipated. The Unit was apparently debarred 
from discussing its findings in its Reports, which were presented in a "facts only" 
format, thought suitable for an exercise which seen as on-going monitoring rather than 
policy-related research. 
Thus, in the minds of many, the APU passed from bogey to boring routine. No 
matter what its observers and evaluators hoped or feared it might do, it is best 
understood as a strategy for monitoring and for information gathering. And in the 
game of information as power, we do not only need to consider what use can be made 
of the information held : the fact of holding information, and of being in a position to 
require others to provide it, in itself demonstrates and thus enhances power. 
I now turn to the contribution made by HMI to the department's growing appetite 
for information during these years. The Rayner report of 1983 into the work of the 
Inspectorate made it clear that the first and over-riding duty of HMI was to assess 
standards and to advise the government on the state of education nationally (DES 
1983a, p91) . This advice was to be both quantitative and qualitative. Part of the 
former responsibility was discharged through the Inspectorate's key role in the APU 
but in addition they increasingly undertook large and small scale surveys of whole 
sectors or of specific topics which usually combined quantitative analysis with 
commentary and critique. The most substantial efforts of this kind were the major 
surveys of both primary and secondary education completed in the late seventies (DES, 
1978c and 1979b). 
Such surveys, coupled with the routine processes of school inspection and the 
responsibility of representing the DES on a huge range of bodies, within and beyond 
education, fed HMI knowledge of the system and therefore enabled the Inspectorate to 
aggregate its experience and make qualitative statements, privately or publicly, on 
issues of concern to the department. Thus the DES Annual Reports emphasised the 
enhanced role of HMI in collecting and transmitting information for the department's 
internal purposes (DES 1977d and 1978d), and the 1978 Report specifically mentions 
their contribution to the RSG discussions. 
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So far this discussion has dealt with both APU and HMI input into the departmental 
information base. But there is another sense in which we must consider the 
knowledge/information base as a source of power, and that is in relation not to the 
accumulation but rather to the production of knowledge. 
In examining the post-war decades, it was argued that knowledge production had 
become a widely dispersed activity. Academics, researchers, teacher-trainers, 
platform-oriented teachers, subject associations, curriculum developers and evaluators 
were the people who generated and fed discussions of educational issues. Moreover, 
as power in the system was more widely dispersed, the views and actions of local 
politicians and officials and of the teacher associations were of far greater importance 
and therefore received considerable attention. But since the middle seventies, the DES 
appears to have successfully colonised the knowledge-production process by 
promoting its own capacity to choose the issues and lead the debate, and also by 
systematically establishing the centrality of some groups in this matter while down-
grading or, as in the case of the Schools' Council, positively abolishing others. 
In this take-over, HMI have played a key role. From a low-point in the mid-
seventies, the Inspectorate achieved an increasingly prominent role in knowledge 
production. Some of the credit for this clearly belongs to an exceptionally strong-
minded and able Senior Chief Inspector, Sheila Browne. But larger wheels were 
turning than can be explained with reference to a single individual. Sheila Browne's 
successor, Eric Bolton, said in 1984 
....we are quite clearly under pressure to use more of our time in 
relation to policy and policy interests and developing policy than we 
have ever had to do in the Inspectorate's history. 
(THES, 8.11.84) 
There were, he said, "fractious" and "troublesome" effects accompanying the shift from 
"years ago when nobody bothered what HMI said" to a situation where "suddenly 
everybody wants to know what HMI thinks". Obviously some part of this contribution 
was made during internal planning meetings ; but during this period HMI came to adopt 
a far more positive and an increasingly prescriptive role in the public promotion of 
specific educational values. 
When HMI produced Curriculum 11-16 (DES 1977e), it was greeted with respect 
but also with some amazement, because for many years the Inspectorate had not made 
such a direct and public statement about curriculum, or indeed, any other matter. 
Thereafter they went into print on many occasions. Publications were of various types. 
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First, there were the broad statements on curriculum policy : the ideas concerning 
"areas of experience" which first appeared in Curriculum 11-16 were followed up with 
five LEAs and further reports were issued in 1981 and 1983 (DES, 198 lb and 1983c); 
in 1980, HMI published their View of the Curriculum (DES, 1980b) in response to a 
direct request from the DES, a document which many considered showed some 
interesting ideological differences from the parallel DES statement, A Framework for 
the Curriculum published a few hours beforehand (DES,1980a); and in 1985, HMI 
issued a further document, Curriculum 5-16 (DES, 1985b), again well received as a 
balanced professional statement. Second, HMI published surveys of provision across 
the various sectors of the school system : primary (DES,1978c), secondary 
(DES,1979b), and middle schools (DES, 1985d), combining quantitative data with 
discussion and evaluative commentary. Third, HMI published a series of papers in the 
late seventies under the general title of Matters for Discussion  and starting in 1985, a 
further series entitled Curriculum Matters. Although the later series appeared in a 
changed climate (evidenced, for example, by the reference to their function in Better 
,Schools - see above) and they are therefore significantly more prescriptive, taken 
together the two series show a remarkable breadth and coverage. Fourth, there was a 
substantial number of one-off papers on matters as widely varied as behavioural units, 
travellers' children, homework and outdoor education. Fifth, there was a very 
substantial body of school and college inspection reports (220 in 1983 alone) together 
with various summaries and information booklets about procedures. Into this group 
must come the various trouble-shooting inspections which were carried out under the 
direct instruction of the Secretary of State but which did not always produce the 
judgements anticipated : such, for example, were the reports in the early eighties on the 
North London Polytechnic and on the London Borough of Haringey (Lawton and 
Gordon, 1987, p148). And finally, there were the Annual Surveys of Educational 
Expenditure, published each year since 1981, which did not hesitate to identify the 
negative effects of expenditure cuts. 
This list adds up to a formidable body of material, much of which was, and is, 
acknowledged to be of high quality. One effect has been that there is hardly a 
curriculum issue or a topic of importance which has not been the focus of some HMI 
study or position statement. In the course of the decade, HMI thus moved from a 
position virtually outside the circle into one very close to the centre (although it has to 
be said that after the departure of Keith Joseph in 1986, their importance progressively 
declined ; they played little part in the development of the National Curriculum and they 
are currently under-going a major reorganisation and retrenchment). 
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One question concerns the degree to which HMI have been independent of the DES. 
At one extreme are the views of Salter and Tapper (1981 and 1985) who see HMI as 
the "organic intellectuals" of the department. Using arguments derived from Gramsci, 
they suggest that as the DES reaches for qualitatively different powers, particularly in 
relation to the curriculum, it needs to find sources of legitimation for its new role and 
for the ideological thrust of its preferred policies. During the decade to 1985, such 
legitimation was in large part provided by the Inspectorate whose function was 
to provide a ready and detailed framework of ideas which can be used to 
"guide" future consultations on the curriculum with LEAs 
	 One rule 
(was) to keep up a supply of publications and advice to try and establish 
the climate within which discussion takes place. 
(Salter and Tapper, 1981, p215) 
Thus HMI's vaunted independence, and even the fact of their occasional intransigence 
(as in the matter of their critical Annual Surveys; or their manifestly more liberal and 
egalitarian views on the common curriculum) only serve to enhance their value as the 
intellectual under-writers of DES policy : in the view of Salter and Tapper, such 
hiccups helped to sustain the perception that HMI were not hired hacks, but rather 
independent professionals. 
By 1985, they had modified their view of the unchallenged "bureaucratic dynamic" 
of the DES (as already discussed) but they still saw a vital role for HMI in the 
development of the department's powers. For example, they argue that the decision to 
publish inspection reports extended HMI influence over individual institutions and over 
LEAs, while simultaneously forcing upon the Inspectorate a need 
...to develop criteria about educational standards which can be used to 
assist the DES in extending its control over the curriculum. Unless the 
Department is in a position to pronounce authoritatively and in specific 
terms on what should be happening in schools .... it will never be able 
to activate anything other than indirect lines of control. 
(Salter and Tapper, 1985, p220) 
Since this was written, it has become clear that the DES and, in particular, the Secretary 
of State has sought and found legitimation for policy from an ever widening 
constituency ; and indeed, "specifics" about what should be happening are emerging 
from other sources such as right wing "think tanks", interest groups representing 
employers and, latterly, the various working parties convened to develop the National 
Curriculum. But the Salter and Tapper arguments about the role and function of HMI 
from the mid seventies to the mid eighties remain strong. 
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An equally careful examination of HMI, and especially the theme of their 
independence, has been undertaken by Lawton and Gordon (1987). They argue that 
HMI continued to develop their independent role by advancing a distinctive curriculum 
model based on areas of learning and experience, a model somewhat at variance with 
that preferred by the DES ; by playing an important part in the reform of teacher 
education ; and by offering evidence on the harmful effects of government financial 
policies (p111). Between HMI and DES there is "not a chance difference of opinion, 
but a fundamental question of educational as opposed to bureaucratic values" (p113). 
Their conclusions concerning HMI involvement in the centralisation of control are 
quoted here in full : 
A good deal has been written about the dangers of centralism in 
education, and the tendency in recent years for the DES to increase its 
powers of control. The role of HMI in this is crucial : where more 
central influence is desirable HMI can give essential advice ; but there 
may be occasions when some centralist proposals are not justifiable, and 
if so, HMI should not hesitate to throw their weight behind 
professionalism in opposing the bureaucratic machine. The least 
desirable possibility for the future is that HMI might simply become part 
of the bureaucratic machine. As this book has shown, so far that 
possibility has been avoided. 
(Lawton and Gordon, 1987, p155) 
Examining these two contrasting views of HMI "independence", suggests that there 
is no real "truth" to discover in the situation ; nor is there any real need to search for 
such a mirage (unless one wants to advocate a King Arthur role for the Inspectorate, a 
wish that appears to lurk within the Lawton and Gordon conclusion). What matters 
here is the extent to which the DES secured, in no small part through the activities of 
HMI, a much greater control of both the collection of information and the generation of 
knowledge. Whether or not HMI were, or saw themselves as, or were seen as, an 
independent body of professional educators, they proved good allies to the DES in the 
cause of centralisation and the concentration of power. Their threatened demise in the 
1990s may prove, inter alia, a real loss to the department. 
HMI must therefore be seen as an in-house force for knowledge-production, 
possibly securing legitimation, but certainly generating power. But it would not be 
convincing if all knowledge-production were domesticated and it is not surprising that 
new networks favourable to DES policies were created or recruited during these years 
and that old ones were obliterated or down-graded. The most visible victim was the 
Schools' Council. 
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The Schools' Council was in public trouble from the time of the Yellow Book in 
1976, which described its work in these terms : 
The Schools' Council has performed moderately in commissioning 
development work in particular curricula areas ; it has had little success 
in tackling examination problems .... and it has scarcely begun to tackle 
the problems of the curriculum as a whole. Despite some good quality 
staff work, the overall performance of the Schools' Council has in fact, 
both on curriculum and on examination, been generally mediocre. 
Because of this and because the influence of the teachers unions has led 
to an increasingly political flavour - in the worst sense of the word - in 
its deliberations, the general reputation of the Schools' Council has 
steered a considerable decline over the last few years. 
(quoted in the TES, 15.10.76) 
After a constitutional reform imposed by Shirley Williams which effectively removed 
the teacher majorities and introduced representation of both industry and parents ; and 
after a depressing and possibly ill-conceived study of the "Impact and Take-up" of 
Council projects (Steadman et al, 1978 and 1980), the Council made a somewhat 
desperate switch to a new style of fostering small-scale school and teacher-based 
development projects clustered around themes that were not inconsistent with DES 
priorities at the time. However, with the benefit of hindsight, one has to say that these 
"programmes" were swimming against a rising tide in that they assumed the superiority 
of practitioner-based development. They found little favour with the DES. In 1981, 
Keith Joseph invited Nancy Trenaman to write a report on the Council's future, but 
despite her advocacy (Trenaman, 1981), the Council received the long-anticipated coup 
de grace in 1982. 
The Secretary of State replaced the Council with two bodies : the Secondary 
Examination Council (SEC), and the School Curriculum Development Committee 
(SCDC). As we have seen, once the department realised the potential of the 16-plus as 
a mechanism for curriculum control, the establishment of a nominated body to 
challenge the power of the school examination boards was essential. The SEC was 
therefore financed wholly by the DES, and its members personally appointed by the 
Secretary of State. The SCDC was a curious body. It was funded jointly by the DES 
and LEAs, who between them appointed its members. The task allotted to it was 
largely to complete or continue a relatively small number of projects left over from the 
Schools' Council's agenda. It was explicitly excluded from the task of advising the 
Secretary of State on curriculum policy. Both bodies were largely concerned with 
dissemination and regulation : they were not allowed to get into the business of 
knowledge production. After the 1988 Act they were replaced by the wholly funded 
and nominated National Curriculum Council (NCC) and the School Examination and 
Assessment Council (SEAC). 
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While the DES was in a position to axe the Schools' Council with impunity, other 
rival producers of educational knowledge proved harder to suppress. This is not to say 
that no efforts in this direction were made. Attacks on educationalists in higher 
education took the form of cuts in research funding, and a sustained intervention in the 
work which they undertake with and for teachers, in initial training and in the provision 
of advanced courses. Wide-scale changes were demanded in course structures for both 
B.Ed and PGCE students and a new process of accreditation was instituted under the 
direction of a newly established, government appointed body, the Council for the 
Accreditation of Teacher Education. The argument was that existing courses were too 
academic, and too detached from everyday school practice and the influence of 
practising teachers. College and university lecturers were suspected of having too little 
"recent and relevant" experience ; and thus, by implication, of being too concerned with 
abstract and often negative theorizing. In parallel, the DES made moves to transform 
the funding and organisation of in-service education and training resulted in an increase 
in short "delivery" type courses and a diminution in opportunities for teachers to 
participate in advanced academic study (see chapter 6). 
These moves were part of a wider campaign of denigration and demotion conducted 
against the teaching profession as a whole. From 1976, the general tenor of official 
commentary on teachers became negative, tending to stress failure, incompetence, 
irresponsibility, low expectations and poor performance. Moves to reduce teacher 
autonomy in curriculum matters were often presented as a response to teacher 
intransigence. For teachers, this resulted in an alarming state of demoralisation and a 
lack of both public and self-esteem, a situation re-inforced by problems of pay and 
revised conditions of service. Add to this a conviction that the system itself was being 
starved of essential resources, and it is not surprising that problems of teacher 
recruitment and retention became steadily more serious. 
The purpose of recounting this dire tale is to suggest that the teaching profession, 
from university department to nursery school staff room, became increasingly distanced 
from the chance of making authoritative contributions to the debate about education 
policy. The days of which Maurice Kogan could say that one of the glories of the 
British education system is that innovation has been practitioner-based (Kogan, 1979) 
seem to be long gone. Expertise and authority lie elsewhere in new knowledge-
producing networks. 
As we have seen, some of these networks operate within government. We have 
considered the role of HMI within the DES but room must be made to mention the 
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Further Education Unit, a semi-autonomous organisation within the DES which has 
had a considerable impact on content, style, pedagogy and modes of assessment in both 
schools and colleges. Another source of authoritative comment was the Department of 
Employment's Manpower Services Commission : the TVEI scheme which will be 
examined in Chapter 5 was not the only channel through which their ideas about both 
the content and pedagogy of upper secondary education weredisseminated. We should 
also note the increasingly influential input of the Audit Commission on matters such as 
school management, school inspection and the future of LEAs 
The Normative Base 
During the course of this analysis it has become increasingly difficult to sort out the 
power which accrues from an acknowledged position in the business of knowledge-
production from that which is acquired as a result of receiving significant symbolic 
rewards. At a time when government is playing a commanding role in a particular 
sphere of activity, then it will have few rivals in its ability to hand out such rewards. 
Thus for individuals, or a group of individuals, to have the ear of government, to gain 
a public platform for their ideas, possibly through the good offices of a Conservative 
press, and visibly to influence the direction of public policy, clearly re-orders the 
existing balance of power. There is therefore a considerable over-lap with the 
comments in the previous section. Many of the groups to which reference will be made 
in the following paragraphs would see themselves as knowledge-producers in the sense 
that they have been in the business of building influential bodies of opinion as to how 
education should be organised. Their activities are noted here to illustrate the growing 
power of government to determine whose voice should be heard, whose views 
respected, and whose approval should be sought through the re-direction of policy. 
Kenneth Baker, Secretary of State between 1986 and 1989, frequently complained 
that education had lost its way because it had become too "producer-dominated". This 
was entirely consistent with the Conservative government's promotion of a free-market 
ideology based on the operation of individual choice. Thus professional expertise in 
many spheres was seen to re-inforce a "nanny-state" where the preferences of the 
consumer had come to be dominated by those with a vested interest in maintaining 
control of the services within which they worked. Such views are more than adequate 
to explain the eclipse of professional educators in the status stakes. By the end of the 
eighties it was clear that even the voice of HMI, so crucial to government credibility 
only a few years before, was about to be silenced. On the one hand, they had become 
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too closely identified with the educational professionals; on the other, the legitimising 
task they had previously performed could now be done better by others. 
Who then has taken their place among the blessed? On the one hand we might 
expect to find that high prestige was shifted to organised consumer opinion. This is 
partially true in that employers have gained a key place in educational debate. Employer 
organisations such as the Confedaration of British Industry are prominent among those 
consulted about policy. Employers are well entrenched in the governing bodies of 
schools and colleges. The local Training and Education Committees which oversee 
vocational training are made up of local employers. And key positions (such as the 
current chairmanship of the National Curriculum Council) are given to people from 
industry. Consumer interest in the sense of parental views has not however attained the 
same status. The move towards greater parental influence within governing bodies 
reached full fruition under the terms of the Education Reform Act, and the operation of 
parental choice based on full information is accorded a key role in the cause of 
educational reform : but, as in many other areas of Conservative social policy, it is 
possible to argue that the parental voice is individualized, even atomized, in such a way 
that parents' views are felt as so many discrete pin-pricks rather than as a serious 
collective lobby. A few token organisations may have been 'consulted', but it is hard 
to identify a significant intervention. 
Beyond the consumer voice there is the far more significant role of the 'think-tanks'. 
Reference has already been made to the Conservatives' search for the ideological "high 
ground" which was initiated in the Heath years. Through the years under review in this 
chapter, the contribution to educational debate made by the various groupings within 
this fermenting broth were numerous and, despite the discrepancies within their policy 
preferences, increasingly influential. The story is complex and well beyond the scope 
of this thesis (see Knight, 1990, for an exemplary account, and Lawton, 1992, for a 
useful summary ; also Salter and Tapper, 1985) but it is important to list some of the 
key groups. These would include Keith Joseph's Centre for Policy Studies; the 
Institute of Economic Affairs which has seen education as a key element in economic 
recovery; the Adam Smith Institute which has emphasised the need to expose education 
to consumer choice; and the Hillgate Group which wants to abandon all forms of 
government regulation over schooling and teacher training in order to allow the 
operation of the market to determine educational provision. Certain individuals have 
played a key role in producing the policy recommendations of these groups : the names 
of Cox, Sexton, Scruton, Letwin, Lawlor, and O'Hear are all significant, to name but a 
few. 
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If a single example could indicate the degree of influence exercised by these groups, 
it might be the final Black Paper, published in 1977 and and edited by Rhodes Boyson 
in which we find what is virtually a blue-print for the Education Reform Act of 1988 
(Cox and Boyson, 1977). But more significant than any individual contribution or 
group has been the overall impact of these interventions (which has been substantial 
enough to stimulate the creation of parallel left-wing groups such as the Institute for 
Public Policy Research). Together they have produced a situation in which coherent 
and sometimes persuasive position statements are produced and in many ways, they 
have inherited a role from which the traditional educational partners - the LEAs and 
their associations, the educationalists and their institutions, and the teachers and their 
associations - have been dispossessed. 
3.4 Conclusion 
The period reviewed in this chapter ends with the enactment of the Education 
Reform Act. Through this Act government acquired a huge range of new powers over 
the system, including the detailed specification of the curriculum. Although some have 
claimed that this was a rather late accretion to the government's intentions for 
educational reform, nevertheless it is possible to see in the history of the preceding 
decade and a half an almost inexorable line of development from a system marked by 
decentralisation and autonomy towards centralisation and control. 
The conclusion to Chapter 2 described a situation in which the coercive powers of 
central government were relatively insignificant beside the collective influence of LEAs, 
examination boards and the full range of professional interest groups. By 1988 (and 
prior to the Act), this was substantially changed. The details of how that came about 
have been charted in this chapter. 
Others have drawn attention to the contradictions within Conservative policy during 
the eighties caused by a tension between neo-liberal and neo-conservative tendencies 
(Dale, 1983; Quicke, 1988; Knight, 1990). However what has sustained the party's 
unity over this long period has been a shared commitment to the market which neo-
liberals could welcome for its supposed capacity to deliver a freely achieved 
equilibrium, and neo-conservatives could support as an imposed discipline upon an 
unruly public sector. Within such an ideology it is inevitable that almost all questions 
can be resolved into issues concerning resources. Attempts to control the curriculum 
via exhortation having largely failed, the Reform Act marked the end of a search for 
voluntary compliance. But the enforcement process can itself be understood as a form 
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of contract. Government now specifies the "product mix" and "product quality" 
(Keep, 1992), and effectively contracts with schools, increasingly on an individual 
basis as grant-maintained status spreads, to supply what is demanded. Quality control 
is exerted both by the contractor and, indirectly, by the "client". 
There is a case for suggesting that the key to the achievement of this new settlement 
lies in the transformation of the remunerative base, and, within this, in the 
development and use of contract and pseudo-contract, in order that policy formulation 
may lead directly and speedily to specific changes in practice. I therefore intend to 
focus on this approach to funding over the remainder of this study. 
Such changes do not, of course, go uncontested. But where the only available 
means are so closely tied to specified ends, there is little room for disobedience at the 
point of delivery. Practice, if not opinion, inevitably becomes more standardised. 
Thus the notion of pluralism, which had proved an acceptable explanatory concept 
during the post-war years, has proved less and less useful to contemporary critique. 
An emphasis on consensus and accomodation has yielded to a focus on ideological 
conflict and to debates about contested values. And as in most situations of conflict, 
resources are a crucial commodity. 
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Chapter Four 
DEVELOPING THE REMUNERATIVE BASE : 
CATEGORICAL FUNDING 
4.1 Introduction 
The last chapter concluded with the view that in the years between 1974 and 1987, 
central government became increasingly dissatisfied with influence as a means to secure 
curriculum changes in line with its evolving policies. In that process, the publication of 
The School Curriculum in 1981 (DES 1981), followed by two inconclusive Circulars 
urging compliance, signalled the end of an era. Thereafter, in the early years of the 
decade, government found new ways to expand and transform its grip on all the four 
elements of power identified in this argument, re-vitalising its coercive, remunerative, 
knowledge-generating, information-gathering and normative capacities. 
However, with the return of a third Conservative administration in 1987, there came 
a rupture in this evolving story, as government decided to embark upon a programme 
of strenuous legislation. It seems certain that the Education Reform Act, which became 
law in July 1988, will stand with the Education Acts of 1902 and 1944 as one of the 
great turning points in twentieth century educational history. The Act introduced a 
massive programme concerned with the installation of a national curriculum 
underpinned by a national programme of testing; provision for schools to take over 
responsibility for managing most of their own financial affairs or even, if their parent 
body so voted, to opt out of local authority control altogether, the further development 
of the powers of lay governors and the enhancement of parental choice of school for 
their children. By these means the Act 
increased the powers of the Secretary of State for Education and Science 
.... restored to the central government powers over the curriculum 
which had been surrendered between the Wars, and set up formal 
machinery for exercising and enforcing these powers and 
responsibilities .... introduced important limitations on the functions of 
local education authorities who were forced to give greater autonomy to 
schools and governing bodies .... The change in the power structure 
extended to higher education .... Universities and polytechnics were 
brought more firmly under the control of the Secretary of State, through 
changes in their funding aimed at increasing accountabilty and making 
them more amenable to government direction .... 
(Maclure, 1988, p.ix) 
The specific provisions of this comprehensive Act, and the motivations behind the 
government's decision to introduce it, are beyond the scope of this thesis. In many 
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ways the reassertion of legislative power - itself only one element within the co-ercive 
base - has now overtaken the more evolutionary development of the other power bases. 
Indeed, a careful exploration of that development provides such persuasive evidence of 
an increasingly effective capacity for greater control (through mechanisms relating to 
such matters as planning, financial regulation, accountability, the exploitation of 
information, and the control of teachers' training, pay and conditions), that one might 
well ask whether the Act was even necessary. There are, of course, broader reasons 
why the Conservative government may have chosen to mark its third term with a 
programme of radical social legislation, but again it is tempting to ask why it should 
have chosen such a high-profile, high-risk strategy in relation to education. In the light 
of the analysis in this study, it would seem that the answer must relate to an ideological 
commitment to a market economy characterised by consumer choice; and also to the 
shorter-term electoral imperative to define a social problem and then to pursue it with 
noise and demonstrable effect. 
The second half of the thesis narrows its perspective to developments within the 
remunerative base, and in particular, to the adoption of categorical funding strategies 
for the promotion of specific curriculum-orientated policies. Despite the advent of the 
new Act, the use of such funding mechanisms appears to be persisting, although the 
promotion of policies by such relatively elaborate funding procedures takes on a rather 
different significance when those particular policies could or might be summarily 
installed through new statutory powers. However, the practice of categorical funding 
is still very much with us and it must therefore be assumed that it has some inherent 
advantages over other available strategies. 
Subsequent chapters will, as already indicated, review its operation in relation to 
three specific areas. In those chapters the emphasis will be upon the actual application 
and impact of categorical funding and will draw upon the writer's personal involvement 
and investigations in each of these fields. The function of this chapter is rather 
different. I intend initially to develop an analytical account of the chief characteristics of 
categorical funding and the elements within it (Section 4.2); and then to chart the 
emergence of such strategies in the educational sector over the past two decades (4.3). 
I conclude with a more detailed reflection upon the model proposed as a prelude to the 
case studies that follow (4.4) 
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4.2 Categorical funding ; implementing policy via resource procedures 
To find a name for what is effectively a new style of funding is not easy. 
"Sponsored development" or "sponsored innovation" may be an adequate description 
but perhaps neither suggests the level of control exercised by the sponsor. "Specific 
grant" also narrows the focus. Various other names and terms are in use : "incentives 
for innovation" (Pincus 1973); "categorical programmes" (Knapp and Cooperstein, 
1986); "categorical grants" or "matching grants" (Tsang and Levin, 1983); even 
"honeypot management" (Knight, 1987). I have elected to use the term "categorical 
funding", which derives from the various programmes for the disadvantaged funded 
through the 1965 ESEA Act in the USA (Atkin and House, 1981). I begin by listing 
the major characteristics of such strategies. 
Categorical funding is, I suggest, used to facilitate a policy in situations where, 
under existing conditions, neither the policy makers nor their initiating agency have the 
statutory right or the means to implement desired changes without the co-operation of 
those who have both. They do however have the resources and they proceed to use the 
normal processes of contract to implement their policies. 
For example, the TVEI scheme could not have been implemented by the MSC 
despite the initial willingness of its Chairman, David Young, to set up his own 
educational institutions if LEAs had not been willing to co-operate. Effectively TVEI 
could only be realised by LEAs acting through their schools and colleges. 
In the eighties it was hard to find direct parallels for this type of funding policy in 
other areas of central government spending but then again it was also hard to find other 
areas of social policy in which the relatively undefined power relationships that existed 
between the DES and the LEAs could be paralleled. The closest might possibly have 
been in the area of health : the Department of Health had to deliver a health service 
through the intermediacy of Regional Health Authorities, and it seemed that there was 
only a relatively loose control over the way in which Regional Health Authorities used 
the resources allocated to them, even when they received extra funds to provide 
services which government had identified as priorities. But as we move into the world 
of the Citizen's Charter (Prime Minister, 1991), the language of purchaser and provider 
has come to dominate the entire field of social policy and public services to the point 
when it is realistic to talk about "government by contract" (Mather, 1991). These theme 
will be further explored in the final chapter. 
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The distinction between block grant and specific grant is well understood and 
routinely practised in the financial arrangements between central and local government. 
Specific grant is frequently made available to bidders who meet the criteria and make 
the appropriate promises. However categorical funding, as defined here, is a form of 
grant with a particularly tight set of strings. Only in the Department of Trade and 
Industry's selective financial assistance schemes (SFAs), where in the past support has 
been given in order to rescue and restructure ailing industries, can we find analogous 
characteristics of specificity and conditionality. 
Policy implementation by means of categorical funding proceeds via a series of 
logical and sequential steps : 
1. a policy is developed 
2. funds, generous enough to attract those who can and may deliver, are made 
available (this is particularly potent when the potential recipients feel themselves starved 
of alternative resources) 
3. voluntary co-operation is invited in exchange for a share of the resources 
4. acceptance of the resources is equated with the acceptance of the policy - and also 
with the ability to deliver. (1) 
This account of the process is equally applicable in all the three case studies which 
follow. In each, it will be argued that the rapid installation of the new policy is 
testimony to the effectiveness of the funding strategy. 
Within the mechanisms of categorical funding, there are a number of integral 
elements : these I propose to name as criteria, bid, contract, monitoring, evaluation, 
and replication or impact. At this point there follows a brief account of each : later in 
the chapter each will be analyzed more fully. 
1. Criteria - these specify benchmarks set out by the prospective donor to indicate to 
those who may wish to join the scheme what would be required of them. These criteria 
act as the explicit rules and they represent the parameters within which local diversity 
will be tolerated, even encouraged. There are often a further range of operational rules 
and assumptions which go beyond mere bureaucratic requirements. For example, in 
many projects there is a high profile on 'cost-effectiveness' though it may not be listed 
as such among the formal criteria. 
2. - the process by which the would-be recipient sets out his proposals. This is 
typically followed by a period of negotiation during which the original bid is brought as 
close as possible to the 'ideal' as set out in the criteria. 
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3. Contract  - this represents the deal struck between the parties concerned. It forms the 
basis on which the recipient may proceed and the expectation is that any deviation not 
specifically allowed for (such as an agreement about the permitted scope for virement) 
willneed to be re-negotiated. 
4. Monitoring - normal patterns of accountability within contractual arrangements 
would indicate that the party providing the funds should be able to satisfy itself that the 
terms of the contract are being met, so a flow of information as to numbers, categories, 
and outcomes is typically asked for and provided. This extends to the certification of 
expenditure and the auditing of accounts. 
5. Evaluation - categorical funding appears to require of evaluation two somewhat 
contradictory functions : first, a degree of independence so that special pleading and 
self-justification do not act as a smokescreen for a failure to deliver the agreed 
programme; and second, a focus on the processes of implementation rather than any 
form of fundamental critique concerning the underlying goals or strategies of the 
programme. 
6. Replication/Impact - the funding promised is finite though it is often held out as a 
possibility that extensions on a similar or revised scale may materialise. Hence the 
stress on the quasi-experimental, pilot nature of many of the schemes funded in this 
manner, and the assumption that students or others within the programme form some 
sort of a 'research cohort'. The essential nature of many categorically funded schemes 
to date has been that funds are offered as seed money, and both monitoring and 
evaluation are largely geared to assessing and publicising the positive outcomes and 
their ripple effects through the expectant waters of the pond. There is, however, an 
alternative scenario where the distributed resources are not seen as a means to fund 
exemplary activities. Here there may be a more straightforward attempt to produce 
changes of attitude, priorities or practice in line with the funding agency's policy 
preferences. This may give rise to a much more extended use of categorical funding 
than is implied by the concept of seed money. 
4.3 The Advent of Categorical Funding 
Before looking in more detail at these various elements, I propose to review the 
practice of categorical funding within the education sector in order to indicate how this 
particular style of resource control has developed, putting the three specific cases to be 
examined into context. 
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By the late eighties the practice of categorical funding was well established in the 
DES. Yet it is important to remember that this was not simply a reversion to the use of 
specific grant, a strategy which per se had in the past brought little return to the 
department in terms of direct authority. It was, I suggest, the pioneering work of the 
MSC during the seventies and early eighties which demonstrated the effectiveness of 
specific grant tied to contract for securing tight and quick links between policy 
formulation and policy implementation. 
Initially the MSC adopted such strategies in order to deliver its emergency 
programmes for the young unemployed : WEP, WEEP, YOP, CP and now their 
replacements, YTS and the new ETS (see glossary). To achieve this, the MSC signed 
contracts with employers, colleges, voluntary organisations and all manner of training 
agencies. Overlap with the work of the DES was inevitable as these short-term 
programmes began to involve the colleges of further education. The MSC has, of 
course, a wider responsibility for vocational training and re-training, and therefore a 
detailed concern with the provision of non-advanced further education (NAFE). By 
1985 its concern was consolidated by a financial arrangement broadly reminiscent of 
categorical funding in its pure form. Under this arrangement, the MSC supplied 25% 
of the funding for NAFE, but in return gained the right to review and co-ordinate 100% 
of LEA provision - a neat example of the capacity of funding based upon contractual 
arrangements to secure influence over and beyond that for which it specifically pays 
(MSC, 1985a). 
It was in November 1982, with the announcement of the Technical and Vocational 
Education Initiative, that the MSC moved directly into the school sector. From 
September 1983, the operation of this scheme provided the DES with a powerful 
example of the potency of categorical funding. The department itself began to take 
some tentative steps in this direction. 
The department's Lower Attaining Pupils programme, funded by the Urban Aid 
programme, was introduced in 1982, and the DES itself funded some limited in-service 
grant schemes in 1983, 84 and 86 (see Chapters 3 and 6). As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the 1984 Education Act established the Education Support Grant scheme by 
giving the DES power to retain 0.5% of planned educational expenditure for this 
purpose, a figure later raised to 1%. This new figure seemed to be only a temporary 
staging-post : in the Green Paper Paying for Local Government  (DoE, 1986) it was 
suggested that "there may be a case for some new grants, for example in the education 
field in support of the government's objective of raising standards at all levels of 
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ability". At least one reputable newspaper suggested a possible level of 10-15% (The 
Guardian, 22 January 1986). The implications for LEAs of such a shift in terms of 
both their financial independence and their capacity to pursue their own policies were 
huge (though subsequent legislation achieved the same ends by rather different means). 
Better Schools announced new strategies for the in-service training of teachers, 
justifying the move with the statement that "the in-service training grant scheme of 
1983-84 has succeeded in stimulating training in selected national priority areas " (DES, 
1985a, para 174). One month later, an eighteen month programme of training, 
ostensibly related to TVEI, was announced by the MSC (MSC, April 1985); however, 
in various public and semi-public meetings, DES officials and HMI have made no 
secret of the fact that this scheme for "TVEI-related In-service Training" (TRIST) was 
intended as a dummy run for their own scheme which began in September 1987. The 
MSC employed its by now well-practised categorical funding strategy, though this time 
within indicative totals for each LEA; the DES then took over the same strategy with its 
successor and much larger scheme. 
It is in the Education Reform Act itself that we find the clearest discussion of the 
government's intention to introduce contract funding into the higher education sector. 
This move was envisaged in the 1987 White Paper to which fuller reference will be 
made in Chapter 7. However the percentage of funds coming to the universities from 
the University Grants Committee's block grant had been declining since the early 
eighties, and universities had increasingly been obliged to sustain their income by 
seeking funds from a variety of other sources. Some of the shortfall was made up by 
securing industrial sponsorship, mainly for applied research; or by direct enterprise, 
through the establishment of trading companies and science parks. Both these activities 
have accustomed universities to the task of seeking funds and entering into contractual 
arrangements. Other funds have come from the more traditional source, the Research 
Councils. However, the development of greatest relevance to this study is the growing 
practice of making bids to the DES and other government departments for "special 
initiative" monies. Examples of such initiatives, which show all the marks of 
categorical funding, include the ETP, ALVEY, PICKUP and EHE programmes (see 
Chapter 7). Presumably the DES drew upon the experience of these projects in 
preparing their advice for the new Universities Funding Council on how to proceed 
with the process of contract funding envisaged in the new Act. 
The purpose of this section has been to chronicle the onward march of categorical 
funding and to suggest that the DES has learned substantially about both its procedures 
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and its efficacy from the MSC. It would be interesting to speculate about the particular 
structural and organisational characteristics of the Commission, as compared with a 
government department, which prompted or permitted it to devise new approaches, 
new relationships, and a new versatility in responding to goverment policy aspirations 
within politically attractive time-scales. But the focus of this study is the operation of 
the funding strategy itself rather than its roots. I therefore propose to analyze the 
various elements within the strategy in greater detail in order to lay the ground more 
fully for the case studies. 
4.4 The Elements Explored 
Criteria 
The first and most obvious fact about the criteria attached to an offer of funding is 
that they represent the explicit policy ambitions of the donating body. Yet that 
statement must immediately be qualified in three ways. 
In the first place, criteria represent the public and explicit agenda : they may well 
conceal a private and implicit agenda. For example, the explicit agenda may be the 
promotion of a specific innovation in schools or colleges : the implicit agenda may be to 
by-pass and thus weaken existing structures and constraints which may be perceived by 
government as unhelpful across a much broader range of issues than the particular 
innovation in question. Second, in drawing up criteria, donors have to strike a balance 
between the prime objective of policy implementation and the necessity of recruiting 
local support, for it must be remembered that part of the definition of categorical 
funding is that it is used in those situations where the funding body has neither the right 
nor the means to enforce compliance on the potential recipients. Put crudely, it is a 
bribe, and the price paid has to be satisfactory to both parties (always remembering that 
the recipient may be short of alternative sources of revenue). Third, and as an 
extension to the previous point, the donor invariably requires not only compliance but 
also initiative, enterprise, commitment, and even legitimation from those funded. In 
this we see exemplified Archer's 'resource dependency theory' (Archer 1981). For 
money is not the only resource within these relationships. Those who receive funds 
have both their professional expertise and their professional approval to bestow : to 
proceed without both would necessarily be a risky business for the donor. Criteria 
must therefore be drawn up in such a way as to offer scope for the recipients to attach 
their enthusiasm to the scheme, and to find space within it for the realisation of at least 
some of their own aspirations. Having said that, however, it is important to realise that 
104 
criteria need only to be broad enough to recruit a sufficient number. (Others will join 
the ranks as alternative options shrink, and as new resources identify new opportunities 
and/or new career routes.) It could not be said of any of the three cases to be studied 
that the programmes have initially enjoyed the support of more than a handful of 
potential contractees. 
Criteria can, of course, be redrawn to suit a changing situation. Where categorical 
funding has become part of a yearly cycle, as in the case of INSET, there is an annual 
opportunity to re-order priorities. Equally, categorical funding can be used for a short-
term programme, or for an indefinite period which has the effect of keeping the 
receivers "on their toes". Moreover, criteria are invariably embedded in procedural 
rules about such matters as how and when to apply, and these can be altered to shorten 
or lengthen the time-scales within which the programmes must be mounted. 
One further point about criteria concerns their very nature. They do not specify 
precise targets : they are more in the nature of aims, principles, aspirations, or 
directions for development. They are thus, in a sense, beyond realisation. Those who 
accept categorical funding acknowledge, at least publicly, that they are on the mad; they 
cannot expect total success, unqualified approval, and a gold star for a task completed. 
Thus the donor retains the possibility of critical comment. 
Bid 
In developing a bid, the would-be recipient must pay close attention to the 
conditions which the donor has defined as the base requirements for eligible 
programmes. If the criteria are the overall direction, then the conditions set out those 
elements which the donor considers should feature in the travel plans of the worthy 
traveller. Thus the invitation to bid sets out minimum requirements concerning such 
matters as participant numbers, the programme to be provided, assessment procedures, 
performance indicators, the use of resources, and arrangements for monitoring and 
evaluation. There may also be an indication of more general principles that must be 
accommodated, such as equality of access or preferred pedagogies. Putting together a 
bid therefore involves a demonstration that the recipient will travel the road defined for 
him, and that his journey will be in accordance with the travel instructions issued to 
him. The creativity of the bid will reside in tailoring the one to the other, and in 
simultaneously fmding scope for local priorities and initiative in the spaces that remain. 
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The issue of local priorities and initiatives takes us to the next point. One marked 
feature of the bidding process, common to many categorically funded schemes, is the 
short time-scale for preparing, and later modifying, the bid (submission is another 
commonly used term : a Freudian slip ?). Such pressure precludes genuine 
consultation, even among those whose work will be most directly affected by either 
success or failure in securing the funds. Within categorical funding, the bidding 1 
process therefore tends to reinforce hierarchy and managerial approaches, encouraging 
a situation in which those in authority make undertakings on behalf of their 
subordinates without due consultation. Those who prepare bids are frequently 
operating under great pressure to prepare the necessary documentation before the dead-
line, and frequently have to by-pass processes such as consultation which are known to 
favour successful implementation (Fullan, 1982). These pressures can be seen as part 
of an overall strategy to assert the power of the donor. 
This brings us to the related question of the time-costs involved in the preparation of 
bids. Where potential recipients find themselves in a situation where they feel 
compelled to make a number of bids in different directions, the cost to them of the 
bidding process itself is not inconsiderable. There is evidence that this is a particular 
concern in higher education. 
In making a bid, recipients are often confused as to whether they are bidding for 
additional funds, or whether the monies within the scheme are merely redirected from 
mainstream funding. There is often no simple answer to this question, for who is to 
say whether funds made available for a specific scheme might otherwise have found 
their way into the overall budget ? In some instances (LEATGS, for example), it 
appeared that diversion was the major factor, and so recipients find themselves having 
to ask for sections of their traditional income and then to receive it with new strings 
attached. This issue closely relates to the rather superficial argument sometimes heard 
that categorical funding is a way of reconciling central control with the virtues of local 
autonomy. On one level, recipients are free to choose whether or not to bid; and in 
some instances, for how much to bid. On another, however, and especially in a climate 
of expenditure cuts, this is a freedom which it would be difficult to exercise. Marie 
Antoinette's peasants were, of course, quite free to eat cake. 
Arising from this point is another, possibly of greater importance. This is the 
implication that a successful bid equals a successful strategy. In other words, if the 
proposal is rewarded by funds, it is by definition a good one. Success is behaviour 
that earns a reward. Judgement is extrinsic to the enterprise itself. A further 
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implication is that it is possible to draw up blue-prints for good programmes in fairly 
detailed form before their inception, and that therefore conception is separate from, and 
prior to, execution. To the degree that this pre-determination deters adaptive behaviour, 
it is not consistent with the best educational practice. Research into the impact of 
Schools Council projects demonstrated the tensions between those who had developed 
a programme and saw it as having a significant degree of coherence; and those who 
used it in the classroom and saw it as their professional obligation to tailor the project to 
their pupils' needs and interests rather than defer to its conceptual purity. The parallels 
are obvious. When the bid is successful and the contract agreed, those who wrote it, 
and those who authorised it and then monitor its delivery, can feel dismayed by 
subsequent modifications and changes. 
Contract 
Thus we come to the contract itself. The agreement concluded between donor and 
recipient can appear in many forms and it must not be assumed that in each case a 
document is produced that would be accepted by a lawyer as a legally binding contract. 
However, at the very least, submissions are made, refined, re-written and developed 
into an acceptable form. Then a formal letter announcing the success of the bid is 
issued, though sometimes with further provisos about future developments or 
unresolved issues. If not contracts per se, we have at least contractual style 
agreements. 
To reach this agreement, the parties concerned have often been through a process of 
negotiation, during which the recipient has come to know the intentions of the donor in 
a much more detailed fashion as the original bid is modified to match the criteria as 
closely as possible. Guesswork and anticipation both have a part to play as bidders 
endeavour to prove themselves acceptable. The power of the categorical funding 
process is significantly enlarged if some bids do not make it through to the contract 
stage. In some programmes we shall see evidence of the allocation of less money than 
had been applied for, and in others we shall see examples of bidders being sent away to 
try again in the following year's cycle. In yet other instances, we shall see the donor 
giving permission for a scheme to commence but with-holding the contract itself until 
certain remaining issues are resolved. This naturally provokes anxiety in the recipient 
who is concerned about the chance of being abandoned in mid-stream. 
The notion that the contract itself may be torn up if the donor is not satisfied with 
performance is always on the margins of the agenda, though I can point to no parallel 
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examples of the recipient threatening to renounce the deal. (On Archer's thesis, this 
demonstrates the extreme imbalance of resources between the parties involved.) 
Against these arguments about the significance of the bid-negotiation-contract 
process, it has been suggested that once the deal is signed, the donor loses some of his 
control over the recipient, and thus it may be in his interest to delay or to threaten 
cancellation (Fulton, 1987). Moreover, when funds are routinely allocated by this 
method, the regulatory function also diminishes as routine takes over. This may be 
particularly true in a very complex operation, such as the annual cycle for funding 
INSET. Against this, I would argue that the secret is to change the criteria and to revise 
the demands made upon recipients each year in sufficient degree to maintain 
uncertainty. However, the widespread adoption of categorical funding has not yet gone 
far enough for us to do more than speculate about the strength of these arguments. 
It is worth pausing for a moment to reflect upon the relationships between those 
who enter into contracts. First of all, although in a long-term sense categorical funding 
implies mutual dependence because both parties have goods to bestow which are of 
vital importance to each other, at the practical level this mutuality is less apparent ; 
because the most obvious and immediate element in the relationship is the transmission 
of resources, the reality on the ground is that the recipient becomes the licensed agent of 
the donor (Harland, 1987a). The recipient is free, indeed has been set up, to exercise 
his initiative in the pursuit of the donor's policy objectives and he may well have 
adopted those objectives for his own. But he does this within specified bounds, rather 
as the encyclopaedia salesman is encouraged to be enterprising in his efforts on behalf 
of his employer, but always operating within the streets and using the credit 
arrangements authorized by the company. Thus the salesman, and the beneficiaries of 
categorical funding, become the extension in the field of the will at the centre. Policy 
intentions are translated into policy implementation through their agency. 
Monitoring 
If I sign a contract with a builder for the construction of a house, he will expect me 
to monitor its progress, sending round my surveyor to check that the building 
incorporates all the features that were in the specifications. Such are the implications of 
contract, and they expose the lack of mutuality, at least at the operational level. 
Monitoring in the post-contract period is of central importance in categorical funding 
relationships. At the superficial level, we can relate this to the reservations expressed 
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by Fulton (1987) concerning the donor's potential loss of control once the contract is 
concluded. One potent way to remind the recipient of his continuing obligations is to 
sustain a high level of demand for information and statistical returns, more or less 
loosely tied to pre-specified performance indicators. Most projects experience close 
financial auditing. Fulton suggests that there is often a disproportionate emphasis on 
financial as opposed to educational accountability and this can be explained in a number 
of ways. First, in the short and medium term there is an "absence of comprehensive or 
reliable output indicators" which forces a focus on inputs, of which finance is the most 
accessible. And second, "financial auditing provides the most credible leverage for the 
monitoring agency" (Fulton, 1987, pp 220-21). 
Some elements in the monitoring programme can from time to time appear to be not 
much more than "busy-work", a reminder that the funding agency is watching. Be that 
as it may, the MSC, as progenitor of the current strategies, has achieved a measure of 
detailed oversight over its schemes which is remarkable. Through a network of 
regional advisers, Area Manpower Boards, auditors, officials, information gatherers 
and evaluators, its schemes are "known" to their sponsor to a quite extraordinary 
degree. Clearly there are echoes here of the concept of 'surveillance' as delineated by 
Foucault. In Discipline and Punish, he writes of a system of control (discipline) which 
is based on observation and close knowledge of what is going on : 
The exercise of discipline presupposes a mechanism that coerces by 
means of observation; an apparatus in which the techniques that make it 
possible to see induce effects of power, and in which, conversely, the 
means of coercion make those on whom they are applied clearly visible. 
(Foucault, 1979) 
This strategy is reinforced in two ways. In the first place, by shifting attention to 
compliance with contract, the surveillance tends to assume the flavour of neutral, 
technical monitoring of a freely negotiated obligation and thus avoids at many points the 
implication of judging educational worth. In the second place, it must be remembered 
that this discipline/control strategy is located within a discourse about desirable 
educational and/or vocational aims and choices and about appropriate pedagogies to 
which the MSC itself has made a very considerable contribution. This pervasive 
discourse thus sustains a series of value assumptions which relate to the programme, 
while precluding the need to assert and defend them in the context of programme 
monitoring. 
I shall return in the following chapters to the effect of the new discourses concerning 
both process and product within those schemes which have been the most conspicuous 
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objects of categorical funding; but here I wish to note the extent to which 'new-speak' 
or 'insider-speak' has the power to penetrate and permeate many schemes in schools, 
colleges, education authorities and, increasingly, higher education. The effect of this is 
to create agents acting for the sponsor among scheme participants themselves, even at 
moments of disenchantment. Recipients tend to internalise the language and 
expectations of the programmes upon which they have come to depend, to anticipate the 
response of the funding agency to any development, and thereby to discipline 
themselves. Foucault again, writing of the ideal institution for surveillance, Bentham's 
Panopticon, says 
.... so to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, 
even if it is discontinuous in action; that the perfection of power should 
tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary ... 	 (op cit, p201) 
Thus, I would argue that the relations of dependency encouraged by categorical 
funding, lead to a highly potent form of self-monitoring which supplements that 
imposed by the donor. Against that, some would claim that they have been able to 
exploit the new resources to their own ends. "Take the money and run" is a 
fashionable phrase. It is, in my view, just as probable that such people do not realise 
the extent to which they have been co-opted, or even manipulated. 
In the chapters which follow, there will be opportunities to show how the processes 
of categorical funding (and in particular, bidding and monitoring) create situations in 
which contractees are routinely obliged to operate within the language and value system 
of the programme concerned. Moreover, we should not under-estimate the 
satisfactions of being an insider rather than a long-term outsider. It was Weber who 
said 
On the whole, people have a marked tendency to adapt themselves 
mentally to success, or to what at a particular time holds out the prospect 
of it, not only, as goes without saying, in regards to the means with 
which or the extent to which they seek to realise their ultimate ideals at 
that time, but in their abandonment of these ideals themselves. In 
Germany, it is thought proper to dignify this attitude with the name of 
Realpolitik. 
(Weber, 1978, p89) 
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Evaluation 
In defusing the elements of categorical funding earlier in this chapter, it has already 
been suggested that evaluation in this context has two, somewhat opposed, aspects. In 
the first place, the funding agency often demands some "independent" evaluation. 
Indeed, the advent of such strategies has been remarkable for the extent to which 
mandatory provision has been made for both macro- and micro-evaluation by 
"experts". It seems likely that this demand for an external voice has something to do 
with the need to monitor : in other words, it adds to the overall impression that the truth 
of the scheme cannot be hidden from the funding agency's all-seeing eye. It also has 
the obvious function of not encouraging self-evaluation of a kind which, quite 
understandably, differs little from self-justification. 
The second aspect seems, however, to be the more significant. This is that 
evaluation is essentially about facilitating the implementation of the programme's 
objectives by identifying points of un-ease or malfunction. Thus the evaluator is 
frequently tempted into the role of management or curriculum consultant and moves 
even further away from the possibility of developing any form of critique concerning 
the rationale or even the legitimacy of the whole enterprise. The term "formative" has 
often been claimed by those involved. Yet if this is justifiable in relation to the 
behaviour and performance of those who receive the funding, it does not appear to have 
much meaning at the macro-level. To claim that evaluation is genuinely formative must 
surely imply that even the initial conception of the programme is open to modification 
and revision. Yet evidence exists that decisions are made about the future development 
of schemes (for example, the massive extension of TVEI ; and also the decision to re-
shape the LEATGS scheme by combining it with the ESG programme) long before 
evaluation findings are available. Genuine criticism of the policy thrust behind these 
schemes has to find expression elsewhere. 
Evaluation thus becomes a tool of management and finds difficulty in escaping the 
technocratic imperatives of the system. As Apple says "evaluators are 'experts for 
hire' and these experts are "quite strongly influenced by the dominant values of the 
collectivity to which they belong and the social situation within that society which they 
fill". He goes on to say 
One of the tasks of the expert is to furnish the administrative leader of an 
institution with the special knowledge these persons require before 
decisions are made. The bureaucratic institution furnishes the problems 
to be investigated, not the expert. Since the expert bears no direct 
responsibility for the final outcome of a programme, his or her activities 
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can be guided by the practical interests of the administrative leaders .... 
And what administrators are not looking for are new hypotheses or new 
interpretations that are not immediately or noticeably relevant to the 
practical problems at hand. 
(Apple, 1979, pp147-8) 
In the case studies it will be apparent that there is considerable variation in evaluation 
practice, not least in assumptions about who should be involved - outside experts (often 
from higher education), clients, practitioners. Among them we shall encounter a mix of 
those with experience of evaluation and those with none. Among the former are 
notable examples of experienced evaluators who would wish to declare their resistance 
to the kind of co-option Apple describes, preferring instead to see their work as 
reflecting the interests of all concerned, attempting to equalise power and thus lessen 
bureaucratic and technocratic control over the grass-roots practitioner . My argument 
will be that, although the superficial characteristics of such "democratic" practice may 
be in evidence, all evaluation within categorical funding is necessarily trapped within an 
agenda expressed in the criteria and encapsulated within the contract. Most work done 
derives directly from aspects of the scheme specified in those two sources. 
Independence resides almost solely in the rhetoric. (2) 
Replication/Impact 
It is not possible to make a neat distinction between these two terms except in so far 
as replication implies that programmes will result in an expansion of activity beyond the 
scope of the funding, whereas impact implies that practice will be significantly affected, 
probably altered, by the experience of the programme. 
Replication evokes the metaphor of a ripple in the pond. A key feature of MSC 
strategy has been the capacity to purchase an inordinate amount of influence for a 
limited outlay of funds. Take three examples : some LEAs have funded TVEI 
developments themselves beyond the bounds of their pilot schemes; the MSC itself 
secured 100% oversight of NAFE programmes for 25% of the money; and for a small 
injection of cash into the Enterprise in Higher Education scheme - £1 million over five 
years - the MSC has sought to influence the education of all first degree students within 
sponsored institutions, while simultaneously involving employers in the assessment of 
those students. Thus categorical funding schemes aim to extract the maximum "bang 
for the buck". 
This effect is directly acknowledged by those categorically funded programmes 
which use the term "pilot scheme" (for example, the Lower Attaining Pupils scheme, 
and DES-sponsored experiments with Records of Achievement and Teacher Appraisal 
schemes). Such schemes allow government to assert the legitimacy of policy on the 
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basis of expertise, and in particular, experimentation. Thus pilot programmes take on 
the nature of "scientific" investigations : "the only problems are technical problems and 
the development of the social system must take on the logic of scientific progress" 
(Wilby, 1979). Recent "pilots" have been far from open-ended experiments. We have 
already noted the extension of TVEI ahead of conclusive evaluation; and in the others 
mentioned above, the only issues open to question appear to have related to 
implementation, the zero option being simply not available. However, the very 
existence of pilots enables government to claim a deference to the lessons of trial and 
error, and to the "expertise" thus generated. Habermas (1975) claimed that the search 
for technically-expert solutions allows more and more social questions to be taken out 
of the realm of public debate and Weiler (1983) suggests that one virtue of 
experimentation is that it suspends conflict by "seemingly constructive temporizing". 
Either way, piloting appears to diminish the scope for arguments based on value and 
principle by demonstrating that policy emerges from rational enquiry and objective fact. 
Such strategies have played their part in the replication of categorically funded projects: 
government has involved the teachers, the researchers, the academics, and the 
industrialists in pilot schemes, and shown its commitment to cautious reform. So it 
appears that reason, rather than political ideology, dictates that the programmes should 
be extended. 
One other form of replication concerns the distribution of funds. There is evidence 
that LEAs themselves are choosing to invite schools to bid for inclusion in particular 
developments, and even that within an institution, heads or principals may use the same 
approach in allocating resources to departments or other sub-units (Knight, 1987). 
Even if these practices do not proceed from any particularly nice calculation of the 
potency of categorical funding, it is interesting to see the strategy replicating itself. 
Before leaving this section, we must look more directly at the associated notion of 
"impact". By this I refer to change that occurs as a direct result of the programme. 
This may be at the level of course organisation, content, or pedagogy. It may be 
change by substitution of something new for something old, or at least by a shift in 
emphasis. Most fundamentally, it may be a shift in priorities, in overall system values. 
Thus, people will change what they do, how they do it, and what they think about what 
they do. They may also change the way they think about the sources of system change 
itself. New people will emerge in managerial and leadership roles, because they are 
identified with the area of activity promoted by the programme, with the re-ordered 
priorities, and with the whole process of contracted change. The case studies will 
identify impact in each of these guises. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
To conclude this chapter, I propose to refer to a paper by Knight (1987), one of the 
very few authors to identify the potency of what he chooses to call "honey-pot (' 
management", because the name "catches the image of wafting honey-pot odours 
stirring the slumbering bears into salivated activity" ! Knight stresses the practical 
advantages and disadvantages of honey-pot management and thus he provides a more 
pragmatic account of categorical funding than that presented in this chapter. However 
such an account is wholly legitimate because, after all, it is likely that the MSC, the 
DES and others employ categorical funding for predominantly practical reasons : the 
hidden agenda may not even be apparent to those who choose a strategy for apparently 
"common-sense" reasons. 
Knight claims that donors aim for "maximum effectiveness and minimum hassle". 
Choice of funding strategy is determined by considerations of equity, predictability, 
simplicity, value for money, and effectiveness (op cit, p.206). On these criteria, 
honey-pot management has considerable merits : 
1. it concentrates the minds of both parties 
2. it targets the donor's priorities 
3. it encourages innovation 
4. it speeds up the implementation of policy 
5. it enables the donor to direct and implement policy without requiring a full line-
management structure 
6. it allows scope for local initiative 
7. it can "trickle from one level to another" 
On the other hand, its demerits are that : 
1. it is not well-suited to permanent on-going policies 
2. it is haunted by the problem of opportunity costs 
3. it can create unrealistic conditions (such as to encourage profligate spending) 
4. it can create or increase inequalities 
5. it can be time-consuming 
6. it can create disillusion and lower morale at the lower level 
7. it is difficult to monitor and requires skilled evaluators. 
(adapted from Knight, op.cit., pp 209-10) 
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It has been my intention in this chapter to go somewhat beyond the straightforward 
pros and cons approach exemplified in Knight's argument, useful though it is. The 
practical working out of categorically funded schemes will feature strongly in the three 
chapters which follow, but throughout I argue that it is important to consider the 
underlying meaning and significance of the relationships implied by contractual 
arrangements of this kind and to explore what they may tell us about the distribution of 
power in relation to the curriculum. This chapter has endeavoured to prepare the 
ground for that attempt. 
Foot-notes 
1. I first produced this analysis and much of what follows in the remainder of the 
section in Harland (1985). It subsequently appeared in slightly modified forms in 
further publications (for example in 1986, 1987a and 1987b). 
2. It is significant that the award of contracts for much evaluation and research is 
itself a microcosm of the categorical funding process. Invitations to tender, specifying 
the matters to be investigated and often the preferred methodology, are issued to likely 
contractees by the funding body. There then follows a process of comppetitive bidding 
and the eventual award of a contract. Representatives of the funding agency sit on the 
steering committee to monitor the evaluation and will themselves ultimately evaluate the 
evaluation. 
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Chapter Five 
THE CASE OF TVEI 
5.1 Introduction 
Much of the story of the Technical and Vocational Initiative will emerge from the 
analysis which fills most of this chapter. The section on criteria deals with the launch 
of the programme and the subsequent sections deal progressively with its installation 
and expansion. Within five years all LEAs in England, Scotland and Wales were 
involved and the scheme had been "extended" to 1995, providing a continuation of 
funding, the inclusion of all schools and colleges and the apparent involvement of the 
whole 14-16 age group. Spin-off activities spread to the initial and in-service training 
of teachers (see Chapter 6), and even to higher education (see Chapter 7). Total 
expenditure to 1995 was estimated at £900 million. (1) 
The advent of TVEI spawned an enormous amount of commentary, much of it - as 
will be seen later in this chapter - emanating from the evaluation and promotional 
writing sponsored by the MSC itself. The scale of the scheme alone might account 
for this interest, for TVEI represents the biggest single episode of curriculum 
development undertaken in this country, challenging and surpassing in almost every 
way anything undertaken by the Schools Council. (Holt (1987) points out that in the 
second year of the TVEI pilot, the expenditure of £27 million exceeded the total ever 
spent on the Council). Furthermore, the style and strategy of the TVEI sponsors 
reversed almost all previous practices in the history of curriculum policy-making and 
implementation, and indeed the programme very often appeared to be successful in 
opposition to much of the conventional wisdom about curriculum change. However, 
TVEI was never a specific programme tightly defined by its sponsors and it took 
widely different forms in each of the 100+ pilot projects. Thus even when based on 
detailed empirical and quantitative evidence, a great deal of the commentary has been 
descriptive. The result has been that almost any argument about TVEI can be 
sustained on the basis of one instance or another, one descriptive account or another. 
One of the most acute critics of TVEI, Roger Dale, has argued that 
What is needed ... is some progress towards conceptualising TVEI 
more adequately. One step towards this is the development of 
sensitizing concepts which present the possibility of going beyond the 
mere aggregation of descriptive accounts of different schemes based 
on different and frequently tacit purposes, methods and theories. Such 
concepts would be ... a medium for the possible grounding of theory. 
(Dale, 1989b, p72) 
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The arguments presented in this chapter, and indeed in this thesis, are an attempt 
to do this, at least for those parts of the task which relate to the strategies of 
programme implementation. 
Just before this task begins, however, it is worth including two comments in 
support of my argument about the significance of categorical funding, both from 
people who have studied TVEI in some depth. The first is from Iam Jamieson who, 
although he has doubts which I shall examine later about the potency of the contract 
itself, has written 
(Jamieson, 1990, p131) 
The second comment is from Moon and Richardson who write from the broader 
perspective of a concern for public administration in general; they say of the whole 
TVEI programme with its distinctive funding strategy 
The success of this experiment (so far) may not have gone unnoticed in 
the rest of Whitehall 
(Moon and Richardson, 1984, p33) 
5.2 Criteria 
When David Young wrote to all LEAs in England and Wales on 28 January 1983 
inviting them to submit bids for inclusion in a ten authority initiative, no indication 
was given that there would be further opportunities to join the scheme in later years. 
Young's letter stated that the MSC had set out five principles for its conduct of the 
experimental programme; he also said that a National Steering Group (NSG), 
hurriedly established in the weeks after the Prime Minister's announcement of TVEI 
on November 12th to provide for post hoc consultation with the affected (and 
predominantly antagonistic) interest groups, had "now produced ... a statement of 
aims for the scheme" together with "a set of criteria and supporting guidelines for the 
use of LEAs in submitting project proposals". These principles, aims, criteria and 
guidelines are, for the purpose of this discussion, all subsumed within the overall term 
"criteria". In effect, they form the explicit rationale on which proposals were to be 
based and agreements reached; and even though it will become clear that there have 
been additional requirements and shifts of emphasis over the years, these criteria have 
remained nailed to the official mast. 
Categorical funding, the bidding system, the Don Corleone model of 
curriculum development - call it what you will, it has had a profound 
effect on the whole education system, and of course it was pioneered 
by TVEI. 
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In the weeks between November 12th and January 28th, there had been some 
uncertainty as to what precise criteria should shape the new scheme - in other words 
what precisely it was about. The Prime Minister's announcement was couched in 
terms of up-grading "technical and vocational education for young people" and she 
claimed that this was in response to "growing concern about existing arrangements, 
expressed over many years, not least by the National Economic Development 
Council". She referred to "new institutional arrangements ... within existing financial 
resources ... where possible in association with local authorities" (Hansard, 1982, vol 
31, col 271-2). Thus the focus was upon education and training deficits as perceived 
by the employer : little was said about involving and thereby re-directing the system 
itself and nothing was said about which young people were to be the target of the 
scheme which she had "invited" the Chairman of the MSC to initiate. 
Both questions were the object of conflicting comment and statements over the 
next few weeks. It appeared that David Young (TES 19.11.82 - reports of press 
conferences), Norman Tebbitt and even Keith Joseph were prepared to contemplate 
the creation of a new type of institution outside the control of the LEAs. The 
Association of County Councils (ACC), among many others, was as much alarmed 
by this suggestion as it was were affronted by the sudden announcement of an 
educational programme which was to be outside the control of the DES and its 
partners (see report of their representatives, 18.11.82, quoted in Worgan, 1987). 
More surprisingly, there seems to have been considerable uncertainty as to the target 
group for TVEI. David Young appeared to have his sights on what might be called 
the 'technical' stream, giving rise to anxieties that TVEI might re-create a tri-partite 
approach to secondary education (see for example Holt, 1987, and Chitty, 1986). On 
Christmas Eve, 1982, Education quoted Young as saying that the scheme was not 
intended for "pupils who were taking good 0 and A levels. They are not going to join 
the scheme. My concern is for those who are bright and able and haven't been 
attracted by academic subjects". Three years later, on becoming Secretary of State for 
Employment, he still retained this view : 15% of pupils were, he said, destined for 
higher education, the next 30-35% for "for TVEI and courses which could provide a 
mixture of vocational and academic qualifications and skills", and the remaining 50% 
would be joining the Youth Training Scheme (Times newspaper, 4.9.85). But 
meanwhile Keith Joseph appeared to link TVEI with his concern for the "bottom 
40%"; while John Woolhouse, the first director of the MSC's TVEI Unit, was 
consistently anxious to see TVEI attract the ablest students to technical and applied 
subjects and the world of commerce and industry, and thereby wean them away from 
the non-instrumental learning of the old liberal-humanist tradition. 
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The MSC's five "principles" appeared to concede that the Commission should "set 
itself the objective of working through local education authorities" but they contain no 
reference to the ability range. However, by the time the NSG was functioning, one 
must assume that the education interest was at very least insisting on clarity in this 
regard, for the Aims begin with the oft-quoted phrase 
in conjunction with LEAs to explore and test ways of organising and 
managing the education of 14-18 year old young people across the 
ability range .... though the balance between what is offered for 
different ability levels is expected to vary between projects. 
(MSC, TVEI Operating Manual, 1984) 
Looking more closely at the criteria, it is worth recalling Dale's (1989b) comment 
that the MSC's previous experience of programmes for the young unemployed 
certainly "coloured" TVEI. He identifies the key features of their approach as being : 
that Britain should be moving towards a more comprehensive system of education 
and training for the whole 14-18 age range; that successful "vocational preparation" 
programmes should provide opportunities for work experience and for the 
development of "social and life skills" of the kind which promote positive attitudes to 
work and to training; that an appropriate pedagogy for this type of work was rooted in 
the work of the FEU as exemplified in A Basis for Choice (1979) and a range of other 
publications concerned with vocational preparation, profiling and so forth; and that an 
increased emphasis on practical, "relevant" work would have a highly beneficial 
influence on student motivation. To Dale's list I would add that important lessons 
could be learned from the MSC's own programmes about the means of securing 
programme delivery through a process of short term, renewable (or not), contracts. 
The fruits of this experience come through particularly clearly in the NSG Aims 
where they are re-inforced by comments on the speed of implementation, on cost 
effectivenes, on replicability (ie. the possibility that pilot schemes would have an 
influence beyond their immediate boundaries), on fit with other forms of skill and 
vocational training, and finally, on the need for evaluation and monitoring. 
It is to be assumed that the NSG made their largest contribution to the exercise 
after the Aims, were published in January 1983 and the focus had shifted to specifying 
the characteristics of satisfactory bids, notably through the Criteria and the Guidelines 
for the use of LEAs in submitting project proposals (MSC, September 1983). 
Although NSG membership was dominated by representatives of industry, the matters 
included in the Criteria and the Guidelines were designed to create a favourable 
impression among LEA personnel, school teachers and college lecturers. Thus we 
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find references to equal opportunities and the problem of sex-stereotyping, to 
progression, and to the balance to be achieved between general and 
technical/vocational education. There is also mention of regular assessment, with 
reporting to students and their parents, and the provision of "good careers and 
educational counselling". Students were to be prepared for "nationally recognised 
qualifications" and there was to be a "record of achievement describing qualifications 
gained and recording significant elements and attainments which are not readily 
deducible from the qualifications eg work experience and personal successes". 
Further details are given about the required institutional arrangements : clearly 
defined responsibilities, identified objectives, recruitment of students and size of 
cohort; mrecourse to re-organisations necessitating Section 12 proposals; and the 
need for careful specification of "appropriate resources for the effective delivery of 
the programme". 
Each pilot was also required to establish a local support group "bringing together 
... the interests most directly concerned, viz the LEA, local industry and commerce, 
teachers and lecturers, and, where possible, parents and interested voluntary bodies". 
The Operating Manual makes it quite clear that an MSC nominee is to be an ex-
officio member of the support group ; this nominee is to receive all papers and notice 
is given that those seen as important will be forwarded to the TVEI Unit. The same 
requirement would also applied to any sub-group which might be established (MSC, 
1984, section 4), thus pre-empting any attempt to side-line significant decision-
making into more private settings. 
In each year of the pilot, LEAs aspiring to join were asked to respond with 
proposals based on these criteria, giving details about exactly how they would meet 
their obligations. Those officers, advisers and others responsible for writing the 
proposals would find themselves imbibing and digesting the criteria and second-
guessing their precise meaning, partly by looking over their shoulders at LEAs who 
had succeeded in earlier rounds and partly by responding to hints from the MSC as to 
shifts in emphasis and emerging priorities. Most proposals are remarkable for the 
extent to which they play back to the MSC its own values expressed in its own jargon. 
Authorities learned however that if these were the official criteria, there were 
others which were also influential. An important clue to a successful bid was, for 
example, to be found in David Young's initial letter of 28 January 1983 to LEAs : the 
penultimate paragraph contained references to learning skills, an aspect of the scheme 
which remained a high priority for the TVEI Unit. He wrote 
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we are in the business of helping students to "learn how to learn" .... 
What is important about this initiative is that youngsters should 
receive an education which will enable them to adapt to the changing 
occupational environment. 
Two further examples of implicit or unofficial criteria will serve to illustrate this 
argument. The first relates to what Gaynor Cohen, a senior member of the Unit's staff 
with responsibility for evaluation, refers to as "a central theme" concerned with the 
"management of change" : she writes "one criterion of TVEI has always been 
management through consortia of schools and colleges" (Cohen, 1989). This appears 
to have been one of the characteristics which the MSC applauded in some schemes 
and encouraged others to write into their proposals, and Cohen may well be correct in 
suggesting that collaboration with other institutions helps to remedy the isolation (and 
even compensate for the managerial inadequacy) of many heads; but the published 
criteria go no further than suggest that consortia arrangements may help to achieve "a 
significant widening of the curriculum and of technical and vocational curriculum 
options". 
A second, similarly unwritten, requirement which became increasingly significant 
concerns the 16+ phase where, as a kind of gloss on the thinking within the original 
criteria, the TVEI Unit came to expect considerable emphasis to be given to what they 
termed the "entitlement curriculum". This concept implies that post-16 students 
should be offered more than a specialised academic or vocational course. Hence both 
core and enrichment studies, work experience, guidance and counselling, and 
opportunities to engage in extra-curricular activities should all have a place in the 
educational programme offered to students. Such an emphasis closely reflected the 
priorities of Anne Jones, Director of Educational Programmes at the MSC from 1987 
and previously a comprehensive school head actively engaged in the debate about 
sixth form curricula, and in particular the proper relationship between the academic 
and the vocational, and between school and work (see, for example, Jones, 1983). It 
also pre-figured debate about the widening of post-16 studies, revived by Kenneth 
Baker in a speech to FE principals (Baker, 1989), and more generally by the rejection 
of the Higginson proposals on the future of A-levels, the advent of the AS-level, and 
the demand for core skills. 
To conclude, the role of criteria within the TVEI scheme as out-lined in these 
pages demonstrates certain key characteristics which we may well find can be 
generalised across other examples of categorical funding. It is therefore worth setting 
them out at this stage : 
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1. criteria usually follow rather than precede the formulation of policy and the 
decision to put money behind it (ie to turn a policy into a programme). They may 
emerge only after a period of divergent thinking about just what the programme can 
and should achieve. 
2. consultation with 'interested' parties about the criteria may replace consultation 
about the programme itself : thus conflict and disagreement are concentrated around 
the How? question rather than the Why? or Whether? questions. (This is often a 
characteristic of policy options explored through experimentation : see Weiler, 1983, 
and Harland, 1988.) 
3. the values of the sponsoring body will usually dominate the process of formulating 
criteria, especially where the consultative group which endorses the final statement is 
made up of people representing different interest groups and whose task is therefore 
frequently that of defending their corner. Nevertheless, the period of formulation can 
be seen as a brief window of flexibility and therefore a moment when many of those 
affected can join the debate. This in itself can serve to legitimise the whole 
enterprise. 
4. once written, criteria take on some of the characteristics of received truth. This 
does not necessarily apply where criteria are changed or up-dated on an annual cycle; 
but what certainly happens is that those with executive power to interpret what does 
or does not meet the sponsors expectations can exert considerable influence in 
relation to how they advise, prioritise and interpret the criteria with which they have 
been instructed to operate. Their own preferences inevitably play some part in this 
process. Where the context changes but the criteria stand (as broadly speaking has 
been the case with the TVEI pilot), they positively need to show an ability to adapt to 
new situations and to shift their interpretation of the criteria and their relative 
importance. 
5. criteria attached to an offer of funding are a powerful tool in shaping values within 
the client group (and thus remunerative power shades over into the power to shape 
and re-shape values, ie, normative power). This may be because people do indeed 
change their thinking in line with the overall approach of an activity with which they 
become identified. Or it may be that a given opportunity draws to it and into the 
limelight those individuals whose values are at least adjacent to those which are being 
promoted. Meanwhile those who cannot or will not subscribe to the criteria retire to 
sulk in their tents. 
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53 Bid 
If politicians, MSC officials and, to a lesser degree, the delegated representatives 
of interest groups made their appearance in the last section, this is the point at which 
we encounter LEA members, officers, advisers and teachers. And at the outset it is 
worth saying, in Dale's words, 
(Dale, 1989a, p156) 
Nevertheless, the process of developing the bid - the who?, why? and when? of the 
process - undoubtedly defines the parameters within which future development and 
even divergence can take place. In Chapter 4 it was argued that the artistry required 
in the formulation of a successful bid lies in marrying the requirements of the scheme 
as laid down in the criteria to local priorities in such a way that a synthesis is 
achieved which both sides can accept. The first steps taken determine the spaces 
available later. 
The bidding timetable for the start of TVEI began with David Young's letter to 
LEAs in November 1982 in which he said that he hoped to select ten pilot authorities 
by the end of January. In the event, the formal invitation to bid "by noon on March 
4th" was made in the letter of 28 January 1983 to which reference has already been 
made. By the end of the month no fewer that 60 authorities had indicated that they 
planned to make a submission. By the due time, 66 proposals for 70 schemes had 
been submitted, a number delivered by hand in the closing minutes before the dead-
line. Most but not all of the submissions were from Conservative controlled LEAs : 
of the 14 finally chosen, only 5 were from Labour authorities. The successful 
proposals were then discussed in fine detail with the TVEI Unit before contracts were 
signed. Three months after the first 14 pilots were chosen, and three months before 
their schemes were launched, the government announced that "the experiment would 
be extended to allow 40 more LEAs to join in September 1984", though at a 
significantly lower level of funding than in the first round. Letters of invitation were 
issued on 23 September 1983 and proposals were requested by 12 December. Some, 
but not all, the submissions came in from LEAs who had been continuing their 
planning since the announcement of the first round and who had sought guidance as 
to how their initial proposal needed to be modified to gain approval. This time round, 
being acquainted with the origins and framework of the project does 
not necessarily tell us a great deal about how it works 	 practically 
every study ever published of an educational or curriculum innovation 
concludes that the form it actually takes is different from what was 
intended, that the process of implementation itself alters the shape and 
emphasis of the project... 
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46 LEAs joined the scheme. Scottish authorities, excluded from the first round, were 
now invited to join but they received less notice : their invitation was dated 27 
January 1984 and proposals were required by March 5. 
In October 1984, a further invitation was extended which promised that all LEAs 
choosing to bid would receive funding from September 1985. Beyond that date, only 
a few recalcitrant Labour authorities, including the ILEA, held out ; and they, by this 
time desperate for cash and their fears somewhat alleviated by the experiences of 
other LEAs, were brought in via a shortened pilot phase in 1986. By this time the 
decision to extend TVEI to all upper secondary pupils in all authorities was already in 
place; fresh criteria for the Extension phase were formulated and the whole process of 
bid, negotiation and so forth was beginning again. 
This account of the expansion of the scheme suggests that almost all LEAs were 
anxious to join in, with the disappointed at each stage consulting the MSC - and each 
other - about what changes would result in 'success'. This is not to deny the existence 
of powerful negative feelings in most LEAs about aspects of the scheme. Some 
thought that TVEI threatened to be a divisive influence in comprehensive schools and 
would result in a narrowing of the curriculum for at least some students. 
Furthermore, some LEAs were prepared to resist the intrusion of the MSC into the 
school curriculum and into mainstream educational spending. However, money was a 
powerful enough incentive to overcome most opposition. The Prime Minister had 
made it clear that the TVEI money came out of the overall education budget and some 
LEAs saw themselves as applying "for their own money". One or two did see the 
value of involvement in the interests of influencing the way the scheme developed, 
while others had a natural pre-disposition towards being associated with experiment 
and innovation. Also, as Dale says (1989a, p158), for most authorities "TVEI money 
provided solutions to other problems in addition to that of changing the provision of 
technical and vocational education according to a specified set of guidelines". But it 
cannot be over-emphasised that, in a period of rate-capping and dwindling resources, 
money was the over-riding inducement. 
Dale (1989a, p157) suggests that in the preparation of bids, three rather different 
approaches can be distinguished, each with different consequences for the eventual 
shape of an LEA pilot. In the first of these, overall responsibility was given to the 
authority's senior officer with responsibility for FE because this was the previous 
point of contact between the LEA, the MSC and, coincidentally, with the FEU and 
thus with the pedagogical style which the TVEI Unit appeared to favour. A second 
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model was to devolve responsibility for preparing a proposal to a consortium, or to 
competing consortia, of heads in the authority. A third was for the authority to select 
the schools to take part in the pilot and then to work out a proposal in collaboration 
with them. This taxonomy accords with evidence available except that it does not 
appear to give sufficient space to the LEA's own specialist advisory staff : 
inspectors/advisers in key areas such as CDT and/or Business Studies seem to have 
played an important role in a number of authorities. In others, LEAs clearly sought 
"volunteers" among their schools (colleges, being thinner on the ground, had less 
option about their involvement) : for the most part a response came from the heads 
with little or no consultation (often for lack of time) with colleagues, and it can safely 
be argued that their motives for taking part closely mirrored those of their own LEAs.. 
Where the LEA itself selected the schools, different criteria might apply : 
Some TVEI schools have been included because they have 
demonstrated that they could make it (TVEI) work, others because they 
are thought to need a new challenge. In some cases it has been used to 
equalise provision across the authority by bringing extra resources to 
the worst-off schools, in others it has been used to smooth school 
amalgamation. In yet others, WEI resources have gone to the schools 
in the areas of the most powerful councillors. 
(Dale, op cit, p158) 
An interesting question in relation to the process of formulating a bid relates to the 
extent to which the LEA was able, willing or even required to consult widely within 
the authority before the proposal was submitted. For the most part it would seem that 
the pattern at LEA level mirrored that at the national level : in other words, for most 
people, including both teachers and local employers, the opportunity to join in the 
consultation process was a post hoc exercise. Proposals were typically written at 
speed by a group of three or four people. What is more, for at least the first two 
rounds, LEAs were clearly in direct competition with each other for a limited, even if 
generous, amount of funding. One applicant's success was another's failure. Moon 
and Richardson confirm this scenario: 
.... it would appear that the conventional local consultative processes 
were generally circumvented : teaching unions were informed of their 
respective authority's intention to submit an application, but were not 
invited to participate in the 'profiling' of the schemes. Similarly there 
was little time for anything but the most hasty contacts with 
representatives of local industry. 
(Moon and Richardson, 1984, p28) 
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Once the winners had been selected, the TVEI Unit settled down to negotiate the 
fine detail. In this exercise, MSC officials sought to ensure that schemes addressed 
the minutiae of the criteria. In particular they were anxious to press the question of 
"enhancement", endeavouring to ensure that the TVEI curriculum was genuinely 
different to what was there before, and not simply an old product under a new name. 
They were also keen to discuss expenditure on equipment and on the re-modelling of 
accomodation. 
The Unit seemed less concerned about the very diverse proposals made 
concerning expenditure on staffing. The pilot schemes thus produced a wide variety 
of organisational arrangements. In a paper given as early as 1985, Beattie proposed 
the model shown as Figure 3 (overleaf) to explain the "ideal types" of organisational 
structure and of management style as exemplified by the role of the project co-
ordinator (a post which was a basic MSC requirement). The model sets the various 
observable patterns of institutional responsibility against the management style 
options available to the co-ordinator. Although in theory, nine permutations of 
structure:style are possible, Beattie argued that in practice most cluster around the 
three boxes marked with an asterix. The centralised/competing-head combination is 
consistent with the creation of a strong central team of curriculum 
experts/advisers/trainers; whereas the relative autonomy/adviser combination fits with 
a structure where the bulk of the resources are devolved to the participating schools 
and colleges and thus the extra staff are to be found at that level. In terms of the bid 
and negotiation process, it seems clear that the MSC allowed authorities considerable 
latitude in deciding where to locate themselves on this continuum. Presumably this 
was seen as a legitimate area for experimentation in the attempt "to explore and test 
ways of organising and managing ....". 
It was by no means uncommon for the MSC to allow an authority to embark upon 
a pilot project before the full details of its scheme were agreed. This was particularly 
the case with regard to the 16-18 phase which was, after all, two years down the line. 
A number of authorities made a succession of revised submissions to the TVEI Unit 
and only succeeded in gaining final approval as the first cohort prepared to transfer to 
college. This extended negotiation can be partly explained by the fact that the Unit's 
thinking about its objectives for the 16+ phase was evolving in the light of the earliest 
schemes ; and also as a response to their disappointment about the staying-on rate and 
the proportion of the early cohorts who stuck with an identifiable TVEI track 
(Fitzgibbon, 1988). However, the net effect was to prolong the bid/negotiation 
process and thereby to influence the working relations between sponsor and project 
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staff. For some, the ending of pilot negotiations almost dove-tailed into the beginning 
of the same process in relation to the Extension scheme, and the LEA was thus locked 
into the semi-permanent role of suppliant. 
The final question to ask concerns the rigidity of the original proposal. It seems to 
have been a general experience that the exact curriculum offer and the related staffing 
structures did not stand still over the life-time of the pilots. The TVEI Unit proved 
increasingly willing to allow well-argued variations to the original plans. The 
problem has often been that those people most clearly identified with the original 
proposal have found it difficult to countenance change. It might therefore be argued 
that the bidding process crystallises a certain moment in what might be better seen as 
an evolutionary process ; it can therefore prove a block to further change. 
It is now time to summarise the key characteristics of the bid/negotiation phase as 
they emerge from this analysis : 
1. in making a decision to bid, the lure of resources often seems to over-ride ojections 
of a more principled variety; 
2. the tight time-scales which are apparently the norm result in the enclosure of the 
planning process and the consequent reduction of time for consultation with those 
who will have to implement the programme; 
3. those who are party to the original planning tend to feel a sense of close ownership 
which can lead them to resist later changes; 
4. sponsoring agencies have a need to see evidence of visible changes in order to 
satisfy their own pay-masters; 
5. when criteria are clear, local variations are more readily tolerated; 
6. extended processes of negotiation reinforce the sponsors control. 
Once again, these tentative conclusions can be carried forward to the cases to be 
examined in the next chapter. 
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5.4 Contract 
A contract has two relationships to chronological time : on the one hand it 
represents a fixed point in time, an event, something with a date and signatures upon 
it ; on the other, it is descriptive of a continuing relationship in some cause, a 
relationship which colours interactions between the parties involved, both actual and 
possible. Contract as an event is of only passing interest within TVEI. That there is a 
document which makes certain statements, lays out certain operating procedures for 
payment, reporting, cancellation and so forth, and comes with a stack of Appendices 
containing detailed accounts of what is to be done, is all of a curious insignificance in 
the story. But the relationships which bring the contract into existence and continue 
because of its existence are all important. 
Although the MSC as an executive agency of government was well-accustomed to 
programme implementation through short-term renewable contracts, LEAs, schools 
and colleges had no such experience. On might argue that the payment-by-results 
system of the late nineteenth century represented a form of contractual relationship: 
no results, no payment. But since then the education system had had no experience of 
being paid for what it achieved (outcomes) but rather was completely at ease with the 
thought that it was funded to put young people through a particular experience (a 
process) in the belief that it was beneficial to them. (3) The clearest expression of this 
came from Stenhouse (1975) who argued that while teachers were wholly responsible 
for the professionalism with which they managed the learning process, if their efforts 
at that level could not be faulted, then they could in no way be held responsible for 
what pupils actually achieved. 
In a 1986 paper by Geoffrey Holland, Director of the MSC during and before the 
TVEI years, we can see how far the MSCs approach contrasts with that of Stenhouse 
in particular and the education system in general. Holland affirms the principles 
underlying TVEI - a scheme to be initiated via the LEAs, taking different forms 
according to local circumstances, voluntary, and with a locally determined curriculum 
-, principles which had largely served to allay the fears of the local authorities. 
However he sets these within an ideological frame which was, at least until recently, 
utterly at odds with the explicit and the implicit operating values of the education 
system. He argues that one of the Commission's major concerns is 
to shift the focus of attention in vocational education and training 
away from processes and towards outcomes. This is not to say that the 
process does not matter - far from it; but for too long debate has 
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centred around institutions, around the process of education and 
training and around the curriculum when what matters at the end of 
the day is the quantity, quality and relevance of the result. 
(Holland, 1986, p98) 
It is not difficult to see the link between a pursuit of outcomes and the use of 
contract. This is what we want. This is what we will pay for what we want. Who can 
deliver ? If you offer, and we believe you can do it, we will write down our 
agreement in the form of a contract. 
In Chapter 4 I argued the potency of contracts - as deals which must be sought, 
negotiated, secured often against competition, and then held on to with some measure 
of anxiety lest they should be rescinded. Though familiarity with the process of 
funding through contract may lessen these effects, nevertheless the transmission of 
resources maintains the client relationship and ensures that the contractee exercises 
his initiative in the interests of the sponsor, operating as a licensed agent within the 
territory defined for him by the contract. 
Since that argument was first published, it has been suggested that the contract is 
little more than a myth. After all, despite delays in agreeing terms and occasional 
hints of cancellation (Fulton, 1987), there is no evidence that TVEI contracts have 
ever been torn up, funds recovered or LEAs 'sacked'. 
Jamieson in particular (1988 and 1990) has taken a hard look at this concept of 
contract. He writes 
...I would agree that this is a good description of the model in its pure 
form but I am surprised that so many experienced evaluators have 
been so uncritical of its actual operation. The practice is that the 
policy is ill-formulated and pretty unclear at the top allowing a great 
deal of room for local interpretation... 	 (p447, 1988) 
Central government has always given the LEAs money for education, 
some of it earmarked for specific priorities. Unfortunately local 
treasurers have often found more pressing local concerns and central 
government targets have been missed. WEI was to be different, the 
LEAs were asked to sign a contract to deliver against their agreed bid 
and the contract was to be monitored and audited by the MSC. 	  
The 'contract' is largely a myth, but like all myths it is both powerful 
and enduring. Locally it is based around the sacred book, the aptly 
named LEA submission. WEI directors and co-ordinators regularly 
point to it and expect submission from recalcitrant headteachers and 
LEA officers ('we have to do it because it is in the submission -
submit') 
(Jamieson,1990, p132) 
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This argument is echoed in Sikes. She writes about the way in which teachers 
have characterised the MSC as an ogre, a task-master, a whip-cracker. 
... although individuals from the MSC frequently visit the scheme 
and/or are known by their name because documents bear these ...., the 
trend among teachers is to de-personalise and homogenize. This may 
well be a distancing strategy which casts the teacher in the role of 
individual facing the organisation. On the other hand it may just 
reflect a view of the commission as a coherent entity and force, 
although this view is inconsistent with criticisms of the MSC's lack of 
internal co-ordination 
On occasion advantage has been taken of the way in which the MSC 
can be characterised and anthropomorphized. 
"I use the MSC as a bogeyman. I tell the heads 'Oh you've got to get 
this or that done because the MSC want it quickly. They might make 
things difficult for you if you don't do it' - and all along it's me who 
wants it done. Wicked I am !" (TVEI scheme co-ordinator) 
"You can use us as a big stick. If it gets the schools or the elected 
members going that's fine. Feel free to take our name in vain" (MSC 
Regional Adviser) 
In many LEAs the shadow of the contract fell even further because the authority 
itself asked its schools to bid for inclusion in TVEI and, increasingly, other 
programmes. And within the school or college, the same sort of procedures could 
operate, with heads inviting departments to put themselves forward for activities 
which will trigger extra allowances. Yet none of this should be a surprise for it is in 
the nature of contracts to spawn sub-contracts. Those who are subject to contract will 
inevitably transmit the system downwards. 
I would not want to argue against the notion that the TVEI contract viewed as a 
document, an event, is in many ways a myth, or that while this myth lacks any real 
potency, it has proved very useful within LEAs and within schools. Yet the 
terminology of contract survives and is frequently used; and its strength resides in its 
continuing ability to stand for a relationship of a very particular kind. That is to say, 
it represents a relationship of dependency, and it signals a breach in the autonomy of 
the LEA in relation to its schools and colleges, of those schools and colleges in 
relation to their own internal affairs, and ultimately in the autonomy of the DES and 
the whole education system. 
(Sikes, 1987, p133-34) 
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But, myth or not, it is the contract which legitimises the process of monitoring and 
that will carry us forward to the next section after pausing to identify what would 
appear to be the key characteristics of contract as exemplified by TVEI. 
These characteristics would include : 
1. the fact that the relationships constructed through the process of contract assume a 
far geater importance than the contract itself; 
2. contracts are essentially concerned with outcomes rather than process. This is the 
case even where the outcomes required appear to relate to new processes (for 
example, new styles of teaching and learning) which the sponsor is seeking to foster, 
3. contractees themselves often find it useful to stress contractual obligations in order 
to extract compliance and co-operation from within their own sub-systems. 
5.5 Monitoring 
The role of monitoring within categorical funding has already been discussed in 
Chapter 4. It was argued there that the dominant feature was the demand for a high 
level of information, partly achieved as a result of close contact between the parties to 
the contract. Using Foucault's term, this was described as "coercion by means of 
observation". 
In the case of the TVEI pilot, monitoring was a multi-faceted activity. There were 
five main aspects to the process : 
1. the annual planning dialogue between senior representatives of the TVEI Unit and 
the LEA, the purpose of which was to review the year's progress and to agree plans -
curricular, organisational and financial - for the coming year, 
2. meetings of the local steering group to which all subordinate committees, working 
parties and so forth reported; an MSC nominee was always an ex-officio member (see 
the earlier section on Criteria); 
3. the requirement that all participating LEAs should make regular financial and non-
financial returns - to MSC auditors; to the TVEI Unit's own data base on student 
numbers, timetables, option choices, estimated and actual examination attainments, 
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etc; and to the "curriculum data base" at Trent Polytechnic which sought details about 
the timetables for all students in the pilot schools and colleges, together with 
information about teacher qualifications and "main teaching subjects"; 
4. the on-going contact with the TVEI Unit's Regional Advisers who were expected to 
keep in close touch with every institution and every key actor in the group of LEAs 
for which they were responsible; 
5. the national and local evaluation programmes which will be the subject of the next 
section in this chapter. 
In addition, one must not ignore the extent to which the scrutiny of TVEI schemes 
by other parties and interests - HMI, local inspectorates, local and national politicians, 
the press, educationalists and others from overseas, some employment interests, HE 
admission tutors, and many more - increased the Unit's capacity to know what was 
happening in the pilots. Moreover the LEAs and their co-ordinators were themselves 
active in the process of image management. If there was a problem, it arose from a 
surfeit of data, rather than the reverse. The TVEI Unit's insistence on referring to the 
students enrolled on the pilot schemes as a "research cohort" (4) no doubt provided a 
motivation for the gathering of all this material, but one can also see such heavy 
monitoring as a control device. In the pilots themselves, some felt that the level of 
scrutiny was excessive and antipathetic to experiment and development; and there 
were continuous and exasperated complaints about the work load involved in meeting 
the demands. 
Most of the remainder of this section will concentrate on the role of the Regional 
Advisers but a few words of commentary on some of the other elements of the 
process will be useful. 
Jamieson has described the annual planning dialogue as "unquestionably a home-
match for local projects" (1990, p132). He argues that the annual report invariably 
contained more information than the visiting team could digest and "the away players 
rarely seem to be able to find the really penetrating question". It is obviously true to 
say that the occasion could be stage-managed, and the prospect of lunch could cut 
short the debate. However most LEAs saw the forthcoming dialogue as at least a 
potential ordeal for which careful preparations had to be made and loose ends tied 
back to the criteria and the contract. Most meetings ended with a list of issues for the 
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Regional Adviser to follow-up with the project co-ordinator, thus providing a base 
agenda for the next twelve months' contact. (5) 
The local steering group was very effective in some LEAs, totally invisible in 
others. In so far as it represented an opportunity for "outsiders" to advise and consult 
on the conduct of the local scheme, the MSC seemed happy not to press the steering 
group issue if there appeared to be other avenues open to outside influence - Project 
Trident, for example. On the whole and with some honourable exceptions, few local 
interests (including employers) seemed anxious to 'steer' TVEI pilots and their 
participation in such groups has been more a public relations exercise than anything 
else. Nevertheless, meetings of steering groups, like the annual planning meeting, 
were also occasions on which the scheme had to prepare itself for public scrutiny, and 
therefore once again the project staff needed to be able to account for their activities. 
Of the financial audit, Jamieson says 
MSC auditing is little different from any other, the accountants 
examine important trivia - important because it is necessary to have 
cost control and to ensure that things like the rules of virement have 
been followed, but trivial in the sense that it is a long way from 
teaching and learning. 
(Jamieson, 1990, p132) 
This aspect of contractual relationships came as a surprise and an irritation to many 
authorities. (6) 
However, despite all this information gathering, contact between the TVEI Unit 
and the LEA was principally experienced through the working relationship between 
the MSC's Regional Advisers and the project co-ordinators. The work of these 
advisers was crucial to the development of TVEI and it is interesting that, within the 
burgeoning commentary on the scheme, so little attention has been paid to their role. 
One exception to this is the paper by Sikes and Taylor in Gleeson (1987). 
Sikes and Taylor point out that the MSC had no standard mode of implementation 
to commend to LEAs, no central body of authenticated expertise, and indeed could 
not hope to comprehend the diversity of local situations, existing relationships and 
modus operandi. 
To handle most of their communication with LEAs, the MSC therefore appointed 
as its Regional Advisers people with substantial experience of education at a senior 
level (most had been either heads of schools or had worked in an LEA advisory 
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(Sikes and Taylor, 1987, p56,) 
They go on to report an address given by a Senior Regional Adviser to a conference 
of secondary teachers in 1985. The Adviser explained that the MSC had "no legal 
locus whatsoever to interfere with the curriculum". Indeed, the Regional Adviser's 
task was to "persuade the LEAs that they own the curriculum development within 
TVEI". But the crunch comes in the tail : "Our interest in the curriculum really 
amounts to (whether) the emerging curriculum will meet the objectives that are 
written into the contracts". 
In the past attempts at large-scale educational innovation have tended 
to be less than successful in realizing their objectives because they 
have encountered 'tradition', inertia and a lack of commitment on the 
part of those not intimately involved 	 the MSC has recognised this. 
Despite its dispersal of generous financial resources and its ability to 
implement innovation more quickly than the DES, we contend that in 
order to avoid (or at least, minimize) intransigence or obstructiveness, 
it operates a strategy of subversive persuasion based in a rhetoric of 
contractual reciprocity. 
service). Each had seven or eight projects to supervise. Their role was essentially 
two-fold. The first element was the task of keeping the scheme on course. As Sikes 
and Taylor say 
This final sentence points to the second aspect of the role. That consisted of the 
reponsibility to act as mediators whenever LEAs sought to make revisions in their 
scheme which needed (and most did) to be referred back to MSC head-quarters. 
It is usually through the Regional Adviser that schemes clarify the 
acceptability of new developments whether these be courses, 
enhancements, off-site experiences or appointments (to TVEI funded 
posts); and receive feed-back on issues like ability spread, sex-stereo-
typing, equal opportunities, questions of future funding and so on. 
	
 But the sort of straightforward, black-and-white clarification co- 
ordinators want is not always forthcoming. Regional Advisers have 
signed the Official Secrets Act and are not always at liberty to disclose 
what they know. 
(op cit, p65) 
The last remark neatly demonstrates where the primary loyalty lay. However it still 
begs the question of who at headquarters made the decisions as to what was 
'acceptable' : can it be that Advisers themselves had a considerable influence not only 
in conveying the questions but also in providing the answers ? 
Developing these ideas further in a collaborative article written with the Open 
University TVEI evaluation team (Dale et al, 1989b), the same writers argue that 
despite the MSC's dominant position with regard to funding and regulating TVEI, 
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they were far from being a key source of information. Instead they are best seen as 
"initiators" of innovation and, once schemes were in operation, as "interpreters" of 
individual schemes. The national framework for the scheme must necessarily remain 
couched in a language of high generality, "allowing a diversity of local responses to 
be mediated, regulated and consolidated by the MSC TVEI Unit through the 
interpretative role of the regional advisers". They go on to say 
Theirs is a delicate task of discursive diplomacy where a new 
vocabulary of the vocationalist ethos is insinuated into the 
conventional rhetorics of educational policy-making and 
implementation. And this seems to be done in a way that does not 
immediately threaten the identities and autonomy of established 
educationalists, and yet provides a basis for transformation which 
appears to articulate with conventionally established educational 
perspectives at all levels. 
(Dale, et al, 1989b, p87) 
Thus the monitoring process, and the relationships which grow up within it (7), 
play a significant part in the establishment and maintenance of a discourse which 
sustains the value assumptions of the sponsor. It is true that this hegemonic function 
pervades all the elements within the categorical funding process; but nowhere is it 
more importantly developed than in the dialogue between the TVEI Unit and the 
LEA, and this lies at the heart of the monitoring process. And once prompted by 
routine observation to assimilate, use and even "own" the new discourse, (and in my 
view this is equally true when applicants bidding for funds choose, albeit somewhat 
cynically, to adopt the words and concepts that they feel will demonstrate their 
conformity to the values of the funder), surveillance does indeed become "permanent 
in its effects even if discontinuous in action"(see Chapter 4). 
These then appear to be the key characteristics of the monitoring process within 
TVEI : 
1. monitoring is a multi-faceted operation which shades over into normal 
administrative procedures; 
2. occasions such as annual reviews which require the contractee to make a public 
demonstration of programme activities permit and extend scrutiny; 
3. monitoring processes (especially when undertaken by representatives of the 
funding agency) provide opportunities for re-inforcing the discourse. 
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5.6 Evaluation 
The bald facts about the evaluation of the TVEI pilot are these : 
1. the second round authorities were required, by their contracts, to allocate 1% of 
their budgets (ie about £4000 per annum) to a "local evaluation"; 
2. by the time their schemes were underway, most of the first round authorities had 
secured supplementary funds from the MSC to commission their own local 
evaluations, often on a much more generous scale; 
3. the MSC commissioned two national evaluations to cover the pilot phase: a team at 
Leeds University undertook an investigation of "Curriculum Change and 
Development", using case studies of particular schools within selected projects; while 
the NFER investigated "Organisation, Operation and Reception" using survey 
questionnaires with groups in all projects, supplemented by a few case studies. The 
total budget for these two national studies was £2 million; 
4. in addition the MSC sponsored a series of separate studies on special issues and 
various supplementary projects as they arose. 
This outline of the evaluation indicates a total outlay of something around £5 
million, and this excludes the sum spent on the monitoring activities outlined in the 
previous section. The whole gigantic exercise was co-ordinated by a "division" 
within the TVEI Unit. Its responsibilities were 
- offering professional advice to WEI co-ordinators and evaluators 
- co-ordinating the various strands of evaluation 
- communicating with evaluators and co-ordinators 
- analysing and summarizing reports and data 
- disseminating information about evaluation and evaluation 
outcomes to all interested parties 
identifying gaps in evaluation and commissioning further studies to 
fill these gap 
(MSC, WEI Evaluation Information Leaflets ,undated. ? 1985) 
When we add to the estimated £5 million, the huge costs involved in running this 
division in terms of staffing and, above all, printing and publication, the grand total 
clearly exceeded all previous expenditure on educational evaluation in this country. 
Not surprisingly, one result was the generation of an enormous body of material. 
Much of the national work was of a very high quality, although its sheer volume 
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probably militated against it being as widely read as it deserved. Local evaluation 
reports had a more restricted circulation (DES, 1991b) but the networks among the 
evaluators, stimulated by conferences and meetings set up by the TVEI Unit itself, 
resulted in a good deal of paper writing and theorising in the education journals and 
also fed into the seemingly never-ending flow of publications, pamphlets and so forth 
put out by the Unit. 
So why have so many resources been put into evaluation ? The MSC's own 
answer to this question was simple : 
TVEI is a pilot programme and everyone with an interest in education 
needs to know if it works and how it works. 	
(MSC, op cit) 
The reality is of course more subtle. It is inconceivable that the answer provided 
to the "if it works" question could have turned out to be "it doesn't work !" : 
inconceivable because of the scale of the commitment, the size of the enterprise, and 
the political significance of the whole thing. If the zero option may one day be open 
to the historian, it was certainly a luxury denied to the evaluators of TVEI. Success 
thus assured, evaluation has concentrated on "how it works" and such negative 
findings as did emerge have been assimilated into the general category of 
implementation problems. 
Before returning to this theme it would be useful to look at the special case of the 
local evaluator. (There is less to gain from a close examination of the national 
evaluations because they were far more firmly located in mainstream styles of 
education research and evaluation, concentrating on the tried and tested techniques of 
survey and case-study, followed by substantial reports containing anonymised and 
homogenised information and findings.) For most LEAs the emergence of formal 
TVEI evaluation was co-terminous with their own growing interest in and concern for 
evaluation. Despite the current ease with which LEA officers and staff now speak of 
evaluation and assume its role in many of their activities, in the early eighties it was 
still a largely alien activity, seen as something attached to Schools Council projects 
and not much else. The LEAs' own work in this area had been largely confined to 
gathering pupil statistics. 
The requirement to evaluate their own TVEI programme was therefore, for many, 
a catalytic experience. As Jamieson (1990) says, 
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Project personnel, very often with the assistance of the evaluator, 
began to acquire the language and concepts of educational evaluation 
(and in many cases of education itself) which permitted them to have 
useful dialogues with each other. 
(Jamieson, 1990, p137) 
The effect of this experience can be clearly perceived not only in the manner in which 
LEAs came to discuss evaluation in the Extension phase of TVEI, but also in the way 
they have handled later moves towards such matters as school development plans, 
INSET, and teacher appraisal. 
The MSC produced a rather formidable list of "Hard/Statistical Issues" and a 
much shorter list of "Soft/Attitudinal Issues" about which "questions should be asked" 
in both the "immediate and continuing" period and the "longer term". They suggested 
that LEAs would have to choose between a "single LEA" or a "consortium" 
arrangement for their local evaluation, and that a principal evaluator, preferably 
"independent", should be "identified and commissioned". Their guidance resulted in 
very diverse practice. About half the authorities in the first and second round 
appointed a named individual from higher education, but from the second round on 
such people had to consider the financial logistics of the small annual budget. Most 
often the HE institution accepted several one-off commissions and operated a team 
approach to the task while still tailoring their work to each authority (eg, Open 
University and CARE, East Anglia). The ultimate in rationalising the task was to 
seek a sufficient number of contracts to employ a team of one or two researchers and 
then to operate a standardised package of largely survey-based work across the 
consortium (eg, Lancaster University, which had contracts with 12+ authorities). 
Some LEAs avoided direct links with HE by making their own internal appointments 
(eg, Hertfordshire), often on part or even full-time secondments, though it was not 
unusual for such people to have some kind of external supervision. 
This diversity of approach, coupled with the diversity in the schemes themselves, 
makes it difficult to generalise about the work undertaken. However, McCabe (1988) 
has suggested that most local evaluations tended to move over time from descriptive 
reports based on observations and discussions, to an examination of the organisation 
of the scheme and its location within the LEA's structure; then on to more student-
focussed surveys, often concerned with attitudes to work and with response to TVEI, 
and finally towards the investigation of specific issues/topics/problems which were 
matters of importance to the LEA's TVEI team. (8) 
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These evaluation exercises were sometimes fraught, especially in the early stages 
when LEAs did not understand the need to negotiate a clear contract with their 
evaluators and indeed often did not share with them a common expectation as to what 
evaluation could achieve. But for the most part the working relationships which 
emerged were close and supportive of the project and its staff. As Gleeson et al 
(1990) say, it was often possible to manage a local evaluation as an extended case 
study, developing along the way "the process of formative and action-oriented 
research within TVEI - which was by nature experimental and supportive of 
idiosyncratic innovation". Local evaluation was able to generate and to focus internal 
debate about the LEA programme; and this was at least partly due to the fact that the 
evaluator travelled around the programme's sites, raising and exposing issues through 
the very choice of questions to be discussed. Consequently much local evaluation 
tended to proceed in private : Gleeson et al say 
... public accounts cannot wholly reflect, in the interests of 
confidentiality, the contribution external evaluation has been able to 
make in its support of individual institutions, their teachers, and also 
to project management teams. 
(Gleeson et al, 1990, p 111) 
McCabe (1990) also says that "most of the local evaluator's activity ... never appears 
in the literature or any report". 
For McCabe, who has been responsible for a number of evaluations in the North 
East, there is apparently no problem with this cosy relationship. In 1986 he wrote 
"Evaluators cannot in fact remain independent and external, at best they can be 
described as semi-detached" (p32); and later in the same paper, he advises authorities 
to appoint as evaluators "people with whom the dialogue and process can be carried 
on easily. Part of the process may involve the evaluator in in-service work or in 
discussions on your behalf ...." (p38). In 1990 he writes 
When you ask your evaluator to go round the schools and report on 
progress towards some favoured objective, we all realise that he or she 
is largely promoting that aspect of the project for you and at the same 
time giving your colleagues in schools opportunities to sort out their 
ideas and express their interest. 
(op cit, p14-15) 
This symbiotic relationship could of course seem enormously useful, and for an 
educational theorist/academic, it was a very beguiling role to play. But it is not a role 
which went unquestioned. For example, Gleeson et al talk about the distinction 
between evaluation and confirmation, and about the fact that 
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The pressure on LEAs to be seen as successful managers of centrally-
funded initiatives may be reflected in the way evaluators tend to be 
guided towards examples of 'good' or 'interesting' practice. 
(Gleeson et al, 1990, p109) 
Others are even more concerned. In a paper pointedly titled "What is Evaluation 
after the MSC?", Nixon questions the whole concept of "formative" evaluation in the 
context of categorically funded projects. He remarks that the notion of TVEI as a 
carefully controlled experiment gave way over the years, especially after the 
announcement of the Extension in 1986, to an attempt to permeate the whole 
curricular map for the 14-18 age range. "Viewed from this perspective, evaluation is 
seen as having an important part to play in shaping the innovation as it develops". 
Worried by this thought, Nixon goes back to examine the original concept of 
formative evaluation as developed by Scriven (1967). He finds that Scriven argued 
that a key characteristic of formative evaluation must be the scope to critique the 
worthwhileness of programme goals, and moreover to draw attention to unintended 
outcomes. Nixon then goes on to say some disturbing things about the supposedly 
formative nature of TVEI evaluation: 
(Scriven's) perspective, which informed the development of evaluation 
throughout the 1970s, is in certain crucial respects singularly 
inappropriate to TVEI, where outcomes are not only pre-specified, but 
where that prespecification is reified into a formal contract between 
the LEA and the Training Agency (formerly, the MSC). Under the 
terms of the funding agreement, an LEA is contractually bound to 
'deliver' the curriculum package as specified in its TVEI submission. 
The critical reflective function that formative evaluation might 
otherwise be expected to fulfil is, therefore, seriously limited; it can 
help tease out the practical implications of the original statement of 
intent, but is rarely expected to question its basic assumptions. 
(Nixon, 1989, p129) 
This comment represents a serious criticism, for if the evaluation is neither summative 
nor genuinely formative, what is it ? 
Clearly the tradition of "democratic" evaluation which had emerged from the 
curriculum development movement of the sixties and seventies was being directly 
challenged. For in those decades, curriculum development was not directly in the 
hands of central government, but rather was sponsored by mediating agencies (most 
importantly, the Schools Council), who facilitated rather than directly managed 
projects. Such agencies were eventually receptive to advice about the crucial 
importance for effective change of the initiative, commitment and sense of 
"ownership" felt by the grass-roots practitioner and the individual school. Thus 
evaluators came to see themselves as free-wheeling "knowledge brokers" with a 
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responsibility to all the "stake-holders" in a given enterprise (MacDonald 1974). No-
one should pull rank in order to gain control of the evaluative exercise : the right to 
know was more important than the right to manage. 
Categorical funding shifts responsibility for initiating change back from the 
practitioner to the centre, often to central government and to specific spending 
ministers. In this context, evaluation practices are forced to change. 
MacDonald himself, with Kushner, has written a powerful paper pointing up what 
they see as the dangers implicit in this situation. But they do not take the easy way 
out and blame the problems on scheme administrators; in my view, that would be not 
only wrong but would also serve to distract attention from the structural reasons 
which underpin this challenge to the prevailing practice of evaluation. Instead they 
give what can only be called a sympathetic account of the situation of the manager. 
They point out that those who manage rather than facilitate programmes have a 
"heightened sensitivity to bad news". 
These civil servant managers who commission evaluations are 
vulnerable to unfavourable judgements of the policies they are 
implementing or of the ways in which they have chosen to prosecute 
them. Typically they seek from the evaluator knowledge that will 
increase their control over programme participants and maintain 
fidelity of interpretation and action across distributed and distant sites. 
They also want evaluators to assist development at the local level, to 
help participants make the most of their piece of the action. They do 
not want and will strenuously oppose, policy evaluation of a kind that 
could embarrass their superiors by raising questions about the validity 
of the programme rationale. Neither do they want their own 
performance as managers evaluated, though they may welcome 
confidential, off-the-record advice. 
.... The administrators who manage these programmes are under no 
illusions about the political imperatives that constitute their brief. 
These programmes, though they may well bear the official status of 
'pilot' or 'experiment', and though they may well be saturated with 
evaluation processes apparently designed to establish their worth, are 
expressions of political conviction rather than explorations of 
educational hypotheses. 
(Kushner and MacDonald, 1987, pp152 and 155) 
Although in this extract, Kushner and MacDonald seem to be most concerned 
with the national level, there are clear parallels with the situation at the local level. 
They argue that local evaluators, "faced with these sensitivities and not without an 
interest in their own marketability", usually choose one of two roles : that of "ally" to 
management which may afford "a seat at the high table of management" and thus 
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provide scope for "the promotion of educational values that may be more prominent 
in the rhetoric of the programme than in the reality of its implementation"; or 
alternatively, that of "nourishing the grass roots of programme action", contributing 
"to the quality of the programme at the point of delivery" and looking towards the 
needs of the teachers involved. Both these they describe as forms of "participant 
evaluation" which provide evaluators with "honourable occupations and defensible 
interpretations of their responsibilities". However, while they admit that such roles 
are 'legitimate' in the sense that they are supportive to a policy devised within the 
framework of a representative democracy, the rest of their paper goes on to call into 
question whether this form of funding and its associated implications for evaluation 
are adequate within a genuinely democratic society. I propose to return to that 
argument in my conclusion. 
The account and critique of TVEI evaluation in this section may be seen as an 
explanation of both the quantity and the blandness of much that has been written 
about the scheme. The scope for undertaking searching analysis of schemes such as 
TVEI, despite their huge importance, within the normal confines of personal research 
are so very limited when compared to the wide expanses of commentary made 
possible by the sponsor's funding : and given the structural constraints which are built 
into the logic of categorical funding, it is scarcely surprising that evaluation is largely 
concerned first with implementation; and second with accountability, upwards to the 
MSC, and ever upwards to the appropriate government ministers. 
In sum, the key characteristics of evaluation as demonstrated by the TVEI 
experience would seem to be : 
1. that it is essentially concerned with the processes of implementation. Summative 
evaluation, in Scriven's sense, is not on the agenda ; and formative evaluation 
becomes something which closely resembles a management strategy; 
2. local evaluators experience both a pressure and a temptation to 'go native', though 
in doing so, they may raise the level of awareness and debate through the questions 
that they pose and the issues to which they direct attention; 
3. those who commission evaluation - national as well as local - are themselves 
operating under constraint : they look to evaluation to legitimise the programme, and 
their own success in operationalising it. 
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5.7 Replication/Impact 
The problem with pilot schemes which stretch over many years is that the rest of 
the world does not stand still while the experiment is conducted. Moreover, to 
employ a cliche much loved in TVEI circles, the goal posts are constantly shifting. 
The educational environment which spawned TVEI changed and the scheme 
correspondingly had to adapt, and to fmd new rationales and even new strategies. By 
the late eighties, its thrust was accordingly less clear-cut and less decisive. 
Most commentators on TVEI agree that its conception demonstrated a certain 
brilliance in that, by employing the MSC as pay-master, an educational policy 
succeeded in by-passing the tortuous procedures of the Rate Support Grant and 
directly tempted all but the most recalcitrant education committees. Moreover it 
opened up the curriculum itself to government priorities in a way which neatly side-
stepped all the many layers of influence, control and vested interest which had 
previously stood between policy and practice. The system was shocked, but it was 
also amazed at the audacity of the manoeuvre. A knight's move on a field which more 
often saw pawn-like rigidity ! 
Much of this scenario has now changed. The government, through the Education 
Reform Act, has secured detailed control of education, partly by employing yet again 
a form of contractual obligation in the very device of delegating most educational 
spending to the institutional level against the 'delivery' of a required programme. In 
particular it has secured a degree of control over the curriculum which goes beyond 
anything anticipated before 1987. Moreover, the thrust of its curricular policy, while 
paying lip-service to the achievements and priorities of TVEI, contains much which 
can be seen as antithetical to the scheme's overall principles. An emphasis on a 
curriculum defined and imposed (if not necessarily taught) under traditional subject 
headings, re-inforced by a testing system which is intended to be a high-stakes 
boundary marker for students, especially at 16, poses serious questions about what 
space remains for popular developments identified with TVEI : cross-curricular 
work, active and open-ended learning strategies, links with the world outside school 
including work experience, and studies in areas which are peripheral to the territory of 
the National Curriculum. 
Not surprisingly the MSC/TA had to adopt defensive strategies. As an on-going 
scheme, TVEI became, in the way of things, a vested interest in its own right : from 
an innovative strategy for policy implementation it grew into a well-diffused but 
144 
recognisable organisational structure, with an identifiable personnel, opportunities for 
career advancement and a defined credo. One early response to the threat implied by 
the National Curriculum was to suggest that while it was concerned with "product", 
TVEI was essentially about "process": thus there could be synthesis rather than 
antithesis (Anne Jones, 1989). She and others have argued the wisdom of using 
matrix structures to explore the degree to which TVEI principles and practices can be 
integrated with and explored through the attainment targets of the the statutory 
curriculum. 
Gambles (1991) referred to this process as "holding on to the gains of TVEI", a 
phrase which seemed to reflect accurately the sentiments expressed by the MSC/TA 
itself in its "Focus Statement". This first appeared in 1987 and was later adopted as a 
joint statement with the NCC. It attempts to re-formulate TVEI principles through the 
assertion of five broadly expressed aims concerned with matters such as knowledge of 
the world of work, the attainment of qualifications appropriate to a "highly 
technological society" and the development of personal effectiveness (see Figure 4 
overleaf). Each aim begins with the repeated phrase "By making sure that 	 ". It is 
arguable that in this, we see a transition from the bright, confident morning of 
requirements and criteria to the more hazy, tentative afternoon of aspirations. 
Organisationally, the TVEI interest was to some extent incorporated into planning 
for the National Curriculum through the appointment of one of its best known 
Regional Advisers to the National Curriculum Council and further the choice of that 
individual to chair the working party charged to look at the "Whole Curriculum". 
Despite alleged hesitations and delays in the publication of the reports of this 
committee, Circular no 6, which gave preliminary guidance on "whole curriculum 
planning", did appear at the end of 1989 (NCC, 1989), and the much fuller statement, 
The Whole Curriculum, in following March (NCC, 1990a). In April the first of the 
detailed statements about the individual 'elements' identified, Education for Economic  
and Industrial Understanding. was published (NCC, 1990b). In June there appeared 
further pamphlets on Health Education  (NCC, 1990c) and Careers Education and 
Guidance (NCC, 1990d). Environmental Education (NCC, 1990e) was published in 
September and Education for Citizenship (NCC, 19900 in November. For the 
purpose of this argument, it is useful to note how many of the principles and 
priorities of TVEI are reflected in these 'themes', and the 'skills' and 'dimensions' such 
as equal opportunities associated with them in The Whole Curriculum. However, 
even as these publications emerged, funds for the TVEI extension scheme were 
halved and it was announced that more Training Agency functions were to be 
devolved to the new local Training and Enterprise Councils. 
145 
WHAT IS TVEI TRYING TO DO? 
TVE1 aims to ensure that the education of 14-18 year olds 
provides young people with learning opportunities which 
will equip them for the demands of working life in a rapidly 
changing society. 
TVE1 seeks to influence the Education of 14-18 year olds 
in 5 explicit ways: 
(1) By making sure the curriculum uses every opportunity to relate 
education to the world of work, by using concrete/real examples if 
possible. 
(2) By making sure that young people get the knowledge, competen- 
cies and qualifications they need in a highly technological society 
which is itself part of Europe and the world economy. 
(3) By making sure that young people themselves get direct oppor- 
tunities to learn about the nature of the economy and the world of work 
- through work experience, work shadowing, projects in the community 
and so on. 
(4) By making sure that young people learn how to be effective 
people, solve problems, work in teams, be enterprising and creative 
through the way they are taught. 
• 
(5) By making sure that young people have access to initial guidance 
and counselling, and then continuing education and training, and op- 
portunities for progression throughout their lives. 
Figure 4 : MSC/TA "Focus Statement" 1987 
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But replication and impact are to be measured on wider dimensions. In policy 
terms, TVEI surely demonstrated the effectiveness of contractually-based policy 
initiatives; and, however briefly, it is worth rehearsing the developments which the 
scheme sponsored and which substantially influenced practice beyond the pilot 
programme (even though the evaluation of that influence must necessarily be intuitive 
rather than precise). 
First, TVEI undoubtedly paved the way for the incorporation of Technology into 
the National Curriculum. The quality of the debate surrounding the development of 
attainment targets, programmes of work and curriculum strategies for Technology 
was a testimony to the extent to which this area of experience (to use HMI 
terminology) had been the object of intensive curriculum development during the 
years of the TVEI pilot. (9) Outstanding questions are entirely concerned with how, 
not whether. Moreover, the theme of "technology across the curriculum" 
demonstrates that Technology is no longer bolted down within its own time-table slot 
but is rather to be incorporated in Science, in Maths, in the Humanities, and indeed in 
most areas of the curriculum. Second, TVEI encouraged curriculum development in a 
wide range of activities beyond Technology and its related areas : these include 
Business Studies, Home Economics, Media and Creative Studies, and many others, 
including some with a very local orientation such as tourism, boat-building and 
horticulture. TVEI practices also moved from an early preference for seeing 
Information Technology as a free-standing area of study towards its incorporation and 
integration across the whole curriculum. Third, TVEI undoubtedly made a 
considerable impact upon thinking about post-16 curricula : the MSC's demand for an 
'entitlement' curriculum that widened the offer beyond a straight choice between the 
academic or the vocational track has fed directly into the move towards 'core skills' in 
the post-compulsory years (FEU May 1989). Fourth, TVEI influenced not only the 
content but also the pedagogy and the assessment of upper secondary education, by 
providing a focus and an incentive for more active styles of teaching and learning and 
more participatory forms of assessment, notably profiling. Fifth, TVEI shifted the 
limelight of curriculum development to areas previously in the shadows, and thus 
offered opportunities for career enhancement, promotion and leadership to a new 
group of educators (Harland 1987a) in such a way that we are unlikely to see teachers 
of vocationally focussed and applied areas of the curriculum creep back to the relative 
isolation that was once their lot. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, TVEI 
promoted collaborative styles of working, within and between schools and colleges. 
This process was reinforced by provision for INSET and other opportunities for 
shared discussion and negotiation, supported by a steady stream of publications and 
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quite unashamed forms of 'hype'. It could be argued that this increased professional 
debate and developed critical self-awareness to a level not achieved by the curriculum 
development of the sixties and seventies, for all its associated "teacher-as-researcher" 
model. (10) 
There remains considerable scope for disagreement about the extent to which 
TVEI was successful under all these headings. For example the Leeds evaluation 
team has cast doubt on the degree which teachers genuinely adopted new learning 
styles (Barnes et al, 1987). Other local evaluations reported disappointed and critical 
comments from as many as 40% of the early cohorts (Hinckley, 1987) and a lack of 
coherence in the management of work experience (Saunders 1987). Another local 
evaluation which looked at GCSE results reported that TVEI students were 
performing below expectation (Fitzgibbon et al, 1988), while evidence about the 
depressed level of staying-on rates at 16 and the lack of progress in tempting girls into 
non-traditional choices was widespread. Thus it is clear that the reality often fell 
short of the rhetoric about TVEI. But on another view, rhetoric can usefully set the 
pace : cheer-leaders are there to create an atmosphere of high expectation, and of 
confidence that the team is going to deliver. 
To conclude this section on replication and impact, we need to raise two final 
questions : what was the role of the TVEI Unit in supporting this process? and what 
was required of LEAs and schools as their contribution ? 
Apart from exposure in the national and the educational press - for which material 
was readily available from the MSC's Press Office - the Unit itself kept up a 
continuous flow of free publications. As well as printing and circulating the bulky 
reports from the two national evaluations, the most notable and noticed publications 
were the magazine style TVEI Insight, published three times a year from September 
1984, and the later series of booklets, TVEI Developments. Of these, TVEI Insight 
was an unashamed exercise in scheme promotion. Photographs, jazzy lay-outs and 
short snappy articles spread the glad news of officially sanctioned 'good practice' 
around the country. Editorials read like the vicar's slot in a parish magazine : and just 
as in the parish magazine, no-one questions the existence of God, so in TVEI Insight 
 
no one queries the value or the effectiveness of the programme. It must be assumed 
that the audience for this publication was not only teachers, inside and outside the 
scheme, but also the wider world of the scheme's political sponsors and ultimately, 
the voter. 
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TVEI Developments made its first appearance in 1986. Its object was "to give a 
few contributors rather more space in which to relate how specific schemes have been 
put together, how they have developed and, importantly, what problems have been 
encountered and possible changes foreseen and planned ...". Thus the tone is 
somewhat more sober and the booklets contain a series of short essays around a 
specific theme. 
The editorial choice of themes for both these publications obviously reflected 
MSC priorities. Once again the critical voice is absent. In a beguilingly mixed 
metaphor, Jamieson (1988) calls them "TVEI review dishes" which serve up "blow by 
blow accounts of what happened in local projects". As such they clearly met a need 
perceived by the MSC to build a corpus of material about TVEI to feed the discourse 
and to establish a sense of its presence and permanence. 
It has already been noted in the previous section that the TVEI Unit was generous 
to evaluators in the matter of setting up workshops and supporting networks. The 
Unit also permitted and even encouraged LEAs to show the same sort of generosity 
within their own schemes. In a world where teachers were inured to attending INSET 
in redundant school buildings, TVEI introduced them to residential conferences in 
comfortable hotels. This is a far from trivial point in the calculation as to how the 
MSC sought to enhance the image and hence the impact of TVEI. 
The second question concerned what was required of the LEAs, schools and 
colleges and it is more difficult to answer because the expectation was about an 
attitude rather than a specific set of activities. Essentially pilot schemes were 
expected to be seen and heard. 
To meet this obligation TVEI programmes were expected to hold their doors open 
in a manner to which the education system was scarcely accustomed : to other 
interests and audiences, which would include industry and employers, the press, and 
overseas visitors; to other LEAs; and of course to the MSC itself. One symptom of 
this greater awareness of the world outside was the steady improvement in the 
presentation of LEA materials, partly under the influence of the technologies which 
TVEI made available to them but also partly as a result of exposure and example. 
TVEI heralded the arrival of public relations in many LEAs. 
We must of course remember that in any individual institution the impact of TVEI 
was always limited and shaped by what had existed before; and moreover that TVEI 
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resources, no matter how generous they may have appeared, were essentially marginal 
when compared with the on-going expenditure on system maintenance, whether at 
LEA level or at institutional level. Thus it is unreasonable to expect radical 
transformation. It is nevertheless remarkable how far, after the early years of 
suspicion, TVEI succeeded in recruiting teacher loyalty. Some would say that this 
was because teachers and project staff found that the MSC yoke was indeed light: that 
they were able to take the money after a mere ritualistic gesture towards the MSC's 
requirements and then undertake developments which fitted their own priorities. 
Others would claim that there is in the TVEI philosophy the seeds of a much sounder 
approach to mass upper secondary education, plus the opportunity for teachers to 
improve their professional skills and job satisfaction. 
My view is that while much of this may be partly true, nevertheless the 
mechanisms of categorical funding and the logic of contractual arrangements work to 
recruit those who take the king's shilling in a manner which is so subtle that they 
continue to see themselves as free agents. I would hope that such a position has been 
amply supported by the account of TVEI given in this chapter. 
It is more difficult to extract generalisations about the replication/impact phase 
than it has been for previous elements in this analysis. The conduct, the content and 
the context of TVEI have been unique to itself, and the same is true of its outcomes. 
However, we might at least conclude that : 
1. the probability of substantial replication and sustained impact can be re-inforced by 
extensive promotion. For this reason, those who take the money must expect to 
operate in the public eye. Doors must be open at all times; 
2. much will depend upon the extent to which the sponsor is able to turn compliance 
into advocacy. But to be involved but detached is a difficult position to sustain. The 
dependency generated by specific grant encourages those who, over time, become 
active and vocal supporters, and freezes out the rest. 
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5.8 Discussion 
In conclusion I want to make three broad points about the larger significance of 
the TVEI policy experiment : the first concerns the pattern of relationships within the 
education system and their significance for the management of change; the second 
concerns the impact on what Dale has termed the "mandate" of the educational 
service; and the third relates to the significance of TVEI for the formulation of 
educational policy. 
Relationships within the system 
TVEI was a policy initiative designed (in an off-the-cuff style) to address a range 
of perceived problems in schooling : pupils were trapped by a self-addressing and 
isolated teaching profession into an irrelevant, de-motivating and over-academic 
curriculum; they were therefore leaving school with little knowledge relevant to 
working life and with very little understanding of industry or of the functioning of a 
capitalist economy. Any real solution to these problems would need to smash 
existing ways of doing things. 
The TVEI initiative thus took on the task of shifting not only the content of the 
curriculum but also the existing ways of bringing about and managing the process of 
change. This was largely done through a process of disaggregating what were 
previously distinct agencies that related to each other in ways that were well 
understood. By routing money through the MSC, TVEI broke the monopoly of the 
DES in educational matters. By using the money to enter into contracts with parts of 
the system, it created divisions and ambiguities in what had previously been a fairly 
clear line of delegated responsibility : some LEAs, but not - for some time - all; some 
parts of an LEA's operation, but not all; some schools and colleges within an LEA, 
but not all; some departments and teachers within an institution, but not all. Among 
those party to the contracts, new dependencies and obligations were thereby created. 
Some LEA officers now owed an allegiance to an agency outside the LEA. Similarly 
some teachers were answerable to project staff rather than to their own senior 
management for some of their activities. Heads came to realise that the quid pro quo 
for the resources received was the loss of some autonomy. Thus many things that had 
been simple became more fragmented and ambiguous, and as a result, previously 
unquestioned assumptions had to be reconsidered. 
151 
Despite the later popularity of TVEI, the scheme was for some time responsible 
for creating a substantial insider/outsider culture. In an early and influential paper, 
Saunders describes how TVEI created "innovation enclaves" within schools ; he 
defines this as 
a set of practices, expressed in a policy text, which are inserted or 
which intervene in an established set of practices ... accompanied by a 
strong rhetoric which allies participants and distinguishes them from 
non-participants. 
(Saunders, 1986) 
House gives a similar but more general account of the impact of innovation 
accompanied by "inducements" : 
In .. a tight economy, rewards and job slots are in scarce supply. If 
participation in the innovation increases promotion opportunities for 
innovative teachers, it reduces opportunities for those excluded. 
Excluded teachers are in a position where it is rational to attack the 
innovation. 
(House, 1974, p96) 
I want to argue that the practice of categorical funding within the TVEI scheme 
challenged what policy makers took to be a monolithic system, and imposed 
something much closer to what has been called a pattern of 'competitive 
individualism'. They were therefore able to challenge not only the content of 
schooling but also the traditional routes through which change had been attempted. 
Altering the "mandate" 
Dale (1989b) produces a sophisticated argument in which he claims that TVEI 
represented an attempt to move schools and colleges further away from the 
educational mandate and operational style associated with the DES, and closer to that 
of the Department of Employment and its satellite, the MSC. Later I shall go further 
and suggest that it is not only TVEI but categorical funding as a strategy which does 
this and that for MSC we should read something broader such as modern 
managerialism; but for the time being I wish to stay with Dale's argument. 
On the matter of the mandates, Dale quotes in full the objectives of each 
department as set out in the white paper Working Together  (DES, 1986a, Cmnd 
9823). That document says of the DES 
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The principal aim of the Department of Education and Science is to 
improve standards throughout the education service and to increase 
the value obtained for the substantial resources allocated to it by the 
taxpayer and the ratepayer. 
Of the Department of Employment it says 
The prime aim of the Department of Employment is to encourage the 
development of an enterprise economy. 
Later it is said that a key aspect of its work is to 
.. improve training arrangements so that young people get a better 
preparation for work. 
Given the thrust of TVEI it is not difficult to agree with the argument that the 
initiative was intended to move the education system closer to the mandate of the 
MSC and its parent department. 
The contrasts in operational style which Dale draws between the DES and the 
MSC are summarised in Figure 5 (overleaf). It is important to recognise that some of 
the differences identified here are no longer as stark as they were in the early and 
mid-eighties. I have therefore suggested in the heading that the argument best fits the 
years between the announcement of TVEI in 1982 and the publication of the 
Education Reform Bill in 1987. However the relevance of this analysis to TVEI will 
be immediately obvious. What Dale suggests is that, in accommodating TVEI, the 
education system has taken on something of a hybridised version of these two styles 
of operation. As a result teachers have become more and more accustomed to 
categorical funding - and hence to the bidding process; to demands for increased and 
more specific accountability; to more extensive and intrusive monitoring; to new 
expectations about inter-institutional arrangements; and to a speed of change to which 
they have not previously been accustomed. It is not difficult to draw from these 
arguments a view that the significance of TVEI is much greater than the impact of the 
scheme itself. 
New patterns of policy formulation 
Educational change in Britain has tended to emerge from one of three sources : 
either it has been the product of debate and consultation among practitioners, aimed at 
improving some part of the curriculum; or it has been the result of recommendations 
arising from the work of some blue ribbon committee; or it has been brought about by 
legislation. Where government has been involved, Moon and Richardson, writing in 
1984, claim that the established policy style is characterized by "sectorization, 
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FIGURE 5 
A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE CAPACITY AND THE MODUS OPERANDI OF THE DES AND THE MSC : 1982-87 
DES 
Department of State 	 Cabinet Minister 
accountable via Parliament 
to the electorate 
Bureaucratic, rule-following 
process-orientated 
Operates via LEAs 
System maintenance/development 
On-going budgetary commitments 
much educational spending outside 
its direct control 
Financial approval precedes spending 
Demand led expenditure : re-active 
Assumption that education 
will be state-funded 
"Allocative" state activity : 
provision of public service in 
accordance with constitutional 
and legislative codes 
MSC 
Public Board with executive responsibilities 
members delegated by interests they represent 
Technocratic/commercial 
action-orientated 
Operates directly througn own regional network 
Crisis management 
Funds short term programmes 
via contracts with providers 
Post hoc accountability for spending 
involving much auditing/monitoring 
Supply-side interventions : pro-active 
Looks for best buy 
efficiency, cost-cutting, best bid 
"Productive" state activity : 
crisis management/avoidance needing 
rapid non- rule governed decisions 
(Adapted from an analysis in Dale, 1989b) 
154 
clientilism, consultation, institution of compromise, and the development of exchange 
relationships : all working to discourage sudden policy change". Elsewhere they say 
that policies usually "emerge as the result of a process - usually fairly lengthy - of 
consultation with various non-governmental organisations". They claim that TVEI 
"avoided or side-stepped all these traditional routes". 
They go on to argue that "the unilateral declaration of the initiative was a gamble 
on the part of the government" and claim that the announcement was very rapidly 
followed by a move to establish a consultative body (the National Steering Group) to 
legitimate the policy. Their conclusion sums up what I would wish to say on this 
score : 
We suggest, however, that the TVEI experiment is of wider interest to 
observers of the UK policy style. It suggests that under certain 
conditions radical innovation is possible, even (or especially?) in a 
period of resource squeeze. Policy-makers have been prepared to 
chance their arm; they did have resources (money) to offer, and the 
policy is not being universally applied (hence those who really oppose 
it do not have to participate). But we need to note that a relatively 
crude style of deciding what you want to do, announcing it and 
attaching some cash to it, may have wider implications for policy-
making in hard times. 
(Moon and Richardson, 1984) 
This leads to their conclusion that the rest of Whitehall had not failed to notice the 
success of the MSC strategy. It is part of my argument that the message about 
categorical funding was well learned. The next chapters will examine this new 
approach to policy making in the hands of the DES. 
In concluding this review of TVEI, therefore, I want to argue that it is the fact and 
the specific mechanisms of categorical funding which have enabled these 
transformations to occur in the relationships between central and local government, in 
the apparent "mandate" of the DES as well as in its operational style, and in the 
formulation of policy. All these changes might have been wished for ; all might have 
come about without the encroachment of contract : but, as we saw in Chapters 2 and 
3, without an effective means for linking resource allocation to policy, the gap 
between government rhetoric and local practice can be very large. 
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Foot-notes 
1. One might argue that even the installation of the National Curriculum has 
involved a less significant input of targetted resources than TVEI in that it has been 
much more concerned with the re-direction of mainstream funding : development 
costs on both core and foundation curriculum subjects and on the associated testing 
programmes are unlikely to exceed TVEI expenditure. 
2. It is an observable characteristic of this type of funding that it always endeavours 
to gain a wider response and level of activity than it is actually paying for: further 
evidence of this tendency will be found in the following chapters. 
3. Recent suggestions from the Secretary of State that teachers' salaries should be 
related to the performance of their pupils on measures such as examination and test 
results and truancy rates may indicate that 'outcomes' thinking is making a come-
back. There is also growing interest within the FE sector (and from the NCVOJ in the 
notion of funding outcomes (ie qualifications attained). 
4. See Weiler (1983) and Harland (1988) on the contribution of 'experimentation' to 
the legitimation of policy. Presenting new policy initiatives as pilots or experiments 
can serve to remove them from the realm of controversy. The lessons 'learned' can be 
presented as the object of scientific investigation rather than ideologically driven 
policy. 
5. These observations are based on first hand experience of 6 planning dialogues in 
3 LEAs, and on corroborating conversations with other local evaluators. 
6. I vividly recall the shock in one LEA when an MSC auditor wanted personally to 
count the micro-computers purchased for each school; and again when the decision to 
re-organise the TVEI offices resulted in the purchase of an extra £100 worth of carpet 
and drew furious protests from the MSC because it was not in the original 
accommodation budget. Such trivia, together with the pressures created by making 
returns of quantitative data, have provoked surprise, frustration, and even laughter. 
7. During my own evaluation work, it seemed that the relationship which developed 
between an MSC Adviser and a project co-ordinator could be ambivalent. While the 
hierarchical and contingent relationship did not vanish, both parties appeared to 
appreciate their mutual dependence. In some sense, both had become marginal 
people : the adviser had broken away from his roots in the educational mainstream 
and needed to feel that he was not now disowned by the professional world; while the 
co-ordinator, who was now working to an authority outside the normal LEA and DES 
channels and might thus be seen as some-one with divided loyalties, also needed re-
inforcement. 
8. McCabe's account reflects my own experience with uncanny accuracy. 
9. Later moves to "revise" the Technology orders do not invalidate this point. 
10. However, the proviso has to be made that the quantity of the debate is not to be 
confused with its quality; and an orchestrated debate on themes generated elsewhere 
may in fact demonstrate a significant and ultimately damaging shift in the concept of 
teacher professionalism (Harland 1987b). 
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Chapter Six 
THE CASE OF INSET 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter traces recent developments in the in-service education and training of 
teachers : it will attempt to demonstrate how an emerging policy was realised, and its 
particular character determined, by the adoption of a funding strategy which reflects 
very closely the model employed within TVEL The discussion here will be structured 
in the same way as in the previous chapter, using the section headings of criteria, bid, 
and so forth. At the end of each section, there is a reference back to the 'key 
characteristics' identified in the analysis of TVEI. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion which also follows the headings in the conclusion to the last chapter. There 
is however a distinction between the two chapters : in the case of TVEI, the model was 
explored through material derived largely from evaluation and experience in the field, 
whereas in this chapter, because of the paucity of other material, the argument is based 
to a greater extent on documentary analysis. 
It is beyond the scope of this study to give a comprehensive account of 
developments in in-service education (INSET) or of the debate, political and 
professional, from which they have emerged. However, a brief attempt must be made 
to sketch in the background and to show the roots of the new strategies. Figure 6 
(overleaf) attempts to summarise some of the discussion which follows. 
We can begin the account by referring to the James Report (DES,1972b). This 
report offered a model of INSET which sought to "reflect and enhance the status and 
the independence of the teaching profession and of the institutions in which teachers are 
educated and trained". It made ambitious proposals for regular teacher release for 
further study and training which were probably over-optimistic even in the years 
preceding the oil crisis of 1974. But nevertheless the arguments offered in the report 
appeared to legitimise the concept of advanced education for teachers (and not merely 
training intended to up-date their skills). Moreover, it appeared to favour the growing 
popularity among teachers of extended study leading to formal qualifications such as 
Diplomas and Masters' degrees. 
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Figure 6 
THE LINEAGE OF THE LOCAL EDUCATION TRAINING GRANT SOMME CLEATGS) 
MSC 	 DES 
James Report 
Teacner Education ana training 
1
DES. :972 
ACSTT 
Making INSET Work 
1978 
TVEI 
announced 1982 
begins 1983 
ACSET Report 	 ESG scheme 
Proposals on INSET 
	
announced 1984. 
1984 	 begins 1985 
Better Schools 
TRIST 
	
1985 
September 1985 
DES Circular 6/86 
ste 
GRIST 
begins 1987 
(later called LEATGS) 
GEST 
	  
begins 199c 
 
 
Glossary 
ACSET Advisory Committee on the Supply and Education of Teachers 
ACSTT Advisory Committee on the Supply and Training of Teachers 
ESG 	 Education Support Grants 
GEST 	 Grants for Education Support and Training 
GRIST 	 Grant Related In-service Training 
LEATGS Local Education Authority Training Grants Scheme 
TRIST TVEI Related In-service Training 
TVEI 	 Technical and Vocational Education Initiative 
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To understand the significance of this stand - and to appreciate the degree to which 
the DES sought to transform INSET in the late eighties - it is important to recall the 
existing pattern of advanced education and training for teachers. At that time, when 
there were substantial changes going on in the schools coupled with an increasing 
feeling that the promise of the 1944 Education Act had not been fulfilled, many 
teachers appeared (and felt themselves) to enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy in 
relation to both the organisation and the curriculum of their schools. This encouraged 
an increasing number to take an interest in education at a conceptual, and not merely a 
practical, level. In response to this demand there was a rapid expansion of advanced 
courses for teachers within university departments of education and, later, polytechnics 
and colleges of education. As both cause and effect of this growing interest, the same 
period saw an equally rapid and exciting growth in the range of research and 
scholarship within educational studies, with notable advances in such fields as 
educational sociology, and curriculum studies. 
Thus, from the mid sixties, a significant number of teachers were seeking the kind 
of advanced education which gave them access to debates about education and which, 
by implication, lay beyond the management of their own class-rooms and the up-
dating of their own teaching specialisms. However, for the most part these teachers 
were self-selected, and their objectives were almost invariably tied to their personal 
preferences, interests and ambitions. The education system was expanding rapidly and 
it was an observable fact that many of those who improved their academic qualifications 
were subsequently promoted. Many had enjoyed up to a year's full-time study, paid 
for through an "uncapped" pooling system whereby each LEA contributed an equal 
amount to a central DES fund but could claim from it for the costs of teacher release in 
accordance with the number of secondments they were prepared to offer. The 
operation of this system was clearly inequitable and in many cases the number and 
purpose of the secondments did not appear to be part of any kind of coherent LEA 
policy. Moreover, apart from discrepancies in the extent to which LEAs were 
interested in encouraging teachers to follow courses, there was also a general tendency 
"to increase the number of secondees not just to improve the quality of the profession 
but to use it as a means to off-set the salary bill caused by falling rolls, and to 
supplement the numerical strength of advisory teams" (Goddard 1989). The overall 
picture was thus characterised by a lack of any thought about the overall needs of the 
system and driven by personal factors in a wholly unco-ordinated manner. 
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From the mid-seventies there was increasing criticism of school standards and hence 
of teacher effectiveness. It was therefore not surprising that the arbitrary nature of the 
existing system of INSET came under attack. But it can also be argued that the concern 
to reform in-service education and training was as much a response to a changing 
context as to an inadequate practice. In the first place, the topic of training and re-
training had become a central pre-occupation in most forms of employment, and it is 
now hard to remember how much this was a reversal of previous attitudes and practice 
in industry, commerce and the professions. The formalization and systematization of 
INSET is therefore partly to be understood in this wider context. Second, and 
particularly in the eighties, government was laying increasingly specific requirements 
upon teachers. In situations where teachers have a considerable degree of autonomy, it 
may be that further education and training are most naturally geared to up-grading 
overall professionalism ; but where the teaching task is specified in greater and greater 
detail, training requirements themselves become more specific. Third, policy in any 
one area is formulated in the shadow of other specific actions or general objectives. In 
the eighties, the Conservative government endeavoured to rein back the powers of local 
authorities, partly in order to restrain public expenditure, but also to prevent the 
subversion of national policies by local actions : the abrogation of INSET policy to the 
centre can be seen as a brick in this wall. 
Returning to the developments mapped in Figure 6, we should note the importance 
of the ACSTT report, Making INSET Work  (DES, 1978a), which argued strongly that 
INSET should be rationalized and planned in a manner which recognised the needs of 
the institution alongside those of the individual. By 1984, the reconstituted committee, 
ACSET, was taking an even more explicitly managerial tone when it argued for an 
emphasis within institutions on the identification of needs, for more systematic feed-
back of lessons learned during INSET, for the training of key personnel for their 
specific responsibilities, and for a more careful evaluation of the effects of training on 
teaching and learning (DES, 1984a). To achieve this the committee proposed that each 
school should be required to make an annual submission to the LEA which the 
authority would then reconcile with "regional and national developments". It was 
proposed that LEAs should receive general grant for this purpose, possibly at the rate 
of 5% of the teachers' salary bill, over which they would exercise their own discretion. 
The report also recommended the abolition of the pooling arrangements ; and it 
suggested that short courses should be paid for "at cost" so that LEAs would be in a 
position to gauge "value for money" and therefore the relative costs of different types of 
provision. 
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With the publication of Better Schools  (DES,1985a), the government announced a 
total re-structuring of arrangements for the funding and regulation of INSET. Although 
the ACSET objectives were clearly reflected in the new policy proposals, there had 
been some significant transformations. For a start, the DES expressed satisfaction with 
the success of its small scale initiative of 1983-84, the In-service Teacher Training 
Grants Scheme, under which it had offered limited funding for specified INSET 
activities. From this experience it had learned two lessons : first, that it is highly 
effective and perfectly possible to target training on the government's policy priorities ; 
and second, that a high level of control can be maintained through the mechanisms of 
categorical funding. In Better Schools a new policy was accordingly set out. The DES 
accepted the ACSET arguments for coherence, and the balancing of institutional need 
against wider priorities ; but from 1987 it was proposed to switch to specific rather than 
general grant in order that LEA INSET programmes should be subject to the oversight, 
guidance and approval of the DES. 
Better Schools justified this move on the grounds of 
the increasing demands which the government's policies for the schools 
will make on the teachers' 
- practical teaching skills; 
- breadth and depth of subject knowledge; 
- knowledge of and skills in assessment. 
And the conclusion drawn is that 
Extensive in-service training will be needed to equip teachers to respond 
to these demands. 
(DES, 1985a, Para 172). 
The enactment of the Education Reform Act in 1988 only served to increase the force of 
this argument. 
After the publication of Better Schools, the DES moved swiftly to implement the 
new arrangements. A position paper was issued during the summer of 1985, a draft 
circular in early 1986, and finally a formal Circular (DES, 6/86) in August inviting 
LEAs to bid for funds under the new scheme for the financial year 1987-1988. 
The line of action from the ACSET report of 1984 to the introduction of the new 
scheme in April 1987 did not, however, occur in a vacuum. The TVEI was, as we 
have seen, announced at the end of 1982, and launched in 1983; also in 1983, the DES 
introduced its small specific grant scheme for a few categories of in-service training 
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(Circular 3/83); and in the following year it announced the Education Support Grants 
scheme which, by offering subsidy at 70% for specified activities, aimed "to encourage 
local education authorities to re-deploy a limited amount of expenditure into activities 
which appear to the Secretary of State to be of particular importance" (DES, Education 
(Grants and Awards) Act, 1984). Moreover the DES appears to have been impatient to 
experiment with specific grant for INSET and accordingly diverted £25m from the 
general education budget for a programme which became known as the TVEI-Related 
In-Service Training Scheme (TRIST) and was administered for the department by the 
MSC. Under this latter scheme, a letter to chief education officers dated April 1985 
invited LEAs to submit proposals to the MSC within eight weeks for new or additional 
in-service training and professional development programmes which related in some 
loose way with the objectives of TVEI. The Senior Chief Inspector, responsible at that 
time for teacher training, has made no secret of the fact that TRIST was seen as a 
dummy run for the subsequent Grant Related Inservice Training scheme (GRIST), later 
re-christened the Local Education Authority Training Grant Scheme (LEATGS). The 
outcome of this move was that, by using the MSC for the pilot programme, the DES 
inherited the full apparatus of categorical funding. 
The adoption of this strategy was open and explicit. In the House of Commons 
debate on the 1986 Education 	 the Secretary of State said 
Every curriculum improvement needs appropriate in-service training. 
To meet all of these needs effectively, a sharper financial mechanism is 
required. The Secretary of State does not at present have financial 
powers which match his many statutory reponsibilities. There is an 
imbalance here. That is why the Bill proposes ... that in-service training 
should generally be financed through a new specific grant. 
(Hansard, June 1986) 
Thus, we fmd the new INSET policy embedded within the structures of the education 
system through the adoption of a particular funding strategy : it will therefore be 
appropriate to interrogate its practice to see how well it fits the model already proposed 
in previous chapters. 
The discussion which follows will deal mainly with the four financial years in which 
the scheme operated : from April 1991 LEATGS and the ESG scheme were combined 
into a new Grants for Education Support and Training Scheme (GEST - draft Circular, 
DES 1990) to which reference will be made only to indicate how the DES has sought to 
apply the lessons learned. 
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6.2 Criteria 
The criteria to which each authority had to work were more complex for LEATGS 
than for TVEI, though not necessarily harder to meet. They have consisted of the 
"Aims of the Scheme" ; the "objectives" spelt out for each year, the specific instructions 
within the annual circulars as to the issues, feedback and planning strategies to be 
included in each proposal; and the changing list of national priorities, announced on a 
yearly basis. Together these elements constituted the "criteria" (though the term itself 
was not explicitly used) which authorities had to recognise and meet in the course of 
preparing their proposals. Each of these elements will be considered separately in this 
section, but first it is worth noting that in a system where annual submissions are 
required (unlike TVEI which offered funding for a period of five years), there is much 
more opportunity for criteria to be changed from year to year. However, the corollary 
of this is that they tend to be more explicit and therefore less subject to unarticulated 
evolution and shifting interpretation. 
The aims of LEATGS remained more or less constant over the years between 1986 
and 1990. Quoting from Circular 5/88, they were 
.... to support in-service training so as : 
- to promote the professional development of teachers ... 
- to promote more systematic and purposeful planning of in-service 
training ... 
- to encourage more effective management of the teacher force ... 
- to encourage training to meet selected needs which are accorded 
national priority. 
Within these aims, the broad objectives in each successive year focused more and 
more specifically on teacher skills in relation to government requirements. Whereas 
Circular 9/87 spoke of "the development of local education authorities' in-service 
training programmes and ... arrangements for managing them", and Circular 5/88 of 
"the effective introduction of the National Curriculum", Circular 20/89 indicated that the 
DES wished "to ensure that teachers ... are sufficiently well trained to secure the 
effective introduction and implementation of the Government's policies to improve the 
quality of education", policies which included assessment arrangements, teacher 
appraisal, schemes for licensed and articled teachers, and the management of pupil 
behaviour. The draft Circular of July 1990 which set out the proposals for the new 
(DES, 1988) 
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GEST scheme, spoke of ensuring that teachers are "properly prepared for the reforms". 
The tone of these objectives thus became increasingly prescriptive and pre-emptive. 
Successive Circulars gave specific instructions about the matters to which LEAs 
should attend in preparing their proposals, either in terms of reporting on progress in 
terms of their management of INSET. For example, 9/87 asked for reports on progress 
in devising new ways of managing INSET (para 3), and 5/88 included a ten item 
questionnaire on the same theme. Circular 5/88 (para 7) also demanded that details of 
complementary activities funded through either TVEI or ESGs should be noted in the 
submission. Circular 20/89 (para 5) told LEAs to include 3 out of the 5 "Baker" days 
into the formal in-sevice plans, and moreover asked that bids should show the 
implications of a fmal allocation of plus or minus 15%. 
Each Circular included information on the factors which the Secretary of State 
proposed to take into account in determining the final maxima for grant-aided 
expenditure for each authority. The role of indicative allowances will be discussed in 
the next section : the immediate point is to suggest that the Circulars consistently 
encouraged LEAs to equate favourable resource decisions with demonstrated success in 
meeting DES criteria. 
A central feature of the scheme in its first four years was the distinction made 
between national priority areas (NPAs) and local priority areas (LPAs). From the 
beginning NPAs were supported at a higher rate of grant than LPAs : 70% for NPAs 
(dropping to 65% in 1990-91) as compared to 50% for LPAs. Moreover the 
percentage reserved for NPAs within the total funds available increased from 35% in 
1987-88 to 37.1%, 39.3% and 56.9% in the following years (McBride, 1989). (In the 
revised scheme for 1991-92, when ESGs and LEATGS were brought together, the 
provision for LPAs vanished altogether and all support was directed towards centrally 
identified activities.) The specification of NPAs and the year-on-year changes in the list 
were therefore a central element in the criteria towhich LEA proposals had to attend. 
NPAs have covered training in specific subjects or activities such as maths and 
science, assessment and management training; the changeover to GCSE; local financial 
management in schools and colleges; and the introduction of the national curriculum. 
They have included health education and the teaching of adult literacy and basic skills. 
They have also provided for the training of special needs teachers, youth and 
community workers and educational psychologists. The number of activities identified 
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as NPAs varied between 17 and 24 in any one year. Overall, a total of 44 NPAs were 
nominated over four years. But of these, only support for the training of youth 
workers and educational psychologists and for developments within FE provision for 
students with special needs appeared in every year's list. Other priorities have come 
and gone over the period, and some, such as management training for senior teachers 
and technological up-dating for FE lecturers have disappeared only to make a later 
come-back. (All information from Glickman and Dale, 1990.) In each year, the DES 
also indicated the maximum level of expenditure it was prepared to support for each of 
the NPAs. 
Overall it is clear that, even without formal criteria, LEAs were left in no doubt that 
their proposals had to be in line with the blue-print provided by the DES. We shall see 
later that meeting the criteria could still leave an LEA with plenty of room to 
manoeuvre. However, in exercising these liberties, authorities sometimes chose to 
forget that they could roam only within the designated territory. 
How does the operation of 'criteria' within LEATGS compare with that in TVEI ? 
Although it is clear that, as for TVEI, the criteria were worked out after the policy 
decision about INSET funding was made, there was little attempt to consult externally 
as to what they might contain, nor were there windows of opportunity for LEAs and 
other interested parties to influence the overall direction. The all-inclusive nature of 
LEATGS meant that the operational criteria were a much blunter instrument than in 
TVEI and the programme proved far more co-ercive, with less emphasis on competition 
and none on volunteering. Flexibility was visible only where it suited the evolving 
agenda of the DES. As to values, it is self-evident that LEA co-ordinators were 
obliged to put together a programme which reflected DES criteria and thus they at least 
appeared to be advocates of the DES-formulated priorities. We must therefore 
conclude that the role of criteria is contingent upon other aspects of categorically-funded 
programmes. 
6.3 Bid 
To understand how far the criteria constrained LEAs in formulating their proposals, 
it is necessary to look at the bidding process itself. 
As in TVEI, it has often been claimed that the preparation of bids under the new 
INSET arrangements was subject to undue time pressure. With the experimental 
165 
TRIST scheme this was certainly the case. The scheme was announced in May and 
authorities had eight weeks in which to submit their plans. There is some useful 
commentary on their response in Evans (1990) who was responsible for the national 
evaluation of TRIST. She writes that though some officers and advisers were shaken 
out of their "usual, sometimes pedestrian, routines, ... more often the enforced pace 
was seen as creating fundamental problems" (p109). Interestingly, however, she 
comments that those authorities which seemed to have fewest problems in concluding 
their contracts with the MSC, often encountered greater difficulties at the 
implementation stage than those who had engaged in a more protracted discussion and 
re-formulation of their plans. 
In another parallel with TVEI, the short time-scale allowed for submission enabled 
some LEA officers to "by-pass their own bureaucracy" and "most LEAs' plans were 
devised by a small group of key officials". Thus, "a scheme designed to enable LEAs 
to plan for the systematic management of INSET had an in-built pressure to cut corners 
and respond in an ad hoc manner" (op cit, p110). One effect of this was to exclude 
significant groups such as advisers from the consultation process. This tension seems 
to be a problem for any policy process which involves bidding. Even where the 
explicit purpose is to encourage more participative strategies (what one LEA inspector 
in the Evans study called the "imposed democratic model"), the effect of time pressure 
can produce the very opposite results from those intended. 
It might be thought that problems of the kind described in the preceding paragraphs 
would be ironed out after the early stages of the scheme. However, the Scrutiny 
Report prepared for the DES in late 1989 under the auspices of the Prime Minister's 
Efficiency Unit (Glickman and Dale,1990) draws attention to continuing problems 
related to timing. Notification of indicative allowances were arriving in August and 
bids were required in late September ; notification of fmal allocations arrived at the end 
of December. One authority enquired of the scrutineers "Is there an obsession at the 
DES for sending information to authorities just before major holidays ?". A more 
substantive complaint concerned the fact that, for the most part, there was no guarantee 
that activities named as NPAs would be renewed for the following year. The authors 
of the report observe that 
many LEAs, conscious of the annual nature of the schemes and because 
of their experience of the grant mechanisms, remain unsure as to 
whether activities will continue as might have been originally indicated. 
This has hindered planning and good management. Uncertainty and 
contingency planning have not helped LEAs, nor the DES, secure 
maximum value for money. 
(Glickman and Dale, 1990, para 90) 
166 
A major parameter for the bidding process is obviously the question of the total 
funds available and the conditions which apply to the distribution of that money across 
various activities. Unlike TVEI and, to a lesser extent, the ESG programe, the 
LEATGS was not competitive. The TRIST programme notified LEAs of "grant 
ceilings" and LEATGS itself used the term "indicative allowances". For the most part 
these allowances were calculated on the basis of pupil/teacher numbers. Only in the 
first year (1987-88) was any allowance made for historic costs to reflect previous levels 
of spending on INSET. 
While this shift to pre-determined levels of grant represents a variation in the model 
of categorical funding outlined in this thesis, it is nonetheless a development to be 
expected when a funding body seeks to implement a policy across the system rather 
than to proceed via experiment and example. Given that part of the purpose behind the 
new INSET arrangements was a levelling of LEA provision, it is not surprising that an 
overall reduction for some occurred. There are three comments to make on this shift. 
First, TVEI itself shifted from competitive bidding to something very much akin to 
indicative allowances as it became clear that all LEAs could expect to join the pilot 
phase and then participate in the extension, subject only to a satisfactory proposal. 
Second, the effect of the shift made no substantive change to the experience of 
categorical funding for it had little impact on the other elements in the contracting 
process. And third, as in the case of many other social and educational policies, it 
would have been unacceptable to suggest that some LEAs would get less or no support 
for INSET when, for example, the requirements of the Education Reform Act fell upon 
them all. 
The global allowance for LPAs stood at £130m over the first three years of the 
scheme and then fell to £92.4m in 1990-91; as noted in the previous section, LPAs 
therefore accounted for a diminishing percentage of the total, but also declined in real 
terms due to inflationary factors. LEAs therefore had the task of preparing their bids 
with the DES indicative allowances in mind. They also had to calculate how much 
expenditure from within their own resources would be needed to "trigger" the DES 
support. This did not, however, represent a ceiling on their total INSET expenditure, 
but merely "the limits up to which the Secretary of State will contribute grant under this 
scheme" (letter to LEAs, dated 19.12.86). 
The indicative allowance did not provide LEAs with a simple global sum for NPAs 
and another for LPAs. The NPA allowance was notified broken down into indicated 
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totals for each priority area. An important element in the bidding process was therefore 
the need to make the proposal "fit" the sums indicated. During the four years of the 
LEATGS scheme these sums could be adjusted by providing for additional expenditure 
on NPAs from within the LPA allowance although such supplementary expenditure 
was supported only at the lower rate. Movement of funds in the other direction, from 
NPAs to LPAs, was not allowed. Expenditure on particular NPAs could also be 
increased by virement between headings. Such virement was restricted to 10% of the 
indicated maxima unless exceptional permission was sought from the Secretary of 
State. Each year there was a changing list of NPAs from which virement was not 
permitted. 
The preparation of bids was therefore shaped, inter alia, by the balance between 
NPAs and LPAs and by the possibility of virement between headings. With the advent 
of GEST for 1991-92, both these framing factors were removed, decisions which 
throw an interesting light on the mechanics of categorical funding. In the first place the 
DES determined to withdraw provision for LPAs entirely despite the recommendations 
of the Scrutiny Report. The authors of that report had concluded that although 
a large discretionary element appears at odds with the concept of specific 
grants 	 , this element of flexibility has proved of significant value 
(to LEAs) and has helped efficiency. 
(Glickman, 1990, para 79-80) 
However, in the draft circular of 20 July 1990 it was said that 
The Secretary of State has reviewed whether the LPA should continue 
	
 Given the range of national priorities needing support through the 
GEST programme, and the convergence of national and local training 
needs following the ERA, he has concluded that it should not. 
(DES, 1990, para 20) 
Simultaneously, the DES decided to restrict virement to the movement of funds 
between sub-headings of expenditure within the allocations for separate activities. The 
draft circular stated 
virement has ... caused widespread problems in auditing grant claims, 
causing delays in the submission of audit certificates. It has also 
distorted the levels of support for individual LEATGS activities as 
determined by the Secretary of State. (op cit, para 28) 
The implications of these two changes are clear, for both represent a re-inforcement 
and an extension of central control over INSET activities funded under the scheme. As 
such, they demonstrate the effectiveness of categorical funding in ensuring that the 
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intentions of the sponsors are not distorted at the point of delivery. Bids are thus even 
more firmly tied down to the criteria of the particular programme. 
In conclusion, there would seem to be very many similarities between the bid phase 
in both TVEI and LEATGS. The over-riding significance of resources which 
demonstrates LEA dependency upon DES grant in whatever form it is offered ; the tight 
time-scales and the consequent enclosure of the planning process ; the demand from the 
sponsoring agency to see visible changes (for example, in management practices) ; the 
possibility of local variation within clear parameters ; and the control implications of 
extended negotiations are all apparent : all these are just as much features of LEATGS 
as of TVEI. 
6.4 Contract 
In relation to TVEI, it has been argued that contract can be seen either as an event, a 
specific document, or alternatively as a symbol of a continuing relationship. Much the 
same is true of 'contracts' within LEATGS. 
Here, however, there seems little need to argue whether the contract can or has been 
enforced or even cancelled, whether it is essentially a "myth", or whether it is used by 
local officials to keep the system moving forward. This is because, rather than employ 
the language of contract, the DES apparently preferred to talk about indicative 
allowances, submissions, letters of approval and additional requirements. However, it 
was also partly because the scheme was always intended to be inclusive ; LEAs might 
grumble (as some did when they discovered that historic costs would be rapidly 
discounted) but it was always assumed that none could or would fail to 'co-operate'. 
Furthermore, we cannot ignore the fact that, even though the compliance of LEAs 
was apparently assured by a shift in funding arrangements over which they had no 
influence, they were not without power within the bargaining process. Their position 
vis-a-vis the DES is well explained by Archer's dependency theory (Archer, 1981) : the 
dependent partner in this case certainly held reserves of expertise and of an even more 
crucial commodity, the capacity to comply and even support the new programme, 
which was crucially important to the ultimate success of the programme. 
With good reason, therefore, the DES wanted to pass from the stage of initiative to 
the stage of normal practice as quickly and smoothly as possible. Talk of contracts, to 
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be won and possibly to be lost, might have increased tension and risked re-opening the 
whole issue of INSET on a year by year basis. Instead the department went for a rule-
governed scheme with control over programme content, virement, planning cycles, 
management practices, monitoring, and so forth, which implied rather than stated a 
contractual relationship. Funding is provided in exchange for the delivery of an agreed 
programme within limits and under conditions specified by the sponsor. And that is 
contract in all but name. 
Once again, it is reasonable to conclude that the operation of contract in LEATGS is 
broadly similar to its role within TVEI. Here too, it is the contractual relationship - the 
obligation to deliver a specified programme in return for the necessary resources -
which is more important than the contract itself ; and once more, there is a clear 
emphasis on outcomes, even where those outcomes are concerned with demonstrable 
changes in process. And here too, it is evident that if LEAs are to meet the 
requirements of the contract, they are likely to emphasise their obligations to the DES in 
order to enforce compliance within their own sub-systems. 
6.5 Monitoring 
Monitoring and, for that matter evaluation, has been a much less clear-cut and 
coherent area in the LEATGS scheme than in TVEI. This is scarcely surprising for 
three reasons : first of all, the DES was much less experienced than the MSC in the 
establishment and then the subsequent management of a programme funded by specific 
grant and shaped in detail by its own criteria ; second, it was not aiming for a pilot 
scheme but rather for the incorporation of all INSET into a new pattern ; and third, 
unlike the MSC, it did not seek to set up a temporary system complete with Regional 
Advisers, local project managers, identified post-holders in schools and colleges, and a 
network of evaluators, but rather it was aiming for a re-definition of roles and 
responsibilities within existing structures. 
Evidence about the role of monitoring within the LEATGS scheme we have 
evidence which derives from the two Notes on monitoring and evaluation issued by the 
DES to LEAs in November 1987 and in January 1989; from the responses of LEAs to 
formal enquiries concerning their INSET programmes, both in their original form and 
also as summarised by the department; from HMI reports; and, in various forms, from 
the comments provided by LEAs on their experience of the scheme. We also have the 
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evidence of administrative practice itself within which we can discern DES monitoring 
processes. 
The overall message of all this evidence is that the tasks of monitoring and 
evaluation have been areas of some perplexity and confusion. The DES has held 
conferences for INSET coordinators, regional networks of LEAs have done the same, 
and INSET programmes themselves have in many instances included formal training 
for school and LEA staff. Nevertheless there have been many complaints about the 
over-accumulation of undigestible data and many concerns expressed about the 
difficulty of isolating and evaluating the ultimate impact of training on pupil learning. 
There has also been a tendency to draw only very indistinct lines between monitoring 
and evaluation. There is therefore some inevitable overlap between this section on 
monitoring and the next on evaluation. Here I shall therefore emphasise those aspects 
of the whole which relate to the task of monitoring geared to the enforcement of 
contract. The manner in which the DES promoted, and required LEAs to engage in, 
both monitoring and evaluation was in itself a significant part of the supervisory role 
legitimised by the fact of contract ; it must therefore not be ignored. 
There have been two distinct thrusts in the guidelines offered by the DES to LEAs. 
One was concerned with informing authorities about the department's own intentions 
concerning monitoring and evaluation; the other with giving advice as to how LEAs 
were to conduct their own monitoring and evaluation as required under the terms of 
LEATGS (DES 1986b, paras 23-26). But in both the DES appeared to use the terms 
"monitoring" and "evaluation" loosely, often interchangeably, and usually linked 
together like a pair of Siamese twins. 
In the Note of November 1987 the DES offered (in the same paragraph) both 
informal and formal definitions in order to distinguish between the two. The informal 
version reads : 
In this note "monitoring" denotes the process of establishing what you 
are getting and whether it is what you wanted; "evaluation" denotes the 
process of establishing what good it is doing, and whether you were 
right to want it. 
But immediately there follows the formal definition from which the rather dangerous 
"whether" questions have already vanished; and several other themes, such as relating 
outcomes to intentions, seem to change places: 
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i. Monitoring seeks to identify and quantify the outcomes - intended and 
unintended - of training programmes and the underlying decision-
making procedures, and the inputs of human, material and financial 
resources relating one to the other. 
ii. Evaluation seeks to establish the value of the outcomes, positive and 
negative. It seeks to explain relationships between inputs and 
outcomes, and compare outcomes with initial plans and objectives. 
(DES, 1987c, para 4) 
Not surprisingly the Note of January 1989 remarks that "a number of LEAs are still 
unclear..." and "there appears to be some confusion about the definition of these 
terms"! There then follows another attempt. 
i. Monitoring is concerned with establishing whether training 
programmes and the underlying decision making procedures are taking 
effect and developing as planned; 
ii. Evaluation is concerned with establishing the quality and 
effectiveness of training and the effects of training on the quality of 
teaching and learning. 
(DES, 1989a, para 7) 
To this reader there still appears to be a confusion, not least because the word "effect" 
is used in three different senses: under monitoring we see "taking effect" in the sense of 
"happening according to plan", whereas under evaluation we have "effectiveness" in 
the sense of efficiency and "effects" in the sense of impact. 
This analysis demonstrates the elusiveness of the two concepts and yet at the same 
time their significance within contractual relationships. The persistence with which the 
DES insisted that LEAs respond to the department's monitoring and evaluation 
demands, and also meet their own responsibilities in this area, speak strongly to their 
significance in the enforcement of contract; and also to the contribution of self-reporting 
in a situation where the contractor cannot hope to supervise in great detail from within 
his own resources. 
We need therefore to attend to the focus and objects of monitoring and evaluation 
rather than to the techniques proposed or even the confusions created. For as 
Glickman, writing from inside the DES, says 
DES requirements may well have proved helpful to LEAs in defining the 
questions which they and their institutions should be asking themselves. 
(Glickman and Dale, 1990, para 128) 
The 1987 Note, for example, was crucially concerned with shaping "What to monitor 
and evaluate". Here, it was said, 
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information and judgement are needed ... on the following main areas 
of activity : 
1. the systems by which training is managed; 
2. the training provided; and 
3. the effects of the training on teaching and on 
pupils' learning. 
(DES, 1987c, para 8, my emphasis) 
Thereafter, paragraphs 10 and 14 made it clear that the DES intended to concentrate its 
own activities on the first two areas. It was indicated (and it did happen) that in each 
year's submission to the DES, LEAs would be required to report on their "progress 
against the targets for improvements in management systems ... set out in the previous 
year's proposals" (para 10). Within this, "the handling of the identification of training 
needs and their subsequent ranking" is described as an aspect of crucial importance 
(para 11). Paragraph 14 indicated that the DES would require statistical data on 
expenditure, and on volumes of training days and people trained. 
The conclusion we might legitimately draw from this brief account of DES 'advice' 
is that the contractual framework allowed the DES to intervene directly not only in the 
content of INSET programmes but also in the way the whole operation was managed 
by the LEAs From the Notes and from the annual Circulars we can deduce that, while 
the DES did not assume or require uniformity of practice among LEAs, it clearly 
intended to impose management practices which were consistent with and supportive of 
DES policy intentions rather than local, possibly idiosyncratic, preferences. The 
metaphor of 'partnership' is not appropriate here : that of 'principal and agent', which 
belongs within the rules on contract, is. 
For a succinct and somewhat critical account of DES monitoring we can turn to the 
department's own Scrutiny Report (Glickman and Dale, 1990). The first point to note 
is that much of what are defined in this thesis as monitoring processes are referred to in 
the Report as "administrative arrangements". Clearly the way in which LEATGS and 
other similar programmes are run on a day to day basis can itself be designed to check 
on compliance and the adequate fulfilment of contract. 
Glickman found a division of functions within the DES which had not aided "the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the scheme". While policy divisions were largely 
responsible for determining the shape of the LEATGS offer, particularly in relation to 
the choice of NPAs, it was the Teacher Training Division which handled the financial 
arrangements and was responsible for monitoring the scheme as a whole. Thus 
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Largely in the absence of indications from policy divisions as to the sort 
of information they would like to see..., Teacher Training Division has 
continued with collection of considerable data covering training 
activities. We have found little evidence that the information collected 
has been of use to policy divisions nor indeed that it has been used. The 
suspicion which LEAs have that the aggregates of training data which 
they provide is collected for its own sake is, in our view, largely 
confirmed. 
(Glickman and Dale, 1990, para 108) 
The Report records that most LEAs in their written evidence had "complained about 
the administrative burden of LEATGS"; one LEA wrote 
Some of the forms which LEA officers are required to submit have been 
unrealistic, for example the very detailed breakdown in LEATGS 3 in 
March 1989 (eg how many days, people, Ss, devoted to training of 
special school teachers on the cross-curricular theme of industry!). 
(para 118) 
Another LEA complained that requests had been made for similar data on several 
occasions : 
... It is not clear to us why this amount of data is required and it would 
be helpful to find out how this data is used and what conclusions are 
drawn from it. 	 (para 119) 
Glickman confirms that these anxieties are justified. After advancing no fewer than 
five reasons why such prolific detail is "inappropriate", the Report concludes 
We have found no evidence that the data collected has been used widely 
within the Department to inform decision making .... The data is no 
longer used to inform Ministers and senior officials about the working 
of the scheme in any way that appears constructive. (But) the collection 
of comprehensive data may well have been desirable when the LEATGS 
was first established. The scheme was designed to change the way in- 
service training was approached and managed 	 management systems 
are now installed and running effectively in most LEAs. 
(para 128 - 130) 
It was therefore suggested that in future the DES should only monitor closely those 
LEAs "about whose INSET provision it has concerns". 
This comment from within the DES clearly demonstrates that the collection of data, 
at least during the early stages of a programme, has an importance in itself. LEA 
officers may have complained that little use was being made of the copious information 
which they were expected to send to the DES; but the fact that it was required, that 
LEAs had no option but to concur, and that it appeared to focus on what to the 
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department were the strategic factors in the new scheme, re-inforced the new 
contractual relationships within which INSET was now framed. 
How then does the monitoring process within LEATGS compare with that of TVEI? 
There are clearly significant differences. In Chapter 5 I suggested that there were five 
aspects to the monitoring process,. Most of these appear in only a modified form in 
LEATGS. The annual planning dialogue of TVEI becomes transmuted into an 
exchange of Circulars, letters, pro-formas and other documents between the LEA and a 
distant bureaucracy. Local steering groups were set up in many LEAs but without the 
structured formality and the ex-officio representation of the funding department which 
marked TVEI. Financial and non-financial returns indeed abounded and even the DES 
owned to their weight and their diminishing utility. HMI were less effective in terms of 
influencing policy implementation than the Regional Advisers of the TVEI system not 
only because they had to spread themselves more thinly, but also because they could 
not see themselves purely as servants of the scheme. And finally, as we shall see in the 
next section, the role and function of evaluation has been haphazard and confused. 
Missing too has been the intense public scrutiny - from politicians, employers, press, 
educationalists from home and abroad - which marked TVEI, kept the scheme in the 
public eye, thereby increased its visibility to the department. INSET is seen as a 
routine, technical, professional matter - not one which attracts general interest, 
commentary or even (sadly) sustained critique. (1) 
Finally, looking back to the analysis of the key characteristics of monitoring in 
Chapter 5, it seems that in LEATGS as in TVEI it is best to see monitoring as a multi-
faceted operation, with many contacts and activities which are not explicitly part of the 
monitoring process contributing to the capacity of the sponsor to scrutinise the funded 
programme. Whereas in TVEI there were no doubt more occasions on which the LEA 
was required to make a public demonstration of the programme, the crucial process in 
LEATGS has been the annual submission. The framework and procedures of 
LEATGS were sufficiently pervasive to construct a new discourse around the 
management and focus of the new INSET programmes. 
6.6 Evaluation 
In the 1989 Note on Monitoring and Evaluation it was claimed that 
For many LEAs the problems of monitoring and evaluation can be 
directly attributed to lack of precision in defining objectives. 
(DES, 1989a, para 3) 
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The assumption which appears to underlie DES statements is that evaluation must 
ultimately be concerned with outcomes, particularly in terms of establishing links 
between training received and observable improvements in teaching and learning. 
However they appear to have been persuaded that "ultimate" objectives may either be 
distant or ambivalent as to their origins, and they are therefore much concerned with 
"intermediate objectives ... which, if accomplished, either consecutively or 
simultaneously, are believed to lead to or to contribute to the ultimate objectives and 
which can be more easily evaluated" (para 4 and 5). Objectives, they argue, can be 
quantifiable and hence subject to "performance measures", but "where outcome or 
performance is not directly measureable ... a proxy measure or performance indicator" 
should be used. This, it is said, is in the interests of deriving "ratios for economy, 
effectiveness and efficiency" (para 13). 
This outcome orientation is to be understood as part of the process of accountability 
at a time when social policy is shaped by party political manoeuvres and electoral time-
scales. Government departments are driven to control the activities they initiate by two 
considerations. The first of these is the "bureaucratic dynamic" (Salter and Tapper, 
1981) which not only incorporates the ideology of "economy, effectiveness and 
efficiency", but also contains an un-stated notion that local and regional bodies are less 
capable and compliant than government departments and need to be cajoled and 
controlled. The second is the product of the increasingly frenetic engagement of 
government in socio-economic policy. The assumption is that the electorate expect 
emergent 'issues' in the public arena to be reflected in the development of 'policies' 
which in turn will be rapidly incorporated into 'programmes' capable of demonstrating 
successful 'outcomes' : and all this, within a time-scale brief enough to demonstrate 
success within an electoral term. 
Over the past decade education at all levels - from the teaching of reading to 5 year 
olds to the whole structure of vocational education and training - has become a prime 
focus of government efforts to demonstrate its effectiveness within this cycle of issue-
policy-programme-successful outcomes. Thus the DES needs to promote evaluation 
not only as a characteristic of responsible performance and as a means of shaping the 
activities of its, sometimes wayward, local 'partners', but above all as a means of 
providing its political masters with evidence of successful policy outcomes. (A similar 
argument about the position of civil service managers in relation to the evaluation of 
TVEI was presented in the previous chapter). 
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LEAs have evolved a somewhat different approach to evaluation. For most, the 
practice of evaluation is a relatively recent and initially intimidating concept. TVEI and 
its associated TRIST programme were for many their first encounter with systematic 
evaluation as an integral component of educational programmes (albeit that it is now 
deeply entrenched as something, like equal opportunities, which no self-respecting 
proposal dares to leave out !). Early LEA responsibilities for evaluation were often 
discharged with the help of HE specialists who had absorbed and now promoted ideas 
about "democratic" (MacDonald,1974) and "illuminative" (Parlett and Hamilton, 1972) 
evaluation and who believed in teacher research and self-evaluation. Their message 
was that the most productive (and the least threatening ?) form of evaluation was 
formative and was orientated to process rather than to outcomes; also that the 
evaluator's responsibility was as much about facilitating implementation as about 
judgement. Such approaches naturally encouraged LEAs to think that their own staff 
should undertake much of the evaluation themselves and the contribution of HE 
personnel was increasingly switched to training teachers and advisers in the appropriate 
'skills', and to generalised consultancy about evaluation strategy. The confidence to 
take on evaluation at the LEA level was well expressed by the Adviser responsible for 
INSET in a shire county : "Evaluation is best done at the level of delivery ; the authority 
funds a .1 secondment for INSET co-ordinators to review their own operations" 
(interview data). 
Moves to in-house, self-evaluation at the local level were re-inforced by 
developments in the field of school and college management. The work of Bolam 
(1984) and others in promoting the concept of the "problem-solving school" engaged in 
self-monitoring and self-renewal, and the growing interest in the notion of school-
effectiveness (Rutter et al, 1979; Mortimore et al 1988) encouraged the idea that schools 
should take responsibility for their own development through a process which began 
with honest, collegial and largely private self-evaluation. Many senior staff from 
schools and colleges attended courses, funded under the ESG scheme and under 
LEATGS itself, which emphasised more open and participative styles of management 
and stressed the importance of involving all staff in processes of review, evaluation and 
development (see for example, the GRIDS scheme, McMahon el al, 1984). More 
recent pressure to formulate School or Institutional Development Plans certainly draws 
on these ideas; but it is interesting to see how, under the influence of the Education 
Reform Act, official advice on how to produce such plans is emphasising the 
significance of outcomes expressed as targets and performance indicators : this can be 
seen, for example, in the DES sponsored School Development Planning (Hargreaves et 
al, 1989), and in the current requirements for rolling plans and the pre-specification of 
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performance indicators which are attached to TVEI Extension funding by the 
Department of Employment. 
It may be that the continuing efforts of the DES to stimulate a more rigorous (as they 
saw it) approach to evaluation on the part of LEAs are to be explained at least partly by 
a disjunction between the views of each side. It is also possible that LEAs were 
actually more sophisticated in their understanding of the issues than the DES was able 
or willing to credit. Nevertheless the DES continued to urge LEAs to pay greater 
attention to the evaluation of LEATGS. One strategy for doing this was in the context 
of the formal letter indicating agreement to the annual submission. In such a letter dated 
December 1987 to one LEA, for example, it was stated 
In the case of (Zed-shire), the Secretary of State notes that there are a 
number of evaluation projects in individual institutions in place. He 
will, however, wish to see in their proposals for 1989/90 that the 
authority have an overall strategy for evaluation. 
Another device was for the DES to give "notice of its intention to seek further details 
of how LEAs were managing INSET and how it was being monitored and evaluated". 
This was done by issuing a set of questions to which answers were to be given on "one 
side of A4 paper" and submitted with the annual submission. The department declared 
that it would then follow up these replies with "detailed questions", presumably in 
those areas where they saw cause for concern. Divisional HMI played their part in this 
process. 
A major exercise of this kind occurred in 1988 and the quotes above come from a 
paper dated August 1988. The questions posed appear to have anticipated precise 
replies : 
What intermediate and final objectives has the authority set itself for 
INSET ? 
What performance indicators and procedures are used by the Authority 
to arrive at qualitative and quantitative judgements ? 
- but the replies are often highly generalised, even vague, and apparently designed to 
lay the department off. Two examples are given below : 
The objectives of (the) INSET programme have been expressed as 
principles underlying practice because the process of staff development 
is seen as long-term and continuing. 
(Zed-shire - reply to DES, September, 1988) 
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It is difficult to state a final object when the process is a continuing one, 
the aim being to produce as professional a service as possible by making 
the best use of available resources, a constant improvement in teacher 
quality and the consequent enrichment of the the learning experience of 
our pupils 	
(Why-borough - reply to DES, September 1988) 
One of these authorities went so far as to mention the "negotiation" of performance 
indicators with schools that could be incorporated in processes of self-evaluation ; the 
other avoided the needle words altogether. DES statements around this time suggest 
that the department felt itself to be nailing down jellies ; perhaps it is not surprising that 
in the new GEST scheme, specific performance indicators are spelled out for each of 
the NPAs. 
Looking at the findings of evaluation rather than the attempts to shape method, it is 
apparent that the DES had to rely on responses from individual LEAs to either general 
or individualised enquiries such as the exercise described above, on quantitative data 
collected largely for monitoring purposes, and on two reports completed by HMI. It is 
to these reports that we now turn. 
The first HMI report was concerned with the first financial year of LEATGS, 1987-
88; it appeared in mid 1989, some three years after the scheme was launched 
(DES,1989b). The second covered the financial years 1988-90 and was published in 
mid 1991 (DES, 1991a), some 18 months after the department's own Scrutiny Report 
(Glickman et al, 1990) had led to the re-shaping of the whole LEATGS programme, 
including its monitoring and evaluation strategy. These two belated reports represent 
the only evaluation of LEATGS on a national scale. 
The reports can be read on two levels - both id evaluation, and for what they contain 
gLi evaluation. Ak evaluation, they suffer from the predominantly bland style of most 
HMI reporting, moving towards value judgements about good practice only through 
occasional, highly condensed and generalised accounts of particular INSET courses 
and management practices. They certainly fail to produce the kind of quantified data 
which their civil servant colleagues would have welcomed, though in their first 1989 
Report (produced after the second DES Note), it appears that they have some 
sympathy with the department's preferences : 
Monitoring and evaluation need to be developed to provide indicators of 
success for INSET and measures of value for money which combine 
quantitative with qualitative information. 
(DES, 1989c, para 2.18) 
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But what HMI offer is their usual percentage approach to estimating quality. Thus, 
in the first year of LEATGS we learn that 75% of HE-provided and 90% of LEA-
provided INSET was "satisfactory or better"; while in years 2 and 3 the comparable 
figures were 89% and 84%. This may be thought to suggest that HE providers were 
getting better and LEAs worse, but one would have to track through the report to 
deduce why this might be so : the evaluative commentary which could have followed 
from these figures is missing. Moreover, as usual, the judgements concerning 
"satisfactory", "good" and "very good" performance are made as ex cathedra 
statements against undisclosed criteria. The effect of this is to deny the reader any 
chance to engage with the views expressed in a dialectical manner and one is therefore 
left with the impression that this is a form of rubber-stamping evaluation, which form 
dictates must be done and of which nobody expects very much. 
A sceptic might also suggest that not everything shall be "satisfactory or better", 
percentage-wise or otherwise. It is interesting to see which problems apparently 
persisted across the three years covered. Among them we should particularly note the 
development of effective INSET management, a prime target of DES policy : the 1989 
report said that "the management systems in the majority of LEAs visited were largely 
embryonic" but "as the second year unfolded ... the large majority were clearly moving 
towards the more systematic management of INSET" (para 3.8) ; however in 1991 we 
read that "management and provision is satisfactory or better in 60% of LEAs" (para 
3iii) - not perhaps an over-whelming advance ! In the early stages, schools lacked the 
necessary administrative and financial skills to cope with devolved funds and HMI 
reported that "budgets are not always related to development plans agreed with the 
LEAs (para 2.7) ; in the second report, HMI say that the "monitoring of schools' 
expenditure needs to be further improved (para 3iii). Supply cover is a persistent 
problem (para 2.9 and 3i); so is the lack of adequate follow-up and support for those 
who have received training (para 3i and iii). The contribution of advisory teachers and 
inspectors continues to be influenced by role changes which are the product of other, 
ERA-related, factors (para 3i). However, the perennial problem was that of evaluating 
the impact of training on pupil learning. In 1989 there was "very little evidence" and 
"appropriate indicators of change" were needed (para 2.16). By 1991 we read that 
Direct evidence of the effect of INSET on teaching and, by implication, 
on learning by pupils or students was found in 140 of the 200 
institutions where HMI attempted to note the impact of INSET. (para 
44) 
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- but the reference is brief and HMI have clearly not cracked the nut of providing 
"outcome" data which links INSET provision to improvements in learning. Yet that is 
what the department was looking for. 
(It is interesting to consider the position in which HMI found themselves over this 
issue. There is a clear thread concerning the central importance of identifying positive 
effect of pupil learning running through DES statements from the first Circular 6/86 
onwards. This is well traced in Connor (1989) who goes on to describe a substantial 
amount of work across a number of countries on the problem of evaluating the impact 
of INSET. While this is not the place to rehearse the arguments in full, it is apparent 
that attempts to do what the DES was now asking have been tried and have failed over 
two decades and in many countries. Caution in this area was expressed in the Scrutiny 
Report : 
.. it is perfectly possible to collect indicators which help to demonstrate 
the effect of training experiences on teaching ... the effect on pupils' and 
students' learning is likely only to become apparent after the lifetime of 
an individual project. 
(Glickman, 1990, para 143) 
One wonders why the department's professional inspectorate had not so advised them.) 
I turn now to what we can learn from these reports about the monitoring and 
evaluation practices of LEAs - in other words, HMI's views aLevaluation. In the 
1989 report it was said that this had been a low priority in 1987-88 because LEAs, 
schools and colleges were uncertain about effective methods (para 7.1). Stress was put 
on the need for LEAs to provide guidance, models (para 7.4) and specific training (para 
7.10) for evaluation. With support from HE and occasional contributions from 
teachers following award-bearing courses (para 7.7), progress was being made and 
HMI noted (para 7.9) the helpful influence of the DES Note of November 1987 
(DES,1987c). They concluded that there were 
encouraging signs that evaluation is now more widely recognised as part 
of the INSET process .. (but) what is less clear is the extent to which 
evaluation ensures that worthwhile ideas are put into practice 
(DES, 1989b, para 7.14). 
Two years later, HMI write 
Monitoring and evaluation are now given a higher priority by LEAs. 
Progress has been made but much practice was still unsatisfactory. 
(DES, 1991a, para 81) 
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Again HE input is praised and most of what the report has to say about evaluation is 
contained in a half page account of co-operation between one shire county and a local 
HE provider (paras 83-88). To conclude, LEAs are encouraged to follow the example 
of the DES in commissioning an evaluation of its own programme in the form of the 
Scrutiny Report (Glickman 1990) because 
Institutions and individuals need to ensure that training is fulfilling their 
intentions so that time is not wasted in ineffective training sessions. 
(para 82) 
Taken together we can see how the HMI reports appear to articulate with the agenda 
set out for evaluation in Chapter 4 : to facilitate implementation (evaluation as a tool of 
management) and to meet the requirements for upward-facing accountability. While I 
do not suggest that HMI would accept this diminished role for what they would surely 
see as independent, critical and professional reporting, nevertheless the nature of 
contract-based projects seems to set bounds on the role of evaluation. As was the case 
with TVEI, the zero option is not available to the evaluators and thus the potential of 
evaluation to contribute to educational debate is severely constrained. 
Thus what is apparently missing in the LEATGS evaluation strategy is an element of 
manifestly external evaluation which might have provided an independent assessment 
of the programme's achievements. The Scrutiny Report states that "the involvement of 
HMI in the inspection of INSET is the best means of continuous evaluation" 
(Glickman, 1990, para 142). But HMI do not appear to have demonstrated any 
independence in this area and they therefore give the impression of presenting, at least 
partially, an in-house view. The evidence from TVEI suggests that the DES has 
foregone some of the effectiveness of a categorically funded programme by its 
uncertain handling of evaluation. 
If that is the case, we cannot expect to find in LEATGS evaluation quite the same 
characteristics as in TVEI. The concern for implementation is clearly there, and so to is 
the pre-occupation with accountability - from LEA to DES, and presumably from DES 
to ministers. But if it is indeed true that evaluation proved to be something of a non-
event in LEATGS, the explanation may relate to the fact that this was an all-inclusive 
programme, rather than an exercise in public experimentation. 
182 
6.7 Replication/Impact 
In Chapter 4 alternative scenarios were outlined for this aspect of the categorical 
funding procedure : one which emphasised the programme as an experiment, a pilot, 
concerned with a 'research cohort' and best understood as seed money ; the second as 
"a much more straightforward attempt to produce changes of attitude, priorities and 
practice in line with the funding agency's policy preferences". From the very 
beginning the LEATGS programme was designed to encompass the whole of INSET 
and so clearly has more to do with the second of these scenarios. As the scheme 
progressed, the intention to shape the full range of in-service activities became steadily 
more apparent as national priorities expanded and finally, in the revised GEST scheme, 
totally replaced local ones. The limited experimental phase was represented by the 
MIST scheme. With LEATGS, the DES was not aiming to create ripples in the pond, 
but rather to drain and to re-fill it. 
Nevertheless an element of replication persisted. In Chapter 4, I argued that a key 
feature of the MSCs use of categorical funding has been the capacity to purchase an 
inordinate amount of influence in relation to the outlay LEATGS demonstrates similar 
features. In purely financial terms, within a grant-aided programme LEAs had to invest 
their own funds in order to trigger DES support, thus curtailing their own freedom of 
action. But in more qualitative and judgmental terms, we might argue that the 
experience of the scheme contributed to the changed and changing relationship between 
central and local authorities in a manner which had a significance beyond INSET 
programmes. One LEA adviser commented that the LEATGS scheme had created 
a group within the LEA with responsibility to respond to the DES ; we 
can't just add the latest letter to the in-tray. 	 (Interview ; July 1989) 
The parallel with TVEI is striking. 
Inside the DES very similar judgements were being made. One of the main 
conclusions of the Scrutiny Report was that the experience of LEATGS and the ESGs 
together demonstrated that 
Grant aided activities have, on the whole, released energy and 
commitment and promoted beneficial developments in ways quite 
disproportionate to the expenditure devoted to them. 
(Glickman, 1990, para 170) 
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This Report is also a testimony to the structural and political impact of LEATGS. At 
a "fundamental level", the scheme represented 
... an assumption of responsibilities by the Secretary of State for the 
continuing education and training of teachers. In this regard, the 
LEATGS can be seen as a policy in its own right rather than ... a 
mechanism to advance policy priorities as they arise. 	 (para 32) 
INSET was no longer "largely unplanned and on an individual, often voluntary, basis"; 
the Report quotes the first HMI report (DES, 1989b) as "cogent and comprehensive 
evidence" that LEAs were now managing in-service training and establishing systems 
to determine needs and to meet them (paras 33 and 34). (The circularity of this 
mutually affirming relationship between the DES and HMI which persisted at least until 
the late eighties, is well exemplified by this use of HMI testimony about the impact of 
DES policy.) According to the Report, "the Department and HMI have invested 
considerable time and effort in monitoring the establishment of the new INSET 
management systems", and the Scrutiny team found evidence of progress in the LEAs 
that they visited (para 35). 
Training itself, the Report says, "now aims to meet the needs of individual teachers 
set within the context of institutional needs". LEATGS had fostered "the move 
towards school-based training" and a more flexible interpretation of INSET options 
(paras 36 and 37), though the quality of some is still variable and leaves "its audience 
dissatisfied" (para 38). A few snags remain in the system : supervision is still 
"cumbersome", HE expertise is not well harnessed, and there is concern that "LEATGS 
is not fulfilling its promise of promoting the professional development of teachers". 
This last point is, it is suggested, "a function of LEATGS needing time to settle down", 
and also of pressure arising from the short term priorities associated with the 
implementation of the Education Reform Act (para 39). 
Finally, the Report quotes "one body" as saying 
"Our impression of the LEATGS is that it has caused LEA in-service 
training to change from being haphazard and poorly related with 
identified needs to being much more systematically managed." (para 
40) 
Despite the fact that the Scrutiny Report goes on to recommend an amalgamation of 
LEATGS and the ESG scheme and contains some criticism of the efficiency of both, 
the overall tone implies a considerable satisfaction with the transformation of INSET. 
As far as the department is concerned, the implementation strategy adopted had 
certainly proved successful in delivering the policy. 
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Thus far we have looked at the official interpretation of the impact of LEATGS and 
restricted our account fairly narrowly to the operation of the scheme. Much more might 
have been written here but in a sense all the previous sections of this chapter have in 
different ways given evidence of impact, and further elaboration is now unnecessary. 
There is, however, some point in widening the angle of the lens and looking at the 
impact of LEATGS on both higher education institutions, providers of most INSET in 
the days before LEATGS, and also on the evolving concept of teacher professionalism. 
In doing so, we need to remember that there is a distinction between impact which is 
intended (results) and impact which is unanticipated (consequences). 
To get a closer picture of HE provision, we can draw on research within the Institute 
of Education's Centre for Higher Education Studies into New Funding Mechanisms in 
Higher Education, funded by the DES itself (see Chapter 1, foot-note 1). This study 
was based on 24 case studies of universities and polytechnics and one of its main tasks 
was to look at the impact of LEATGS on HE in the wider context of Continuing 
Education. 
Seen this way it is clear that LEATGS was part of a broader government strategy to 
encourage HE to play more of a service role in the provision of post-experience 
vocational education (PEVE). Thus there have been more than superficial resemblances 
between LEATGS and PICKUP (Professional, Industrial and Commercial Up-dating 
Programme). The overall effect of each has been to force providers into a market 
system within which programmes are justified by whether the client wishes to buy them 
rather than by HE judgement about their intrinsic worth. As a result providers are more 
likely to negotiate with potential clients and offer them, if required, one-off, tailor-made 
courses. 
LEATGS put money which was previously more directly available to HE into the 
hands of LEAs and their institutions. They have naturally sought what they perceive to 
be 'value-for-money' provision, often finding it cheaper to use their own advisory staff 
or free-lance trainers rather than buy in the services of HE. 
In the CHES reports (1990 and 1991) it was suggested that there were at least three 
factors which constrained the development of true market relations in INSET. First, 
the client himself is subject to the detailed directives of an external agency, the DES; 
second, the client is not a business enterprise and has serious problems of his own in 
moving from a service to a commercial ethic; and third, the client and the provider have 
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a whole series of pre-existing and on-going relationships of mutual dependency in 
matters such as initial teacher training, research and other forms of development work 
which, as yet, do not operate on a market basis. Many providers expressed the fear 
that charging cost prices for INSET might turn all their dealings with their LEA into 
financial ones. (2) 
The advent of LEATGS therefore disturbed the equilibrium between LEAs and HE, 
which was perhaps inevitable, given the clear intention of the DES to reduce the 
emphasis on higher education courses for serving teachers. Undoubtedly, HE has 
suffered, losing many students, especially from full-time courses. It has had to turn 
more to the provision of short, skills-focussed courses and to revise these frequently in 
the face of changing circumstances and changing demands. The result has been to 
force the pace on modularisation and credit transfer/accumulation as providers have 
encouraged teachers attending short courses (or undertaking development projects in 
their own schools), to seek credit towards an advanced diploma or degree, thereby 
triggering subsidy from the University Funding Council. This trend seems likely to 
persist unless the DES intervenes : all the HE institutions visited during this research 
project claimed that it was enormously difficult to recover the full cost of INSET 
provision from LEAs and thus it was supported only through hidden subsidy from 
other activities. 
What conclusion might one draw from this account ? Despite the public statements 
in both HMI reports and DES Circulars that the loss of 'HE expertise' was regrettable, 
and despite the statement made at an Institute of Education conference in January 1987 
by the Senior HMI responsible for teacher training that "we" would continue to rely on 
HE to produce the "intellectual cadre" among teachers, one direct consequence of the 
new pattern of INSET has been a cut back in the number of teachers following courses 
which might foster an independent and critical spirit. 
The question of whether, for the DES, this was a planned result or an unintended 
consequence is obviously speculative. It seems likely that the DES had little time for 
the extended award-bearing courses which had grown so popular among teachers since 
the mid sixties and had encouraged many university departments and public sector 
training colleges into areas of scholarship beyond initial teacher training. Such courses 
were disliked partly on the grounds of efficiency and effectiveness, but also because 
teachers chose them on the basis of individual interest rather than system needs. Many 
such courses had only an indirect relationship to the practicalities of teaching. 
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Moreover, under the influence of theorists such as Lawrence Stenhouse, the ideological 
message implicit in many advanced courses supported the notion of professional 
responsibility for curriculum development, classroom research and evaluation, a stance 
which was not attractive to a government intent on re-asserting central control of the 
curriculum. Many HE staff were seen as arch-critics of educational policy during the 
eighties, concerned to purvey an out-dated egalitarianism. Thus, one must assume that 
the impact of LEATGS on HE was seen as a welcome push towards a more practice-
focussed, policy-sensitive and market-orientated attitude to INSET. 
The link between the impact on HE and the government's apparent intention to re-
define the role of teachers is obvious. The problem is essentially concerned with the 
degree of autonomy teachers and schools should exercise in relation to the curriculum. 
Should teachers see the curriculum as a given, determined by others - politicians, 
bureaucrats, employers and some token educators - before issues of implementation 
arise ? If teachers are to be restricted to the execution of the curriculum, and debarred 
from involvement in its conception (Apple and Teitelbaum, 1986), then training will 
naturally focus on the implementation of prior decisions, and the currently popular term 
"delivery" becomes peculiarly appropriate. Needs identification becomes a relatively 
straightforward matter of measuring the present capacity of teachers against the 
knowledge and skills required to "deliver" the curriculum. Thus, the funding of in-
service education and training through specific grant involves mechanisms of bid and 
contract which re-inforce a conception of curriculum development as something 
logically prior to teacher development ; and therefore, intentionally or not, it 
undermines the professionalism of teachers in a form which has been the object and 
rationale of much of the best of both initial and in-service education (see Harland 1987b 
for a further discussion of this point). 
Such developments are not, however, confined to this country. The conclusion of a 
recent paper on INSET in Queensland, Australia, might well have been written as a 
description of LEATGS : 
Practicality, relevance and immediacy as dominant design features in 
inservice education policy and programmes restrict the focus of attention 
and inexorably limit teachers' roles to that of technologists whose worth 
is judged in terms of how well they can efficiently and effectively meet 
the requirements set by central management. 
(Sachs and Logan, 1990, p480) 
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My argument, therefore, is that LEATGS has made a significant contribution to the 
re-definition of teacher professionalism in the post-ERA world, and that this is no small 
part of its overall impact. 
From the above, it would seem that the key characteristics of the replication/impact 
phase as described for TVEI are only partially applicable here. LEATGS virtually 
eradicated the existing patterns of INSET ; its impact was thus huge and needed little, if 
any, promotion. In this it differed from TVEI. But as in TVEI, it nevertheless 
remained important to secure not only compliance but also support for the new policy. 
From discussions with LEA co-ordinators during the LEATGS years, it seems that the 
twists and turns of the department's administration of the scheme (with its heavy 
demands for information, sudden changes of direction, and short time-scales) inhibited 
whole-hearted support, despite the fact that most approved of the general direction of 
policy. 
Finally, as with TVEI, we can only guess at the full impact of LEATGS. Beyond 
the identifiable results, there are immeasureable consequences ; this section has 
identified two areas upon which the policy impinged - but there are undoubtedly many 
more. 
6.8 Discussion 
In Chapter 5 I came to three broad conclusions about the significance of TVEI which 
appeared to relate to the use of categorical funding. I propose to discuss LEATGS 
under the same headings. 
Relationships within the system 
It was suggested that with TVEI, an agency outside the educational mainstream 
confronted and changed the existing methods of effecting change within the education 
system. In LEATGS we see the incorporation of a very similar strategy into the central 
government department responsible for education. TVEI may have broken the DES 
monopoly in educational matters, but it appears to have stimulated a more pro-active 
style in that department by modelling an effective mechanism for policy 
implementation. 
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In the hands of the DES, LEATGS did not so much create new relationships as 
transform existing ones. In removing a considerable degree of LEA autonomy in 
relation to INSET, in standardising expenditure on INSET as between LEAs, in 
requiring specified approaches to management, it forced LEAs to conform to its own 
conception of what should be done. 
TVEI, it was claimed, had broken into the traditional relationships within the 
education system by partial contracting - some LEAs, some schools, some students, 
some LEA personnel - and thereby it had diversified allegiances and promoted 
competition. LEATGS differed in that it was intended to transform the whole. 
Indicative allowances meant that no authority was to be excluded but rather that all 
should benefit (and have their INSET strategy re-shaped), subject only to playing the 
game by DES rules. Thus LEATGS brought the DES a greater degree of detailed 
influence and control over LEA activity than had previously been the case, by-passing 
both political and professional preferences at the local level and thereby carrying 
forward the government's more general policy of curtailing local authority autonomy. 
Altering the mandate 
In Chapter 5, Figure 5 offered a comparison between the operational style of the 
MSC and that of the DES. Dale's argument that, in accommodating to TVEI, the DES 
took on some kind of hybridised version of the two was seen as relevant to the years 
1982 to 1987 (Dale, 1989b). LEATGS post-dates the pilot years of TVEI and covers 
the years since the 1987 election, years which have seen a shift from the rhetoric of 
Conservative education reform to its statutory enactment. I have argued above that this 
involved the curtailment of LEA autonomy to the point where their very existence came 
to be questioned. The corollary of this is that central authority must adopt a more pro-
active and interventionist stance. Many of the features of operational style which were 
attributed to the MSC in Dale's analysis are now demonstrably part of the mainstream 
functioning of the DES. 
It may be useful to pause for a moment to look at the terms 'allocative' and 
'productive' which appear in the fmal pairing in Figure 5. These are terms derived 
from the work of Claus Offe who was interested in the response of the state to what he 
saw as a crisis in crisis management. This crisis derives from the problems which 
occur under advanced capitalism when the state finds increasing difficulty in reconciling 
the need to support capital accumulation while simultaneously meeting demands for 
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state management of a re-distributive social system. In these circumstances, Offe 
argues that the state has to find new ways of attempting to meet its obligations. His 
ideas on this (published in German) are well described by Jessop in the following 
passage : 
(Offe) distinguishes between two types of state activity : allocative and 
productive. Allocation involves the general use of state resources to 
secure the general framework of economic activity and/or to provide 
general public services in accordance with general constitutional or 
legislative codes which reflect the prevailing balance of political forces. 
Production involves direct state provision or state-sponsored provision 
of material resources as a pre-condition of crisis-avoidance or crisis-
management where there is no general code which can be applied and 
decision rules must therefore be developed in order to determine the 
most effective action case by case. Offe then argues that although 
rational-legal bureaucratic administration may be appropriate to the 
allocative activities of the state, it is inadequate to the demands of state 
productive activities in so far as these are oriented to the attainment of 
particular objectives rather than the general application of pre-given 
rules. Thus bureaucracy must be replaced with new modes of policy 
formation and implementation. 
(Jessop, 1982, pp110-11) 
This is not the place to argue whether it is reasonable to interpret Conservative 
education policy during the eighties as a response to a perceived threat to the processes 
of capital accumulation, though the economic rationale which has so often accompanied 
policy pronouncements might encourage one to do so. However, what is clear is that 
in schemes such as LEATGS the government has sought to become pro-active, to seize 
the initiative rather than to follow existing conventions as to how things are done in the 
education system. In Offe's terms this is surely a shift from the role of presiding over 
allocation to that of producing policy geared to the wider tasks of a crisis-managing 
state. 
New patterns of policy formulation 
Reference has already been made to Glickman's view that the decision of the 
Secretary of State to take on responsibility for INSET was in itself a policy decision 
(Glickman et al, 1990, para 32). This decision was, in part, legitimised by the ACSET 
report (DES, 1984a) but the funding arrangements proposed by Keith Joseph were at 
odds with the committee's recommendations and were not, in any way, the object of 
consultation. It was as much a political decision as an educational one. 
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Turning to the content of the programme, we have evidence from the same report 
(para 108) that the NPAs were selected by policy divisions in response to their own 
perception of the training implications of the Education Reform Act, rather than by any 
more traditional exercise in consultation. In moving to the new GEST scheme, the 
DES finally declared that, as there is an identity of interest between central and local 
government in the cause of educational reform, there can no longer be any need for 
expenditure on INSET not specified as an NPA, thus effectively rejecting the concept 
of consultation altogether. There is an equally autocratic stance in relation to INSET 
management practices which, it is implied, must conform to DES views of good 
practice. 
A further change in the practice of policy formulation relates to the annual cycle. 
The DES has accepted that LEAs do need some indication that specific programmes will 
receive funds over two or more years, but overall the subjection of policy to the 
constraints of planning within the financial year represents another shift to a more 
bureaucratic and centralised form of control. 
In Chapter 5, I concluded that the advent of categorical funding enabled and 
facilitated these changes. Now that the strategy has been adopted in the DES itself, 
there is something else to add. Any government which aspires to curtail the 
administration of a public service at the local level must expect an enormous increase in 
its own operations, with a corresponding escalation of its supervisory role. The virtue 
of categorical funding in establishing contract as the basis of policy implementation is 
that the need for close supervision tends to diminish once the system is established. 
Such is the nature of contract, that the fact and the manner of resource allocation in this 
mode is in itself a powerful and economical means of control. 
Foot-notes 
1. The comment on sustained critique is not one to pass lightly. It may be thought 
that in a world in which public monies are increasingly distributed through contract, it 
is often far from diplomatic to be seen as a public critic of public policy. In the 
particular case of LEATGS, higher education providers are seen as net losers in the re-
distribution of INSET monies while at the same time they are increasingly dependent on 
LEA and school patronage for their slice of the cake. Coupled with that, they are also 
increasingly dependent upon government funding for various forms of contract 
research. It is therefore perhaps rather naive to expect them to offer much in the way of 
critical commentary on current developments. 
2. As things have turned out, the provisions for the local management of schools 
contained in the Education Reform Act of 1988 have been even more decisive in 
introducing a market relationship between schools and HE. 
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Chapter Seven 
THE CASE OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter sets out to show how the advent of categorical funding in the school 
sector has been paralleled by similar developments in higher education. The account 
which follows draws upon the various reports prepared for the CHES project on 
Monitoring and Evaluation of New Funding Mechanisms in Higher Education, 
undertaken between 1988 and 1991 (see Chapter 1, foot-note 1). The writer of this 
thesis was a member of the research team, conducted three of the case studies, 
contributed to all the various themes encompassed by the study and was responsible for 
writing up the findings on Continuing Education including the PICKUP programme 
and the HE experience of INSET. Full references to the relevant reports, published and 
unpublished, can be found in the bibliography under CHES (1990 and 1991) and 
Williams (1992). The following overview and analysis is, however, that of the author 
alone. 
This chapter can deal only briefly with the substantial findings of the research 
project. It will focus on five specific government initiatives introduced at various 
points during the 1980s. Although widely different in focus these initiatives shared 
twin objectives : in the first place, each aimed to stimulate activity in an area of policy 
priority ; and in the second, each sought to encourage higher education institutions to 
secure additional private sector funding by inviting the collaboration of industry and 
commerce in what were seen as mutually beneficial activities. Of the five projects, 
three were primarily concerned with teaching (the Engineering and Technology 
Programme, the Enterprise in Higher Education Initiative, and the Professional, 
Industrial and Commercial Updating Programme), and two (the Alvey programme and 
the Interdisciplinary Research Centres programme) were focused on research. All 
however were funded by a procedure which involved an initial specification of the 
programme's objectives (criteria) followed by a process of competitive bidding and the 
award of contracts to the successful applicants. All had monitoring and evaluation 
procedures of some kind and all were intended to influence the system beyond the 
scope of the funded activities themselves. Before looking at them in further detail, 
however, it will be useful to make some general comments about the financing of 
higher education in the years preceding these various initiatives. 
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To quote from the Final Report of the CHES study - 
The 1980s was not a decade simply of cuts in higher education 
resources. Overall it was a period of modest growth, although 
expenditure per student certainly fell. The sources of funds, the 
channels through which they became available to universities, 
polytechnics and colleges, the relative shares of the two sectors, and the 
activities for which they were used, changed considerably. There was a 
shift away from incremental and loosely monitored formula funding by 
a single government agency towards more closely specified formulae 
and contractual funding by a wider variety of public and private funding 
bodies. 
(CHES, August 1991) 
To illustrate this statement we can compare the percentage sources of university 
funds for 1981-82 with the projected figures for 1991-92 (CHES, May 1990). The 
most notable change is in the figure for unallocated block grant which fell from 64% to 
40%. If we add to that the total for UK student fees (mostly paid by government), 
these figures become 72% and 60% respectively. Remaining income is derived from 
less predictable sources. The figure for Research Council income (for which 
universities have to compete) rises from 6% to 10% of the overall total. Overseas 
student fees now represent 10% of the total rather than 6%, and income from UK 
business is now 8% rather than a mere 1%. All these are areas in which universities 
must effectively compete with each other. 
These shifts represent a steady opening up of higher education to market forces. 
The CHES Final Report suggested that the case for the market rests on three main 
suppositions : 
1. the private sector can relieve governments of some of the cost burden; 
2. many of the benefits of higher education accrue to private individuals 
and they should be prepared to pay for them; 
3. efficiency improves if government agencies buy services from 
universities rather than make grants to them; so the system has to be 
responsive to consumer demands. 
(CHES, August 1991, p9) 
The case studies revealed a related shift in the organisational arrangements within 
institutions. Overall the traditional pattern of administrative allocation and regulation 
based on consensus has given way to systems of financial management based upon 
devolved responsibilities (cost centres), target setting and various forms of incentives. 
There is, however, considerable diversity as to how this is occurring, not least because 
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of competing perceptions about how to facilitate initiative in the matter of income 
generation while retaining appropriate levels of financial and other forms of control. 
The clearest statement of the government's predilection for the market is contained in 
the White Paper Higher Education : Meeting the Challenge (DES, 1987a) and 
subsequently incorporated in the Education Reform Act of 1988. Under the system 
thereby instituted the University Grants Committee was replaced by the University 
Funding Council with a parallel shift for public sector higher education. In paragraph 
4.17 of the White Paper the government made clear its intentions : 
The government therefore proposes, in place of grants, a system of 
contracting between institutions and the new planning and funding 
body. Its intention is to 
- encourage institutions to be enterprising in attracting contracts from 
other sources, particularly the private sector, and thereby to lessen their 
present degree of dependence on public funding; 
- sharpen accountability for the use of public funds; 
- strengthen the commitment of institutions to the delivery of the 
educational services which it is agreed with the new planning and 
funding body they should provide. 
(DES, 1987, para 4.17) 
Paragraph 4.21 states that new contracts will depend upon an assessment of past 
performance and that "Any serious failure to meet the terms of a previous contract may 
result in revised terms or a failure to renew". Parallel arrangements were proposed for 
the polytechnics but under the Further and Higher Education Act (March 1992), both 
sectors were brought together under a single national funding council. (Coincidentally, 
polytechnics were re-classified as universities and the Crosland concept of a binary 
system containing both public and private sectors within higher education came to an 
end.) 
The overall direction of higher education policy, and the role of resource allocation 
in achieving this, should now be clear and it is time to look at the specific initiatives 
examined by the CHES project. These show early moves to implement policy through 
discrete excursions into categorical funding, the mechanism which is now to dominate 
all financial relationships between central government and higher education. 
For this account of HE initiatives, I propose to abandon the structure of the previous 
two chapters which explored the various elements of categorical funding in turn. Apart 
from adding a little variety, it is clearly better to deal with each programme separately, 
drawing out for each the way in which they were shaped by the manner of their 
funding. 
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7.1 The Alvey Programme 
This programme was launched in 1983 as a direct result of the report of the Alvey 
Committee which had been set up to advise on the scope for collaborative research in 
Information Technology. The programme was managed from the Department of Trade 
and Industry. Its object was to increase the competitiveness of the UK's IT suppliers 
by funding pre-competitive, RD and D, and collaborative activities which it was hoped 
would ensure "a measure of self-reliance in key technological areas for commercial and 
defence purposes" (SSPRU, 1987). The total funds allocated by government 
amounted to £200 million but it was hoped that a further £150 million would be 
contributed by the private sector. 
The model of categorical funding used in the Alvey programme was relatively 
unsophisticated, demonstrating how far such mechanisms have developed since the 
early eighties. In the first place, the programme was essentially developmental and the 
criteria for success were not readily definable. In the second place, it was specifically 
intended to promote collaboration between universities, polytechnics, research 
councils, government departments and industry. The target group was therefore 
diffuse. The range of activities was spread across four distinct key technologies within 
the computing industry, and projects also varied along a continuum from pure research 
to those with a potential for immediate exploitation in the market place. At the height 
of the programme in June 1987, the Alvey directorate had approved 198 industrial 
projects, and 115 academic-only projects. Across the programme, 115 commercial 
firms, 68 universities and polytechnics, and 24 other research institutions were 
involved. A typical project had 3.9 partners, two from industry and the remainder from 
academic institutions. These particulars do not suggest a scheme uniform enough to be 
susceptible to tight control through the normal mechanisms of categorical funding. 
The case studies disclosed no serious complaints about the costs of the bidding 
process, partly because the success rate was judged sufficiently high to warrant the time 
and effort involved. However there did not seem to be any precise way of estimating 
such costs : only two out of the fifteen were able to express these in monetary terms, 
and others suggested time costs which varied between one and nine man-months. The 
need for many meetings between potential and actual collaborators made heavy 
demands on staff time but these are notoriously hard to cost. Judgements as to whether 
the process was "worth-while" often seemed to be intuitive and related to the size of the 
grant received. 
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There were other problems surrounding the bidding process. One university 
reported that, not knowing which of its bids might succeed, it had been difficult to plan 
ahead for the provision of facilities and staff and that this had distorted their resource 
allocations. Another complaint referred to the time-lag between the notification of a 
successful bid and the actual award of grant. Such criticisms reflect the views of the 
House of Commons Public Accounts Committee (December 1988) which reported that 
the effectiveness of the programme had been hampered by lack of administrative staff, 
poor fmancial and management systems, and delays in formalising collaborations. 
It would seem that monitoring processes were restricted to financial auditing while 
evaluation was carried out by the Social Policy Research Unit. The Unit produced 
several interim reports which endorsed the beneficial effects of collaborative 
enterprises, but noted the problem of skill shortages in developing the research and also 
complained of the poor administration of the programme. However it is interesting to 
note that before its final evaluation report fell due in September 1990, the government 
had already decided to terminate the Alvey programme ; industrially-oriented IT 
research will, in future, be supported by the EEC's ESPRIT programme, while a much 
smaller sum will be available through the new Information Engineering Advanced 
Technology programme for more fundamental research. This again neatly points up the 
restricted role of evaluation within categorical funding : programme realities are 
determined by broader political and economic determinants and evaluation relates 
strictly to accountability, implementation and apple-polishing. 
What of the programme's impact ? Our case study institutions agreed with the 
general view that Alvey fostered co-operation between different interest groups though 
there is some criticism of the super-imposed "club" structures which were intended to 
act as information exchanges. More seriously, others complained that the funding was 
neither adequate nor long-lived enough to make real inroads into the country's 
technological deficit in the area. Moreover they feared that the new European 
arrangements would complicate the task of negotiating partnership arrangements. But 
for the purposes of this thesis perhaps the most significant comment comes from the 
Advisory Board for the Research Councils (ABRC) which said that the Alvey scheme 
had pioneered an important means of bringing together Research Councils, universities, 
polytechnics, government departments and industry which "serves as a model which 
may usefully be extended and applied in other areas of research" (ABRC, 1986). 
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7.3 The Engineering and Technology Programme (ETP) 
The ETP programme was announced in 1984 and launched in 1985. It was 
administered by the UGC and by NAB, though its bias remained heavily in favour of 
the universities. It was designed to increase the number of student places in science, 
engineering and technology and from the start, it was intended to favour those 
institutions which could demonstrate that they enjoyed the support of industry in terms 
of employment for graduates, donations of equipment and other resources, and support 
within the teaching programmes. Over a three year period, the programme distributed a 
total of £45 million with funds going variously towards recurrent expenditure, 
equipment and, in the second and third years, building programmes. 
The initial approach from the UGC to selected universities specified the principles 
(criteria) upon which it was considering allocating an unspecified sum of earmarked 
money. At that stage it asked for nothing more than "academic profiles and general 
statements of intent, with a very rough indication of the resource implications". The 
letter was however accompanied by a very elaborate questionnaire ! Over 30 
universities responded, covering more than 250 departments. Twenty were finally 
included in the scheme, to provide 3,900 places by 1990. They were subsequently 
joined by 8 polytechnics offering a further 353 places. 
The time-consuming nature of the bidding process attracted some criticism from 
those institutions within our sample that had been involved with ETP. Those looking 
to mount new courses took more time than those providing additional spaces on 
existing ones. In general, those whose plans involved building schemes had to invest 
the greatest amounts of time in the process, but it is perhaps not fair to blame upon the 
task of bidding the problems associated with designing, constructing and equipping 
new premises. As with the Alvey programme, institutions were uncertain as to how to 
cost the time spent preparing bids, partly because it is difficult to determine just which 
activities, meetings and planning activities are to be counted in. However, most judged 
the time invested worthwhile, considering the benefits of the programme and the 
success rate of bids. 
Monitoring activities by both UGC and NAB appear to have been restricted to the 
collection of information about recruitment, paying little or no attention to the original 
"principle" of industrial involvement. Evaluation as such played no part, presumably 
because the original objective was simply a numbers game. The programme was 
initially referred as the "Shift" and later the "Switch" to science and technology : this 
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made the criterion of success unequivocal. Two universities fell short of their funded 
and contracted targets, and resources were accordingly clawed back. 
The response of the case study institutions to the impact of ETP was almost 
universally warm. While for all it was a welcome source of extra funds in a period of 
economic stringency, for some it had effects out of all proportion to the funds involved. 
One university reported that the initiative had allowed them to change the character of 
the institution by shifting the emphasis away from the Humanities, while another 
claimed that it had helped them to realise priorities previously constrained by funding 
cuts and the freezing of posts. Not only had they recruited younger members of staff 
but these people had brought with them new kinds of expertise which in some cases 
had revolutionised the teaching of obsolescent courses. Together with new equipment 
and improved accomodation, new staff had also allowed for expansion into new areas 
of research and into more productive relationships with local companies. While all this 
did not necessarily make for happier relationships with the rest of the university, it does 
demonstrate the efficacy of targetted resources. On the face of it, £45 million is no 
great sum, but its impact was clearly substantial and shows once more the efficiency of 
categorical funding as a device for policy implementation. 
What the UGC and NAB made abundantly clear to their 'clients' is that in the matter 
of the ETP they were acting under instructions from the DES. The department was 
taking the decisions about the overall number of places, the funds which would be 
allocated, the kind of courses which would be funded and the criteria on which they 
were to be judged. In this it was using a particular funding mechanism to anticipate the 
changes in the role of the UGC, later confirmed in the Education Reform Act which 
replaced the Committee with the more closely controlled University Funding Council. 
7.4 The Enterprise in Higher Education Initiative (EHE) 
This scheme was launched in 1987 by the Secretary of State for Employment with 
the support of his colleagues in Education and Science, Trade and Industry, Scotland 
and Wales. It is administered through the Training, Education and Enterprise 
Department of the Department of Employment, the successor to what has been in turn 
the Manpower Services Commission, the Training Commission and the Training 
Agency. Given the Department's ground-breaking work with TVEI, we can 
reasonably expect to find in EHE a well-developed model of contractual funding. I 
intend, therefore, to deal somewhat more fully with this programme than with the 
Alvey programme, the ETP or - still to come - the IRC programme. 
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In its first four years the department committed itself to spend about £60 million 
over an eight year period to encourage "the development of qualities of enterprise 
amongst those seeking higher education qualifications" (Training Agency, 1989b). In 
the initial "Guidance for Applicants", the main objectives were expressed in very 
general terms : namely, that first degree students should be able to develop "competence 
and aptitudes relevant to enterprise", acquired at least in part through project work 
undertaken in a "real economic setting" and jointly assessed by HE and employers. To 
achieve such a programme, providers would have to offer more than "simple bolt-on 
modules in Business Studies" ; sound proposals would have to show evidence of both 
course and staff development and would have to indicate the involvement of industry in 
practical and resource terms. All HE institutions were invited to bid though it was 
suggested that those not ready to mount a full scheme in the first year might bid for a 
smaller amount of development funds during the first round in order to help them 
prepare a full-scale bid for the second round. 
In the first round a total of 128 outline bids were received of which 82 were for full 
funding. Twenty institutions were invited to prepare full bids, and from these eleven -
4 universities and 7 polytechnics - were selected for full funding. By 1991 EHE was 
being implemented in 41 institutions and 15 more proposals had been accepted to begin 
in 1991-92. The Department claims that 90% of those institutions eligible to bid have 
now done so but "because the bidding is competitive, some have not secured funding" 
(Department of Employment, April 1991). 
In a refinement of earlier, say TVEI, practice, the Training Agency published the 
criteria on which the first round submissions had been judged (TA, January 1989a). 
These criteria effectively became the operational criteria to which future bids have had 
to attend, thus re-inforcing the argument that precision is often an emergent process that 
critically depends upon the practical possibilities which become clear as practitioners 
put forward concrete proposals. 
Our case study institutions had submitted twenty first round bids between them and 
of these, four proved successful. Of those who had made unsuccessful bids, five 
(three universities, one polytechnic and one other) thought it unlikely that they would 
bid again. One reason for reluctance was the perception that the chance of success was 
limited ; this led them to doubt whether bidding was worth the effort. Other problems 
with constructing a bid concerned the need to involve the whole institution, and a 
suspicion that the complexities of the scheme out-weighed the benefits. Others felt 
inhibited by strong competition from neighbouring institutions, while some felt that 
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their predominantly rural location made it difficult for them to put together the required 
back-up system from local industry. None explicitly criticised the objectives of the 
scheme and it was interesting that several said their initial bid had been prompted by a 
desire not to be seen as "anti-enterprise". Another interesting response came from a 
polytechnic which was unsuccessful in the first round but planned to bid again in the 
second ; their perception had been that they needed only to capitalise on their existing 
substantial links with industry and that their bid would be "mainly a matter of co-
ordinating what was already going on ...." : this, presumably, was not what the 
sponsor had in mind. 
Twelve of the twenty case study institutions were able to give reasonably clear 
estimates of the costs involved in bidding for EHE funds, which suggests that 
institutions were becoming more aware of the need to make such calculations. It is 
apparent from our data that the successful bidders had invested more in their bids than 
the unsuccessful. As a result of careful analysis, the research team concluded that the 
total opportunity costs to institutions of the bids submitted amounted to some 4.4% of 
the funds disbursed in the fast round (though it is important to remember that some of 
these costs presumably contributed to success in later rounds). Estimates of cost do 
not, however, include the time invested in meetings and other contacts by collaborators 
in industry. 
Our enquiries were concerned to explore the experience of bidding and the nature of 
response to failure. There were predictable complaints about the tight timetable, and 
also about the lack of specific advance information about the criteria on which the first 
round bids were to be judged. There was further familiar comment about shifting goal-
posts when the Training Agency asked for a much more detailed financial statement 
with second round bids. More seriously, one institution with a strong track record of 
employer involvement was rejected on the grounds that the Training Agency preferred 
to support institutions with a low level of such activity, and was left with a feeling of 
resentment about the precise objectives of the programme. Another felt aggrieved that 
its carefully devised plan, which had absorbed three months of staff time, had been 
rejected "on a cursory examination of its front page". A third felt that it should have 
received more feed-back on its unsuccessful bid ; a fourth, despite initial enthusiasm, 
described the whole process as an "unseemly rush ... it was unreasonable to expect that 
higher education should suddenly drop everything to prepare bids for the Training 
Agency" ; and others that the management structures required by the Training Agency 
were inappropriate and that university autonomy was under threat. Some complained 
that there was no provision for the cost of bidding and one university had concluded 
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that this and other Training Agency initiatives invariably resulted in a net loss to the 
institution. 
Bidding is, of course, an integral part of categorical funding because it under-pins 
the existence of contract and contractual-type relationships. The issue raised by the 
bidding component in this EHE exercise concerns the question of whether stiff 
competition is productive, in so far as it tends to deter some and to alienate the 
unsuccessful. However, despite the apparently widespread disillusion which followed 
the first round exercise, as the EHE moved into its later rounds, institutions became 
more confident that bidding would pay dividends. By the time the fourth round 
winners were announced, 7 of our 14 universities, and 8 of our 10 polytechnics and 
colleges, had gained a place in the scheme. This, however, does not in itself prove the 
virtue of competition. It will be remembered that in the LEATGS scheme discussed in 
the last chapter, we saw the operation of an alternative model, namely the use of 
indicative allowances to be triggered on submission of an acceptable proposal. 
The research programme was able to pay some attention to questions concerning the 
management of EHE within institutions, and to its impact on teaching. Of major 
importance is the evidence that, as required by the Training Agency, EHE projects had 
developed identifiable management structures of their own. The majority had a newly 
appointed EHE director, answerable to a committee or committees, and through them 
subject to TA scrutiny. Beyond that, institutions varied in the extent to which they 
devolved activities to individual departments. The Department's own 1991 report 
makes further observations on these points (Department of Employment, 1991, pp6-7). 
Drawing on evaluation work carried out by the Tavistock Institute (see below), it 
distinguishes between enthusiastic, emergent and reluctant "modernisers" and claims 
that each type has tended to produce a particular style of response : in general, the 
enthusiasts have developed a clear central function but within that, substantial 
devolution ; the emergent have gone in for "taller" institutional hierarchies and relative 
centralisation ; while down among the reluctant, the style has been predominantly "de- 
centralised or dispersed 
	
 (where) real power is vested in pioneering first year 
departments or courses". These distinctions are further related to differing models of 
curriculum and staff development. 
The document from which these comments are drawn appears to demonstrate that 
the Employment Department still has an edge over the DES in the matter of promoting 
curriculum development through categorical funding, as much as anything because it 
has evolved methods of tolerating diversity within limits, even in such fundamental 
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matters as the interpretation of 'enterprise'. It also, quite explicitly, builds on the 
experience of TVEI in areas such as student assessment, and monitoring and 
evaluation. For example, they state 
In entering into contracts to accept ED funding, HEIs commit 
themselves to a process of monitoring of enterprise outcomes. Each 
HEI has a number of annual contract targets to meet ... Information 
about these 'performance indicators' is collated by ED to provide 
statistics about EHE. 
There is a tension in the field of evaluation : on one hand evaluation is 
concerned to collect information in order to monitor progress towards 
objectives and exercise financial accountability ; on the other hand it is a 
formative exercise, aiding growth and development. 
(Department of Employment, 1991, p27) 
For the EHE programme, the department chose to replicate the evaluation strategy 
which it had adopted for TVEI, with a mix of national and local evaluation. National 
evaluations were commissioned from the Tavistock Institute and the NFER. The 
Tavistock addressed the "soft" issues through a series of case studies while the NFER 
collected "harder" evidence about "interim outcomes" through questionnaires. Each 
EHE programme was charged with responsibility for "devising and approving Local 
Evaluation Strategies". These were to operate within "guide-lines" but they were 
allowed considerable discretion as to focus, methodology, and the choice of internal or 
external evaluators. Local strategies had to meet ED requirements for performance 
indicators but, at the same time, they were expected to "play an essentially 
developmental role". The Report also refers to "the variety of information about the 
design, management, and introduction of EHE (which) is being amassed and analysed" 
and acknowledges that 
Unfortunately some of the staff and the employer partners involved in 
EHE have been inundated with paperwork. This has led to a prevalence 
of 'evaluation fatigue' which may militate against the collection of data. 
(op cit, p27) 
There are distinct echoes here of the comments by the DES's own officials on the 
superfluity of data collected in the course of monitoring and evaluating LEATGS 
(Glickman and Dale, 1990). 
In the light of earlier discussions, there are three comments to make. First, and 
perhaps not surprisingly, the Department does not here explicitly acknowledge its own 
dependence on the provision of adequate data for the purposes of upward accountability 
and programme maintenance. Second, we must assume that, as with TVEI and other 
similar programmes in the school sector, programme managers at both local and 
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national level will have the same low toleration of negative findings. And third, once 
again we see that where monitoring and evaluation play a significant role in the process 
of control through scrutiny, the burden on the scrutinised is often very heavy and the 
pressure to report and be reported upon can well exceed the inherent advantages of the 
exercise. 
It is still rather early to gauge the impact of EHE. It is clearly targetted on the 
teaching of first degree students. The Department claims that the programme relates to 
developments in other areas of education and training : 
Two significant themes which have emerged have been the move 
towards active, experiential learning styles and the goal of making the 
curriculum more relevant to the world of work." 	 (op cit, 1991, pl) 
It has allowed broad interpretations of 'enterprise', accepting programmes which 
concentrate upon the development of transferable skills and personal effectiveness as 
alternatives to a narrow focus on enterprise as entrepreneurship. It has argued strongly 
for more "process-led styles of learning", and in many institutions the programme 
seems to be as much about developments in pedagogy, and therefore staff 
development, as it is about course content. The involvement of industry is designed to 
promote opportunities for "practical experience and real-life problem-solving", thus 
linking the first and second aims in the quotation above. In some schemes, there are 
more explicit attempts to introduce students to the world of work, while others have 
sought to integrate "enterprise" courses into regular degree programmes through 
additional modules. But overall the significance of all these approaches is that they 
represent a breach in the barricades which HE has traditionally erected between the 
learning experiences of their students and the outside world. 
Another measure of impact has been the manner in which, as in other instances, this 
funding strategy has apparently succeeded in buying more than is actually paid for. 
Initial funding had to be matched by a commitment in cash or kind from the institution 
itself and its employer partners. Moreover, it was intended as pump-priming finance 
such that, at the end of five years, the programme should become "self-financing". 
But perhaps the most significant impact of EHE is its contribution to a changing 
relationship between HE and the government. This is well illustrated by one university 
in our sample which did not bid in the first round but felt it would be wise to do so in 
the second because 
203 
.... it is impossible to ignore the political implications. If an institution 
does not participate it runs the risk of being seen as anti-enterprise and 
could suffer in many ways as a consequence .... the college has no 
option but to show willing. 
(quoted in CHES report, 1990) 
In conclusion, the EHE programme demonstrates all that has been learned from the 
experience of TVEI in terms of programme administration. The language of bid and 
contract, and all that follows from their adoption, is much more up-front ; whereas in 
the early days it fell to researchers to seek for labels such as these to name the elements 
which they observed in the implementation of new policy, government is now speaking 
directly to its clients in these terms - and those clients are responding in the same 
language. 
7.5 Interdisciplinary Research Centres (IRCs) 
The policy intention behind the IRC programme was to encourage a greater 
concentration and more strategic planning of university research. 
In March 1988 the first IRC was established at Cambridge and by the middle of 
1989 (the point at which the CHES data was collected), a further sixteen had been 
established or were in the process of formation. By 1990 a sum of approximately £120 
million had been committed over a 5 - 10 year period, a growing proportion of total 
research funding. 
Funds were distributed via the Science and Engineering Research Council (SERC) 
and the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). The aim was to concentrate 
research efforts based on existing strengths, to encourage more interdisciplinary work, 
and to increase efforts in important areas of strategic science, especially with a view to 
"exploitability and applicability" (ABRC, 1988). Furthermore, it was hoped that the 
IRCs would improve the inter-face between strategic research in higher education and 
in industry; and would also lead to the more purposeful management of HE research 
and to more effective collaboration between HE and the Research Councils. 
The money for the IRCs came from within the existing block grant and was 
allocated in accordance with the kind of bidding procedures explored in this thesis. The 
Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals (CVCP) responded to the original 
proposals by expressing their concern that the programme might well lead to new 
rigidities, restricting the capacity of HE to respond quickly to new ideas. They were 
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also concerned that the programme might lead to a further concentration of research, an 
outcome which appeared to be in line with a growing government determination to 
differentiate between those HE institutions which concentrated on research and those 
which were primarily concerned with teaching. The allocation of IRC funding up to 
1990 has indeed favoured what have been termed the "existing research heavy-
weights", namely Imperial College London, Oxford, Cambridge and Edinburgh. 
The IRC programme is therefore a further clear example of a move to implement 
policy through the process of ear-marking funds (in this case from within existing 
allocations) and then to shift both policy and practice within the system by distributing 
funds through the mechanisms of bid and contract. It is interesting that although there 
continued to be complaints about the mechanics of this style of resource allocation, by 
the end of the eighties it no longer seemed novel. The IRC programme, however, has 
not had a smooth ride. A group set up to review the IRC programme published an 
interim report in 1989 which, while recognising that the initiative "catalysed, and gave 
urgency to, discussions about new interdisciplinary structures" concluded that 
in future IRCs should be developed in a rather different way. This view 
is based on our belief that the IRC mode of funding should be 
considered as one of a number of possible ways of funding ; and that a 
decision to follow the IRC mode in a particular case should emerge from 
the normal process of reviewing areas, and deciding priorities, rather 
than through a special exercise. 
(Flemming Report, 1989, p28) 
The IRC programme raises a whole series of interesting issues - among them, the 
relationship between research and teaching, the knock-on effect on non-IRC research of 
concentrating staff and resources in IRCs, and the optimum conditions for the 
generation of new, as yet unanticipated, ideas and lines of research. But in this context 
there is space only to refer to some of the evidence from the CHES project about the 
operation of the funding procedures. 
The Flemming report was critical of the bidding process : submissions were 
prepared hurriedly and without the detailed preparation that they warranted; institutions 
made commitments that were not properly thought through; applications were submitted 
without a clear understanding of what was expected, and expectations themselves 
changed during the process; and a great deal of nugatory work was done. 
All these reports were corroborated by comments made to the CHES team. We 
were also told about the problems caused when the rules of the game are changed 
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between the publication of criteria and the concluding of contracts, and beyond. This 
vacillation seems to be so much a part of categorical funding that it is widely referred by 
its own cliche : "moving the goal posts" is now a term used across all sectors of 
education wherever educational administrators are to be found grappling with 
categorically funded projects. There are several possible explanations as to why such 
programmes evoke this standard response. It might, for example, indicate that those 
responsible for the scheme are exploring new ways of doing things in a genuinely open 
manner so that both the programme's objectives and its administrative procedures are 
continuing to evolve during the implementation phase. On the other hand, it might 
equally demonstrate the vulnerability of such politically significant programmes to 
micro-shifts in policy : thus criteria come to reflect even small shifts in political 
priorities. (These explanations leave aside the more cynical explanation that "moving 
the goal-posts" keeps everyone on their toes and simultaneously reinforces central 
control.) 
In the case of the IRCs, there is evidence to support two, if not three, of these 
explanations. One major shift occurred when the SERC altered its original requirement 
that collaboration with other institutions and with industry should be stressed to a ruling 
that such collaboration "should be minor, not part of the basic structure" (letter from 
Chairman of SERC to HE institutions, 1989). In another instance, the SERC promised 
two awards but made only one ; and in another, bids were specifically requested but no 
award was made at all. A further complaint from our case study institutions was that 
no explanations for policy shifts were given, nor feed-back on unsuccessful 
applications. 
Of the 24 institutions in our sample, 14 had bid for IRCs and 6, all universities, had 
been successful. All 14 stated that the bidding process was complex, lengthy and 
costly. The Research Councils made available to institutions their plans for future IRCs 
based on ABRC projections as to where established disciplines were converging. They 
also indicated their financial projections and invited bids, although there was no 
guarantee that their indicated programme would be implemented. Institutions varied in 
the way in which they chose an individual or a team to respond but all agreed that 
drawing up the bid was an onerous task, involving the establishment of contacts and of 
possible arrangements for collaborative working. Costing the projected work was 
another complex task and several institutions claimed that they had under-estimated 
their eventual needs. The final bid might be a document of 200 pages or more. The 
cost of the bidding itself was very difficult to estimate : CHES calculations range as 
widely as from £10k to £250k. 
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Once the contract was agreed in outline, the associated problems did not go away. It 
is worth quoting at some length the comments of one university officer because they 
encapsulate much that was said about bidding within a number of programmes: 
I think I would like to get a message across to the Research Council and 
to the ones that sit on top there, that 
	 these post contract negotiations 
have been infinitely complicated by continual changes of demands from 
the bureaucracy, in particular their habit of issuing one-week deadlines 
for extremely important decisions which involve tremendous amounts of 
time, and demanding that we work to these, but being themselves 
unable to answer even the simplest questions. We have said to them "in 
two months time you will be asking us for this. Could you clarify the 
guidelines so that we can start preparing ?" 
They say "no, I'm sorry we can't, but we'll give you good notice when 
the time comes up". Two months later they ring up and say they want 
such and such in a week. I think this is a message that must get 
through. Quite a lot of our costs are due to the fact that we are just not 
able to work in a reasonable fashion. We have to drop everything and it 
is not as if it is just one initiative in a very small department, there are 
three or four that have been active during this period. 
(quoted in CHES, 1990) 
7.6 The Professional, Industrial and Commercial Updating Programme 
(PICKUP) 
The PICKUP programme, which was announced in 1982, was primarily intended 
to address the training needs of employees in a rapidly changing work environment. In 
order to achieve this end, its objectives were two-fold. On the one hand it sought to 
help HE institutions in their efforts to increase their provision of short courses, the 
development of infra-structures and new marketing strategies in support of such work, 
and the encouragement of new teaching methods and approaches. On the other, it was 
intended to increase awareness among employers of the need for up-dating and of the 
way in which higher education could help in that task. These objectives did address 
many of the concerns of HE in the provision of Continuing Education ; but not all, for 
the focus was upon collective and commercial needs rather than upon those of the 
individual citizen. 
PICKUP funds were distributed through the HE funding bodies and were subject to 
the usual bidding procedures. Institutions were required to set their bids within a broad 
strategic plan for the development of their Continuing Education activities. This had to 
include an estimate of how they intended to increase the number of courses offered, the 
number of students enrolled, and the fee income to be achieved in the planning period. 
Thus, coupled with the focus on infrastructure and marketing mentioned above, one 
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implicit policy intention was clearly to stimulate more development than was directly 
supported through the allocated funds. 
It is not therefore surprising that the CHES data showed up some general 
uncertainty about the real purpose of PICKUP. The declared aim may well have been 
the training needs of the work-force and the wish to see the resources of HE fully used 
and appropriately paid for by the employers who stood to benefit. But the form in 
which bids had to be set gave the impression to institutions that they were to see short 
courses for employees as importantly concerned with income-generation, thus 
decreasing dependence on public funding while simultaneously demonstrating 
responsiveness to the market. This apparent ambiguity (or complexity) within the 
overall policy intention of PICKUP appeared to cause problems for HE, with many 
institutions not clear as to whether their overall programme should be seeking to cover 
its costs or to make a net contribution to central funds. The wider the scope of the 
individual institutions's aspirations in relation to Continuing Education (ie, the larger its 
commitment to adult and community education, including Access courses), the more 
serious the dilemma appeared to be. 
Although some reactions to the PICKUP experience were critical, other institutions 
reported that the funds had enabled developments which might well not have taken 
place without the incentive provided by the scheme. A typical response was the view in 
one polytechnic that while PICKUP had been stimulating, the short term nature of the 
funding presented serious problems. For example, it had proved difficult to appoint a 
PICKUP officer at a sufficiently senior level when the initial funding was only for one 
year. On a similar theme, a university reported that a smaller total sum over three years 
would have been more useful than the larger amount in three lumps. "It is the short 
term nature of the funds rather than the ear-marking that presents problems." Relatively 
short notice about the allocation of funds, and unhelpful time scales for the task of 
planning and staffing courses, seemed to be the basis of most complaints. 
Respondents in several institutions commented on the rigours of the bidding 
process and the time it absorbed, particularly in view of the small sums involved. This 
was particularly true for those providers who already had a substantial involvement in 
the field. It was claimed in one place that each bid involved a month's work. In 
another, the Registrar was sceptical as to whether the amount of money available had 
been worth the trouble of getting it. But another acknowledged that formulating the 
bids had been a very good discipline and that PICKUP had achieved a big impact for a 
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small investment. Overall. the general impression was that, even where bids were 
unsuccessful, little was lost. 
There were some complaints that the funds allocated did not meet the institutions' 
own priorities but rather reflected the policy preferences of the DES. More specific 
criticisms were that PICKUP was focused on people already in employment although 
there was (and is) an urgent need to cater for the unemployed and for others who 
require re-training in order to return to work; also that funds were restricted to 
researching a market and developing a product, whereas in some instances short course 
provision was waiting upon new equipment or various forms of institutional and staff 
development. 
In a number of institutions the observation was made that the decision to bid for 
PICKUP funds had been prompted by a wish to maintain good relationships with 
government and with the relevant funding body. We have already encountered similar 
reactions to other government initiatives in earlier sections of this chapter and have 
concluded that categorical funding can elicit responses which do not necessarily imply 
acceptance of the policy intentions behind the scheme. Thus some of our case study 
institutions certainly gave the impression that they had been "going through the 
motions". 
But despite the reservations and the uncomfortable experiences reported above, it 
seems likely that PICKUP has had a positive effect in terms of expanding and 
systematising the provision of short course programmes to industry. In virtually every 
institution visited, it was clear that the administrative arrangements for Continuing 
Education had been altered and considerably enhanced over the previous three years. 
Most had established some form of co-ordinating office, usually staffed partly with 
PICKUP funds. These offices are fulfilling both outward- and inward-facing 
functions. The outward function is concerned with gathering information about the 
needs of local employers, with disseminating information about what the institution can 
offer, and with building up contacts. The inward function is concerned with 
encouraging, supporting, standardising and regulating the provision of short courses 
internally. Help with the costing and pricing of courses is of central importance. The 
issue of credit accumulation and transfer is increasing in significance, with the 
polytechnics leading the way. Considerable areas of difficulty and widely diverse 
practice do exist : in relation to the allocation of overheads and 'profit' between central 
and departmental budgets ; over the matter of giving remuneration or other forms of 
recognition to academic staff who teach on short courses; and over the whole problem 
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of one-off courses and short-contract staffing. However, overall, it was clear from our 
visits that the whole issue of Continuing Education has taken on a new significance for 
HE and the contribution of PICKUP to that state of affairs, while hard to assess 
accurately, must be significant. 
7.7 Discussion 
In the 1970s it was widely assumed that HE should be a publicly funded service. 
Government's task was to supply the resources to meet the Robbins principle that 
"courses of higher education should be available to all who were qualified by ability 
and attainment to pursue them and who wanted to do so". Universities and 
polytechnics were left largely in control of their own academic policy and resource 
allocation procedures. 
In the 1980s the expansionist times to which HE had grown accustomed came to an 
end. Public expenditure was no longer seen as an unqualified good. As a result 
government became far more concerned to determine which activities met its policy 
priorities and therefore which it would choose to fund. It therefore sought to encourage 
HE to diversify its sources of funding and to reduce its reliance on the public purse. 
With the re-election of a Conservative government for a fourth term from April 1992, 
this trend is likely to continue. 
The initiatives examined in this chapter are all consistent with this policy. However, 
between them they represent only a small percentage of higher education income over 
the years in question. At most, the annual public spending on Alvey (£40m), ETP 
(£15m), EHE (£2m) and the IRCs (£20m) amounted to no more than 3% of the total 
recurrent income of HE institutions (CHES, August 1991; Williams, 1992). 
The crucial question is therefore whether this investment of targetted funds has made 
a substantial impact upon HE. The conclusions drawn by the CHES research suggest 
that this is in fact the case. Evidence was found of significant impact on both teaching 
and research in both universities and polytechnics. This has occurred through four 
main mechanisms (Williams, 1992) : the injection of additional resources at a time of 
stringency ; the collaboration engendered within and between institutions and their 
academic staff ; the parallel collaboration with industrial and commercial organisations ; 
and the spin-offs from both new teaching programmes and new research activities for 
other aspects of institutional work. Beyond this, one might also point to the 
contribution these initiatives have made to the restructuring of administration 
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particularly in relation to financial responsibilities and decision making. And it could 
also be argued that they have significantly affected the capacity of HE to function in a 
more market orientated environment. As Williams concludes 
Overall the case studies show that the .... initiatives have had a marked 
effect on higher education institutions that extends well beyond the small 
percentage of recurrent funding that they accounted for.... They have 
certainly been instrumental in bringing about substantial change in 
British higher education. 
(Williams, 1992, p 122) 
This conclusion reinforces arguments advanced earlier in this thesis concerning the 
capacity of well-targetted and administered categorical funding to make an impact 
beyond what, strictly speaking, it is paying for. 
There have of course been problems. We heard many complaints about the time and 
cost of the bidding process. The CHES study concluded that between 1% and 7% of 
the resources made available are consumed by the bidding process itself. But although 
recommending clearer guidelines, better feed-back, and careful monitoring of the cost 
of bidding (and moreover suggesting that successful bidders should be allowed to re-
coup the their costs), the general conclusion was that there are beneficial side-effects to 
the bidding process. A more serious problem may well exist around the short-term, 
stop-go nature of the funding which seems to fit poorly with the time horizons needed 
for responsible educational planning. Yet another problem concerns the whole concept 
of collaboration with other agencies, academic or industrial, which can prove more 
time-consuming than productive. But none of these problems seem to have been 
sufficiently serious to undermine the impact of the initiatives. It may be too early to 
decide whether this impact has been good, bad, or neutral in its effects. 
One of the issues most entangled with such value questions concerns the autonomy 
of the HE institutions. In his book, which draws together the findings of the research 
programme, Williams says 
There appears to be little concern, even in universities, that the new 
funding mechanisms represent a serious infringement on institutional 
autonomy. For example in none of the case study institutions 
undertaking EHE initiatives was there any serious concern among senior 
staff about this issue. It was felt that these were activities in keeping 
with the academic mission of the institution, and that once the contract 
had been negotiated the monitoring and evaluation were legitimate 
accountability. Even the arguments about intellectual property rights in 
the Alvey and IRC programmes seem to have been more concerned with 
who has control of any cash generated than with issues of principle 
about open publication of research findings. 
(Williams, 1992) p 122) 
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However, elsewhere, he does refer to the strains created when "One is dealing with a 
situation, in institutions which pride themselves on their autonomy, in which an outside 
piper wants to have some say in the tunes being played ...". 
There is no doubt that categorical funding has the capacity to invade autonomy and 
that where that commodity is prized, the intrusion will be resented, even resisted. The 
fact that we found little explicit protest may mean that autonomy is prized less than one 
might have assumed. Alternatively, it may mean that the academic community has not 
yet realised that the wall has been breached, or that it is fighting on so many fronts that 
it has yet to appreciate the overall strategy which underlies the campaign. Categorical 
funding, as in the school sector, represents a far more significant development in the 
task of policy implementation than a mere style of financial administration. 
The discussion above deals directly with issues that emerged from the CHES 
research programme. It would however have been equally appropriate to draw this 
chapter to an end by using the three broad headings employed in the two previous ones. 
For in these developments within the funding of HE, there is once again clear evidence 
of changing relationships within the system; of moves towards an "altered mandate" for 
higher education, predicated upon a 'productive' rather than an 'allocative' role for 
central government; and of significant shifts towards new patterns of policy 
formulation. But the link between the evidence provided and these lines of 
development are too clear to need further elaboration. 
212 
Chapter Eight 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The case for the emergence of categorical funding for specific initiatives, and for its 
efficiency in translating policy into practice, has been set out at length in the preceding 
chapters. I do not intend to repeat the argument yet again here. Instead, I will discuss 
the significance of contract within education against the broader picture of social policy 
as a whole. I shall also re-assess the significance of what has been called here 
remunerative power at a time when government appears to have reinforced its claim on 
all four 'bases of power' as defined by Bacharach and Lawler, and discussed here both 
in Chapter 1 and subsequently. Finally, I shall conclude with some broader reflections 
upon the congruity of government by contract with the characteristics of a democratic 
society. 
Norris has said of categorical funding that it is 
.... a financial instrument which can, under the right circumstances, 
achieve the effect of a statutory instrument where one does not exist. 
(Norris, 1990, p63) 
This comment seems to contain half the truth in that, as we have seen, categorical 
funding can result in a realisation of policy within an amazingly short space of time. 
Moreover, despite the fact that participation in many of the initiatives funded this way is 
seen as voluntary - no-one has to bid - they have proved effective in drawing in both 
the willing and the reluctant, thus achieving a universality in their effect which is similar 
to the impact of a statutory instrument. However, on the basis of the last chapters, my 
view would be that categorical funding represents a much more sophisticated form of 
control, and therefore power, than a straightforwardly coercive intervention. The 
reason for this is that while the statutory instrument instructs, the categorically funded 
project recruits. By drawing in those whose own private or vested interests relate to the 
policies funded, and by creating a discourse around the programmes concerned through 
the processes of criteria, bid and so forth, such programmes appear to create true 
believers (or at very least, participants who at first pretend to believe and then find 
themselves to be de facto converts). Yet another difference between such strategies and 
statutory instruments is directly attributable to the existence of the contract. It has been 
argued in the preceding chapters that a contract, especially where it is liable to re-
negotiation on a regular basis, permits - indeed requires - ongoing administrative 
control experienced as monitoring, continuing visibility, and self-policing through the 
requirement to evaluate. 
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For a number of reasons, therefore, the Norris argument is less than complete. 
What we see in categorical funding is not only the means to create pseudo-statutory 
controls, but also the capacity to side-line all alternative programmes and perceptions. 
Through the relationships of dependency which are built into contractual arrangements, 
central government can virtually obliterate from the agenda any serious challenge (see 
Lukes, 1974, p24 and passim, on the "three-dimensional view of power" which 
recognises that "potential issues are kept out of politics, whether through the operation 
of social forces and institutional practices or through individuals' decisions). 
In concluding this thesis, it is appropriate to note how in recent years the use of 
contractual funding in education has been paralleled throughout all areas of social 
policy. In some ways it is surprising that it was not until the late eighties that policy 
initiatives came to be expressed unequivocally in the language of contract because as a 
strategy,it grows quite naturally out of the Conservative preference for market 
economics. Keith Joseph frequently argued that the free market promotes the good of 
individuals ; Skidelsky (1989) advocated the notion of a social market which "means 
that we turn to the market as a first resort and the government as a last resort, and not 
the other way round". To move beyond this sort of rhetoric into action almost requires 
the use of contract. 
An early sign of this shift was the mounting pressure on local authorities during the 
eighties to put ancillary services out to competitive tendering, but this was at least partly 
intended as a curb on the profligate spending of left-wing councils. Within government 
itself, the major shift came with the publication of the Next Steps proposal (Jenkins, 
Caines and Jackson, 1988) which proposed that the executive functions of government 
should be carried out by independent agencies working within a specification and a 
budget determined by the government department concerned. There are now over 
seventy five such agencies: the aim is to complete the process by the end of 1993, 
leading to a substantial reduction in the number of civil servants. 
In 1991, the Director of the Institute of Economic Affairs, Graham Mather, 
published a paper entitled Government by Contract. In it he argued that "treating 
government service provision as a series of contracts presents new opportunities to 
improve service standards, set explicit performance standards, and improve customer 
entitlements" (Mather, 1991). Such objectives "emphatically will not be secured by the 
traditional techniques of public service". Indeed Mather blames existing public 
institutions for sustaining a "servile society" and seeks to secure a more open, classless 
society through a shift towards "government by contract". His object is to 
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to change the nature of government so that it rests explicitly on a series 
of contracts .... Instead of administering public service, civil servants 
should begin explicitly to meet the requirements of customers. Services 
should be specified in clear contractual terms .... 	 (p5) 
...separating policymakers from providers of services offers major 
opportunities to define more precisely and more frequently the range, 
nature and extent of public services. 
	 (p8) 
It is precisely this philosophy which is reflected in the Citizen's Charter, published four 
months later (Prime Minister, July 1991). The Charter argues, sector by sector, for a 
major shift to a system of "contracting out" services through a process of "competitive 
tendering". This means that, as in the private sector, those who manage can 
"concentrate on planning the future direction of service delivery and on setting quality 
standards and monitoring the service to ensure that the standard required is 
achieved"(p34). It is claimed that competition among service providers will benefit 
both the taxpayer and the consumer of services, whether the issue is rail services, 
housing, public cleansing, health services or schooling : a universal panacea, if ever 
there was one. 
But this simple notion of the all-round advantages of the "purchaser-provider" 
model is not without its tensions. In the first place, there is a continuing contradiction 
between tight specification and managerial freedom. And in the second, there is the 
anomalous position of the third interest, namely the recipient of services. After all, it is 
the welfare of that interest which legitimises the whole business. Yet contract is best 
understood as an arrangement between two parties. There is much talk in the Citizen's 
Charter about customers, clients and consumers, and a number of references to choice. 
But if the manager who writes the specification and pays for the services is the 
purchaser, and if the contractor who tenders successfully is the provider, then the third 
interest group is at best a beneficiary rather than a free agent choosing his way through 
the market place. 
This brief discussion of the use of contract across the range of social policy suggests 
that government has come to favour the remunerative base as the the most efficient 
mechanism for implementing policy. It could even be argued that the need to regulate 
through statute and legislation has been substantially diminished, except in so far as 
such measures are used to create contract-dependent structures (consider, for example, 
recent NHS legislation). But is the story in the sphere of education different, for in the 
1988 Act the government apparently opted for a huge expansion of its coercive powers? 
The analysis within this thesis would suggest that such a conclusion would be a 
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considerable over-simplification : I now turn to review those arguments and to consider 
their implications. 
In the earlier, historical chapters it became clear that through the middle years of the 
twentieth century, central government made only partial use of the powers potentially 
available to it. This was partly because its aspirations to control the content of 
schooling varied in intensity, and partly because at various times it appeared to have 
lost some of its relative strength to other interest groups, notably the local authorities 
and/or the teachers. Given the broad consensus concerning the curriculum which 
existed at the time, it is not surprising that government was not particularly interested in 
extending its powers. 
During the eighties however, it became increasingly apparent that the Conservative 
government had developed an educational ideology which could only be realised 
through the re-assertion and extension of central control over the system and over the 
curriculum itself. This intention co-incided with the development of bureaucratic and 
administrative practices which could be readily adapted (and indeed naturally favoured) 
a move towards increasing centralisation. We therefore experienced a decade during 
which government exploited all the forms of power available to it : 
coercive power, with a substantial increase in legislation and regulation; 
remunerative power, with greater control and limitation over public expenditure, 
accompanied by the adoption of contract or pseudo-contract for the funding of 
specific programmes; 
power based on knowledge-as-information, expressed as a pervasive 
demand to "know" the system through the collection of data and the increasing 
sophistication of monitoring; 
power based on expertise, derived from experimentation, research and 
argument derived from the government's own programmes, and the cultivation of 
new and friendly sources of authoritative commentary; 
and finally, power based on normative influence, whereby new opinion 
makers and practitioners are listened to, while old ones are discarded. 
In the major part of this study, attention has been focussed on remunerative power. 
Chapter 4 expanded the definition offered in the earlier chapters in order to establish a 
model of what, it was argued, had become the dominant mode of resource allocation 
during the eighties, namely categorical funding characterised by the installation of 
contractual relationships. In Chapters 5, 6 and 7, the model was explored through a 
216 
series of illustrative studies to see how it worked in practice. The first part of this, the 
concluding chapter, went on to suggest that not only had categorical funding become 
the preferred mode for allocating funds to implement government policies, but also the 
concept of contract had become the symbol or metaphor for the relationship between the 
government and the governed. The process of separating funding and provision, in the 
mode advocated by Keith Joseph, has resulted in the assimilation of a fiscal element 
into the notion of social contract. 
In the fmal pages I want to return to the question of why I chose to focus a thesis on 
these matters. First, it is worth repeating the reasons for not concentrating on the other 
bases of power. In the first place the coercive seemed less interesting, partly because to 
be effective, legislation and regulation need to be backed by other forms of power; 
partly because the imposition of policy in this style is less novel; and partly for the 
simple reason that the study was conceived before the rather sudden change of tack 
following the 1987 election, which resulted in the Education Reform Act and a 
multitude of lesser interventions. The other two options, power based on knowledge, 
and normative power, are both more subtle and evanescent and as such, would need a 
longer historical perspective for adequate analysis. 
The positive reasons for choosing as I did were partly explained in Chapter 1 : the 
fusion of interest and opportunity led to an attempt to make sense of certain initiatives 
and resulted in an account which has had to be told in an order (ordo demonstrandum) 
which differs in many ways from the chronology of the thinking involved (ordo 
inveniendum). But the nature of the interest itself needs to be further explored. Why 
did I feel concerned about both the operation and the fact of contract as I observed it 
around me ? 
Part of the explanation must surely relate to the apparent efficiency and economy of 
the process itself. Of course it would be wrong to argue that all categorically funded 
initiatives and programmes succeed in delivering the objectives of policy makers, entire 
and whole and perfect. Far from it. As an American management aphorism has it -
"What we want is results, what we get is consequences". In many instances, 
contractees claim that the outcomes of a given programme are a set of consequences 
shaped by their own aspirations and intentions, and are not necessarily the "results" 
envisaged in the original policy objectives. Nevertheless such claims are often made by 
those who fail to recognise the extent to which they have been consciously or 
unconsciously recruited to the objectives of the policy, using its language, adopting its 
values, while busying themselves with personalising the details of local 
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implementation. Categorical funding has undoubtedly brought about change, very 
largely in line with government intentions, and with a speed and effectiveness rarely 
seen in the broad field of social policy. What is more, it has changed the ethos and the 
expectations as to how things are done among the various parties (partners is a word 
now honoured only in the rhetoric) within the education system. 
Thus efficiency was itself intriguing. We do not have an elected government in 
order that it should prove incompetent in devising and then in implementing policy : 
there is an undeniable virtue in the capacity to make things happen. But 
simultaneously, that very efficiency can seem repellent. It took some time to realise that 
to understand my fundamental distaste for contract as a basis for policy implementation 
would inevitably lead beyond an analysis of how it worked and what impact, good or 
bad, it had had. Questions therefore need to be asked about whether contract is a 
legitimate tool for the policy-maker in a democratic society. Effective and efficient, 
certainly. But legitimate ? That is more problematic. 
The basis for this distaste was not easy to determine. For some time I thought it 
rested on a commitment to a certain concept of teacher professionalism. I was 
convinced - and still am - that educational programmes must, within bounds, be 
designed within, and not prior to, educational encounters. Teaching and learning are 
essentially an inter-active process. The teacher brings knowledge of the content and 
procedures of the material that is to be learned, together with accumulated experience of 
the teaching-learning process ; the learner, in a good learning environment, brings 
motivation, interest, and the possibility of an unanticipated and challenging response. 
Each encounter is in a real sense unique ; and so is the context in which it occurs. The 
over-determination of the curriculum by external authorities (and this can be secured 
through contract) therefore damages the whole undertaking. 
A paper by Goodson (1990) recalls the description by Edmond Holmes of the 
dismal effects of the 'payment-by-results' policy of the years between 1862 and 1895 
under which schools were examined yearly by HMI. Holmes wrote 
On the official report which followed this examination depended the 
reputation and financial prosperity of the teacher ... 
The consequent pressure on the teacher to exert himself was well-nigh 
irresistible ; and he had no choice but to transmit that pressure to his 
subordinates and his pupils. The result was that in those days the 
average school was a hive of industry. 
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But it was also a hive of mis-directed energy. The State, in prescribing 
a syllabus which was to be followed, in all the subjects of instruction, 
by all the schools in the country, without regard to local or personal 
considerations, was guilty of one capital offence. It did all his thinking 
for the teacher. It told him in precise detail what he was to do each year 
in each 'Standard', how he was to handle each subject, and how far he 
was to go in it .... In other words, it provided him with his ideals, his 
general conceptions, his more immediate aims, his schemes of work ; 
and if it did not control his methods in all their details, it gave him (by 
implication) hints and suggestions with regard to these on which he was 
not slow to act ; for it told him that the work done in each class and in 
each subject would be tested at the end of each year by a careful 
examination of each individual child ; and it was inevitable that in his 
endeavour to adapt his teaching to the type of question which his 
experience of the yearly examination led him to expect, he should 
gradually deliver himself, mind and soul, into the hands of the officials 
of the Department, the officials at Whitehall who framed the yearly 
syllabus, and the officials in the various districts who examined on it. 
What the Department did to the teacher, it compelled him to do the 
child.... 
(Holmes, 1911, p 103-4) 
But despite these strong words, which have a remarkable topicality more than eighty 
years after they were written, any argument which rests upon a concept of teacher 
professionalism as the basis for concern about the manipulative use of contract in the 
field of educational policy is hard to sustain. First, it implies a lack of sympathy with 
the view that teachers are not uniquely qualified to define the aims of education. For 
after all, the way we want to educate our children is nothing less than our judgement 
about what their adult lives can and should be ; and John White (1979) has 
convincingly argued that teachers have no right to pre-empt this choice on behalf of 
society as a whole. Thus there are compelling reasons why teachers' autonomy should 
be exercised within a framework constrained by socially agreed goals and subject to 
appropriate forms of accountability. 
A second problem with the teacher professionalism argument is that logically one 
would have to extend it to the full spectrum of professional, semi-professional and 
maybe even, all trained and qualified people. That would mean that social workers, 
doctors, lawyers, policemen, bankers, civil engineers and even electricians should be 
able to make unique decisions in their working environment, because they can claim to 
understand it as no-one else can and because each encounter will differ in some way 
from all others. Yet clearly, in any society all such people need to be regulated and the 
general direction of their activities subjected to public scrutiny and regulation. In all 
these cases we are quick to complain when such controls appear to break down. 
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So, to account for my 'distaste', the angle of my argument has to be widened 
beyond the issue of teacher professionalism, significant though that is. The focus has 
clearly to be the nature of democratic society itself, and of democratic education within 
it. And that must inevitably include questions about the role of the political and 
bureaucratic elite within that society. 
In this area, the work of Etzioni-Halevy is very helpful. She writes 
... the manner in which political and bureaucratic elites exert their power 
is of the first order of importance for the preservation and promotion of 
democracy. And democracy, in turn, is worth preserving and 
promoting as it is the most effective framework for decreasing political 
inequalities and enhancing political freedom. ....At the same time 
democracies are exceedingly fragile, beset by internal strains and 
contradictory requirements 	
 These inconsistencies present both 
political and bureaucratic elites with the constant temptation of slipping 
into less regulated ways of wielding power, of becoming less 
democratic as they go along. The task is therefore to preserve the 
regulation of elite power already achieved and to press for the further 
curbing of that power. 
(Etzioni-Halevy, 1983, pp 4-5) 
The argument above is acutely relevant to the content of this thesis which has been 
concerned with the manner in which power has been exerted, and has seen that process 
"slipping into less regulated ways". That of course is not to imply that categorical-
funding operates without rules of its own : much of the last three chapters have been 
about just such procedural matters. Nevertheless the argument has been that the use of 
contractual and quasi-contractual methods of resource allocation has enabled a much 
more comprehensive control over policy related programmes. 
Much of Etzioni-Halevy's book is devoted to looking at tensions between 
bureaucracy and democracy and between bureaucratic and political elites. Of the former 
she hypothesises that bureaucracy poses a dilemma for democracy (and vice-versa). 
Bureaucracy has in fact increased its power because the modern state, in 
its expanding capacity of monitoring the economy and of providing a 
greater variety of services to the public and especially in its expanding 
capacity as a welfare state, is in charge of allocating ever-growing 
resources. 
(Because of this) growing pervasiveness of all bureaucracies, as well as 
the evolving technology of ever more sophisticated devices of 
collecting, storing and retrieving ever larger amounts of information, ... 
bureaucracy has increasingly gained the potential of encroaching on the 
autonomy, liberty, and privacy of the individual - immunities which are 
of the very essence of democracy. 
(op cit, pp 89-90) 
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Yet a powerful bureaucracy is at the same time a necessity for democracy. Just because 
the modern state is so concerned with the distribution of huge resources, it "must have 
at its disposal an organisation that will not only allocate the resources but will do so by 
non-partisan criteria" (p91), something which would be very difficult for electorally 
vulnerable politicians. 
Categorical funding enables politicians to increase the possibility of passing out 
resources in such a way as to achieve partisan policy objectives. Such techniques result 
in the distinction between bureaucratic and political elites becoming more blurred as 
political decisions are fused into administrative and executive strategies. This perhaps 
explains why, in much discussion here and elsewhere about educational policy, there is 
often considerable ambiguity as to whether the term 'DES' refers to a political or a 
bureaucratic function. 
It has been suggested that under the Conservative administration the Civil Service 
has become more politicised. It has also shrunk numerically as the Next Steps policy 
has resulted in the hiving off of more and more functions to self-administering, semi-
independent agencies. But the operation of contract between each of these agencies 
and the government, which is their chief pay-master, has enabled the control function to 
survive the apparent dismemberment of bureaucracy. 
I now return to the argument that there is a pressing need to curb the power of both 
political and bureaucratic elites in order to preserve "fragile" democracy and to 
safeguard the "autonomy, liberty and privacy of the individual" which were described 
as "of the very essence of democracy". To investigate these statements further we have 
to look at the question of what it is to live in a democratic society. 
Etzioni-Halevy's own definition of democracy is disappointingly narrow. 
..(an) institutional arrangement whereby two or more organised groups 
of people (or parties) participate in the contest for power (or for elite 
positions) on the strength of their advocated policies and/or their 
projected images and whereby they acquire such posts on the basis of 
free elections.. 	 (p 86) 
This is fundamentally a political definition which does not seem wholly adequate to 
justify other of her statements which appear to address wider questions about the 
quality of life. To encompass that we need a more philosophical definition. 
To choose one from the enormous body of scholarship in this field is undoubtedly 
arbitrary but an extended excursus into political philosophy at this point would be 
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foolish. The use of only one such theory is to be excused on the grounds that it seems 
peculiarly appropriate to the argument. 
A broader and more socially comprehensive definition comes from the work of the 
Canadian political philosopher, McPherson. In an essay entitled The Maximization of 
Democracy, he argues that within modem attempts to produce a theory which can 
justify democracy, there are two main claims : "the claim to maximise individual utilities 
and the claim to maximise individual powers" (1971, p 4). The first of these is the heir 
to nineteenth century Utilitarianism : on that view democracy is a system which 
aggregates individual satisfactions but does so in a way which is equitable in so far as it 
endeavours to provide each with that to which to he is entitled. Such a view sees man 
as essentially a consumer of utilities. The second claim is one that pre-dates the 
Utilitarianism of Locke, Bentham and James Mill, and was revived in the liberal-
democratic theory of John Stuart Mill and T.H.Green. McPherson describes it thus : 
The second claim is that the liberal-democratic society maximises men's 
human powers, that is, their potential for using and developing their 
uniquely human capacities. This claim is based on a view of man's 
essence not as a consumer of utilities but as a doer, a creator, an enjoyer 
of his human attributes. These attributes may be variously listed and 
assessed: they may be taken to include the capacity for rational 
understanding, for moral judgement and action, for aesthetic creation or 
contemplation, for the emotional activities of friendship and love, and, 
sometimes, for religious experience. Whatever the uniquely human 
attributes are taken to be, in this view of man their exertion and 
development are seen as ends in themselves, not simply a means to 
consumer satisfactions. It is better to travel than to arrive. Man is not a 
bundle of appetites seeking satisfaction but a bundle of conscious 
energies seeking to be exerted. 
(McPherson, 1971, p 5) 
But, argues McPherson, by the time such ideas had returned to the centre of political 
philosophy, the Utilitarian concept was deeply rooted in the realities of a modem 
market society, with the result that we are left in the twentieth century with a form of 
democratic theory which is a hybrid of the two traditions. 
This argument about the duality of democratic theory throws a useful light on the 
subject of this thesis. The ideology of late twentieth century Conservatism, with its 
emphasis on the virtues of the market and the competitive ethos has a bias towards the 
satisfaction of individual appetites and choices. It has espoused the kind of political 
theory which, McPherson claims, "offer(s), as realism, a savage revision, almost 
obliteration, of the democratic content of traditional liberal-democratic theory, with a 
view to re-formulating its liberal market content" (op cit, p 76). 
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The influence of Professor Friedman on Conservative thinking in the eighties is 
uncontested. McPherson, in an essay written in 1968, was already anticipating the 
implications for democracy of Friedman's economics. 
In asserting ... that freedom of the individual, or perhaps of the family, 
is the liberal's 'ultimate goal in judging social arrangements', 
(Friedman) has said in effect that the liberal is not required seriously to 
weigh the ethical claims of equality (or any other principle of 
distribution), let alone the claims of any principle of individual human 
development such as was given first place by liberals like Mill and 
Green... 	 (op cit, p 156) 
The link with the practice of categorical funding and the establishment of contractual 
relationships for the delivery of social policies is now clear. The evidence in the past 
chapters points to the effectiveness of such arrangements in moulding the actions and 
ultimately the values of the contractee to those of the policy-maker. They permit 
detailed intervention and promote self-policing. We must therefore conclude that they 
are effective to the point of manipulation, and they thus constrain the ability of 
individuals whose activities are caught up in such arrangements from exercising their 
powers, from using and developing their human capacities for rational understanding, 
for judgement and for action. They therefore serve to diminish rather than to extend 
liberal-democratic principles within society. 
But against that conclusion, one might argue that a notion of democratic society 
which allows an individual teacher to develop his powers in a manner which might 
damage pupils and students is in no way defensible. In recent years this view has been 
widespread among critics of the education system, and not without some justification. 
The problem here concerns the rationale for a due measure of professional freedom. 
Such arguments as have been produced in the past have tended to be pragmatic, 
concerned with the planning and implementation of the curriculum (see Skilbeck, 1984, 
chapter 1, for a succinct summary). Most have emerged from studies of planned 
curriculum development which appeared to suggest the persistent failure of RD and D 
and other forms of centre-periphery strategies. But to counter arguments about the 
dangers of individual teacher preference, what is needed is a theory which grounds the 
case for professional independence not in the exigencies of practice (for practice can 
change and be changed), but rather in a wider notion about the role of teachers in a 
democratic society. Clearly such a theory will encompass McPherson's developmental 
concept but it will do so in a way which stresses the social as well as the individual case 
for expanding a theory of democracy beyond the maximisation of individual liberties. 
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One writer who has attempted to resolve this problem is Amy Gutmann. In her 
book, Democratic Education (1987), she produces a strong definition of democracy : 
democracy is a political ideal - of a society whose adult members are, 
and continue to be, equipped by their education and authorized by 
political structures to share in ruling. Democratic societies must 
therefore prevent majorities (as well as minorities) from repressing 
critical inquiry or restricting political access. 	 (page xi) 
The means by which adult members are to share in ruling is through the process of 
deliberation: 
Rational deliberation remains the form of freedom most suitable to a 
democratic society in which adults must be free to deliberate and 
disagree but constrained to secure the intellectual grounds for 
deliberation and disagreement among children. 	 (p 45) 
Thus 
... the development of deliberative character is essential to realizing the 
ideal of a democratically sovereign society ... 	 (p 52) 
.... a democratic state must aid children in developing the capacity to 
understand and to evaluate competing conceptions of the good life and 
the good society .... To integrate the value of critical deliberation 
among good lives, we must defend some principled limits on political 
and parental authority over education, limits that in practice require 
parents and states to cede some educational authority to professional 
educators. 	 (p 44) 
Gutmann is therefore arguing that it is the prime responsibility of teachers to 
inculcate in their students the habit and capacity of independent, critical thought about 
the society in which they live. One might suppose that teachers who are tied to a 
concept of education which can be summed up in the term 'delivery' - of a re-ordained 
curriculum or of a negotiated contract - cannot hope to model for their students the very 
characteristics that a democratic theory of education requires them to foster. By 
restraining their 'powers', through remunerative as well as coercive and other 
strategies, we thus restrain the powers of young people to develop into what they might 
otherwise be. 
Gutmann includes in her analysis an account of what goes wrong when democratic 
deliberation is repressed : 
Citizens and public officials can use democratic processes to destroy 
democracy. They can undermine the intellectual foundations of future 
democratic deliberations by implementing educational policies which 
either repress unpopular (but rational) ways of thinking or exclude some 
future citizens from an education adequate for participating in democratic 
politics. 	 (p 14) 
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Where such repression and exclusion result in the curtailment of proper professional 
freedom, the results are dire : 
When democratic control over .. schools is so absolute as to render 
teachers unable to exercise intellectual discretion in their work, 
(1) few independent-minded people are attracted to teaching, 
(2) those who are attracted are frustrated in their attempts to think 
creatively and independently, and 
(3) those who either willingly or reluctantly conform to the demands of 
democratic authority teach an undemocratic lesson to their students - of 
intellectual deference to democratic society. 	 (p 80) 
These quotations from Gutmann's book have been re-ordered in the interests of 
condensing a complex argument into a form which can be incorporated here ; 
nevertheless they resonate completely with my concerns about the use of categorical 
funding in the form of contract to bring about the implementation of government 
educational policy. It is the very potency of this strategy, - its efficiency, effectiveness 
and economy - which is distasteful ; and the reason is that it is not consistent with the 
character of democratic society. 
We are living through a period in which politicians have abrogated to themselves the 
right to be 'educational experts', or at least the right to express 'common sense' views 
about education which they argue are preferable to those which come from professional 
teachers. This has apparently legitimised their right to make authoritative statements on 
almost any aspect of educational practice from the teaching of reading, and writing, the 
choice of a literary canon and the place of course-work in public examinations. And in 
turn this has led to the use of central government powers to convert those views into 
policy and programmes which preclude disagreement, dissent and even serious 
criticism. Yet, as Gutmann says, 
The most distinctive feature of a democratic theory of education is that it 
makes a democratic virtue out of our inevitable disagreement over 
educational problems. 
	 (op cit, p 11) 
It is my view that categorical funding, as an extraordinarily effective mechanism for 
the implementation of policy, seriously curtails and even silences legitimate 1 
disagreement. It is therefore inimical to any generous and optimistic understanding of 
what education tE a democratic society might look like. 
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GLOSSARY 
ABRC 	 : Advisory Board for the Research Councils 
ACSET 	 : Advisory Committee on the Supply and Education of Teachers 
ACSTI 	 : Advisory Committee on the Supply and Training of Teachers 
AEB 	 : Associated Examination Board 
AEC 	 : Association of Education Committees 
APU 	 : Assessment of Performance Unit 
CAC 	 : Central Advisory Council 
CASE 	 : Campaign for the Advancement of State Education 
CATE 	 : Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education 
CCCS 	 : Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies 
CDT 	 : Craft Design Technology 
CEE 	 : Certificate of Extended Education 
(C)E0 	 : (Chief) Education Officer 
CHES 	 : Centre for Higher Hducation Studies 
CP 	 : Community Programme 
CPVE 	 : Certificate of Pre-vocational Education 
CSE 	 : Certificate of Secondary Education 
CVCP 	 : Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals 
DES 	 : Department of Education and Science 
DoE 	 : Department of the Environmment 
ED 	 : Employment Department 
EEC 	 : European Economic Community 
EHE 	 : Enterprise in Higher Education 
ERA 	 : Education Reform Act 
ESEA 	 : Elementary and Secondary Education Act (USA) 
ESG 	 : Education Support Grant(s) 
ESRC 	 : Economic and Social Research Council 
ETP 	 : Engineering and Technology Programme 
ETS 	 : Employment Training Scheme 
FE 	 : Further Education 
FEU 	 : Further Education Unit 
GCE 	 : General Certificate of Education 
GCSE 	 : General Certificate of Secondary Education 
GEST 	 : Grants for Education Support and Training 
GRE 	 : Grant Related Expenditure 
GRIDS 
	 : Guidelines for Review and Internal Development in Schools 
GRIST 	 : Grant Related In-Service Training 
HE 	 : Higher Education 
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HEI 	 : Higher Education institutions 
HMI 	 : Her Majesty's Inspector(ate) 
INSET 	 : In-Service Education and Training 
IRC 	 : Interdisciplinary Research Centres 
IT 	 : Information Technology 
LEA 	 : Local Education Authority 
LEATGS 	 : Local Education Authority Training Grant Scheme 
LPA 	 : Local Priority Area 
MSC 	 : Manpower Services Commission 
NAB 	 : National Advisory Body (for Public Sector Higher Education) 
NAFE 	 : Non-advanced Further Education 
NAGM 	 : National Association of Governors and Managers 
NCC 	 : National Curriculum Council 
NCVQ 	 : National Council for Vocational Qualifications 
NFER 	 : National Foundation for Educational Research 
NPA 	 : National Priority Area 
NSG 	 : National Steering Group (of TVEI) 
OECD 	 : Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PAR 	 : Programme Analysis Review 
PESC 	 : Public Expenditure Survey Committee 
PGCE 	 : Postgraduate Certificate in Education 
PICKUP 	 : Professional, Industrial and Commercial Updating Programme 
PPB(S) 	 : Planning Programme Budgeting (System) 
ROSLA 	 : Raising of the School Leaving Age 
RSG 	 : Rate Support Grant 
'MIST 	 : TVEI-Related In-Service Training 
SCDC 
	 : School Curriculum Development Committee 
SEAC 	 : School Examination and Assessment Council 
SEC 	 : Secondary Examination Council 
SERC 	 : Science and Engineering Research Council 
SSPRU 	 : Social Science Policy Research Unit 
SSEC 	 : Secondary School Examination Council 
TA 	 : Training Agency 
TES 	 : Times Educational Supplement 
TVEI 	 : Technical and Vocational Education Initiative 
UGC 	 : University Grants Committee 
WEEP 	 : Work Experience on Employers' Premises 
WEP 	 : Work Preparation 
YOP 	 : Youth Opportunity Programme 
YTS 	 : Youth Training Scheme 
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